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**Letter to Yazov Urges Local Assignment of
Estonian Servicemen**
*18010660 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in
Russian 13 Apr 89 p 1*

[Article by M. Kornysheva: "Final Session"]

[Excerpt] The Congress of Estonian Women made a preliminary review of candidates nominated by local women's councils for election to the new membership of the Republic Council of Women. The congress also adopted a resolution that it prepare a letter signed by the delegates to be sent to USSR Minister of Defense D. T. Yazov, to read as follows:

"To USSR Minister of Defense D. T. Yazov

"We, the participants in the Congress of Women of Soviet Estonia, appeal to you in the hope of being heard, with the firm conviction that the questions we raise require open discussion and immediate decisions.

"Protection of the Fatherland has been a matter for men from time immemorial. Mothers, wives, and sisters of the protectors of the Motherland have always been for them a reliable support, comforting them in times of difficulty with sympathy and compassion, helping with kind and endearing words to lift and strengthen their fighting spirit.

"We know that the Soviet Armed Forces are experiencing perestroika, which is intended to bring about a new military doctrine. We warmly welcome the forthcoming reductions in the Armed Forces, for this is a wise step. However, we are disturbed by the fact that the honor and health of our husbands, sons, and brothers are in danger; many aspects of Army and Navy life and conditions of service and daily routine remain beyond the focus of society; in units and aboard ships new conscripts continue to be hazed and relations between servicemen remain at variance with regulations. We are saddened that violence, disorder, and negligence tend to undermine military orderliness and discipline. Society has an obligation to know the how and why of the officer corps and how it is serving the people in maintaining a state of high combat readiness and in the matter of nurturing high humanitarian qualities in our children.

"The time has come to undertake a serious examination of the present system of compulsory military service. Every year tens of thousands of young men of the Baltic republics and northern areas of the country are sent by your order to carry out duty in the southern latitudes, while other youths from the South join the ranks of the country's protectors at the northern borders. The disadvantages of this approach are obvious: it tears the youths away from traditions, customs, and culture of their people, from their natural roots; the abrupt change in climatic conditions has a considerable effect on their health. This stands in contradiction to society's present inclination toward humanization. We request that you

consider the possibility of assigning military conscripts from Estonia—those so inclined—to troops of the Baltic Military District, to units that liberated Estonia in 1944.

"It is necessary to eliminate military construction units as a source of evil and non-regulation practices, replacing them with state labor service.

"First-year VUZ students called up for duty should have their term of compulsory service limited to one year or 1.5 years, to achieve social justice.

"We say that the Army is a school of life. That is correct. However, we wish that a man who has completed this school can return home without feelings of disappointment and demoralization, that instead he be full of enthusiasm and vital energy.

Participants in the Congress of Estonian Women
15 April 1989

Candidate Profile: Maj Gen I.G. Kostash
*18010590 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in
Russian 27 Apr 89 p 3*

[Interview with Major General of Aviation I.G. Kostash, chairman, DOSAAF CC of the Moldavian SSR, on the occasion of the 14 May 1989 election for peoples' deputy: "For Peaceful Labor and Defense"; date and place not given; first three paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA introduction]

[Text] In the 26 March election held in Brichany National Territorial Electoral District No 264, neither candidate took more than 50 percent of the votes. Ahead is the repeat election, which will be held on 14 May.

One of the candidates for peoples' deputy from Brichany National Territorial Electoral District No 264 is Major General of Aviation I.G. Kostash. He was nominated by the teachers of the Larga Secondary School of Brichanskiy Rayon, the Lipkany DOSAAF Automotive School, the Brichany DOSAAF Children's and Young People's Technical Sports School, and a number of other labor collectives.

Major General I.G. Kostash is chairman of the Moldavian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee. G. Kozhemyakin, our correspondent, interviewed the peoples' deputy candidate.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA] Ivan Grigoryevich, you are known to quite a few readers by virtue of many articles appearing in our newspaper. They naturally would be interested in the high lights of your life.

[Kostash] My background is quite ordinary. I was born in 1944 in the village of Glavan, Drokiyevskiy Rayon, into a peasant family. I have three sisters. My parents gave us a strict upbringing, did not spoil us in any way, and put us on close terms with the difficult peasant labor, order and discipline.

Upon completing the Drokiyevskiy Secondary School in 1963, I was accepted into the Kharkov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots. After graduation I was assigned to duty in an Air Forces unit of the Central Asian Military District. Military life involves much travel. Mine was no exception. I took my family with me on assignment all over the country, serving at dozens of duty stations. My assignments took me to the Odessa, Transbaykal, and the Far East military districts, and to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. During my service I logged about 3,000 hours of flying, became a pilot 1st class, and rose from ordinary pilot to deputy commander of Army aviation. I continued to fly throughout all those years, even while studying at the Military Air Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin. That is the rule in aviation: even marshals fly. This is proper. Otherwise, what kind of commander can you be if you do not teach your subordinates by way of both word and personal example.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA] A fighter pilot's duties are dangerous, much more so than anything else. Did you ever encounter an extreme situation while flying?

[Kostash] Yes, there was that, also. After all, I had to learn to fly about a dozen fighter craft. I flew various Yaks and MIGs. I even had to learn to fly a helicopter while on duty in the Odessa Military District. Each fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter does have its differences, its own peculiarities.

When I was flying a Yak-28 while on duty with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the piloting system failed without warning. I lost control of the craft. I received an order from the ground commanding me to eject. After assessing the situation, I concluded that the aircraft would strike an installation of a GDR National People's Army unit. I could not permit this to happen, of course. I managed to fly over the installation, and, seeing a wooded area below, ordered the navigator to eject. I myself ejected only at 100 meters. Fortunately, everything came out all right.

Another difficult situation occurred while I was on a night flight over the Transbaykal. Surrounded by fog so thick that a searchlight beam was not visible at an altitude of 100 meters, all my instruments suddenly ceased functioning. The flight operations officer ordered me to eject. But how could I abandon the latest fighter of the time? I decided to attempt a landing. The operations officer repeated the order. After making several unsuccessful attempts to land, I managed to bring the fighter down on an alternate runway. I saved the combat craft, but I heard plenty from my superiors due to my failure to obey orders.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA] An aviator told me that you had plans to become a cosmonaut.

[Kostash] That is true. While I was on duty in the Odessa Military District, a commission from Moscow selected 20 pilots as candidates for the Cosmonaut Corps. After a thorough screening, six candidates remained, and this included me.

For about two months we underwent strict examinations by a medical board and testing in a pressure chamber and centrifuge. I survived it all. However, the doctors managed to find a slight medical flaw. This meant that I had to give up my dream of becoming a cosmonaut and continuing my service in the Air Forces. In 1986 I was offered the position of heading the republic defense society.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA] On 14 May hundreds of thousands of voters are to once more look at the ballots and decide the difficult question of whom to entrust with protecting their interests in the country's highest organ of authority. The list of candidates for peoples' deputy from the Brichany National Territorial District contains nine names of seekers of the deputy's mandate. Each has his own preelection platform and his own concept of solving the problems facing society. What are you offering the people?

[Kostash] Most of my constituents—residents of two northern rayons of the republic—the Brichanskiy and the Oknitskiy—are rural toilers. The country's future and perestroika both depend to a great extent on how successful agriculture will be. I am convinced that we will be able to feed our country and finally do away with expensive purchases of grain and other foreign agricultural products only by effecting revolutionary perestroika in the entire agro-industrial complex. I believe that we must in all ways support agricultural leasing arrangements and make lease land available to good managers not for three or four years, but for 50 years and longer. I endorse the idea of increasing the size of private plots for rural people. We all know that they are already supplying the country with a third of agricultural products. It is not difficult to calculate the results of, say, doubling the plot sizes. And the price? One way to accomplish this is to do away with unprofitable kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Let the strong farms grow, and hand over the weak lands to peasants. This raises the question of increasing the output of small agricultural machinery: tractors, loaders, trailer equipment. This kind of inexpensive and convenient machinery will be usable both by the lessee and on private plots. We must strive to effect a review of prices charged for the tractors and other agricultural implements in production. I consider that their prices are unjustifiably high.

And, of course, we must not fail to devote undivided attention to the construction of social, cultural, and material aspects of rural living. I wish to lay particular stress on improving pension entitlements for veterans. It is no secret that the purchasing power of the ruble is decreasing along with increases in prices. This raises a question: How are people whose pension is less than 60

rubles to make ends meet? Much is being said about the new price policy, or, to put it more accurately, price increases. I believe that this should not come about, considering the considerable social pressure involved. Fixed incomes—pensions, stipends, assistance—must be increased automatically every time the standard of living shows a drop. And another thing. We must increase the amount of leave granted women who have small children. I am sure that this would result in a lower crime rate among children and adolescents, and it would strengthen the basic unit of the country—the family.

An object of my particular attention in my preelection platform will be improvement of pre-draft training for youth and strengthening the Motherland's defensive capability. These questions are extremely important for every Soviet person, regardless of where he lives—in the city or country. The present international situation is not conducive to placidity. For this reason, we must keep our powder dry. The training which youth undergoes in preparation for Army service often leaves much to be desired. This is convincingly attested to by the combat experience of Afghanistan, where we often suffered losses due to poor physical and combat fitness of our soldiers. We are inviting Afghan fighting men to join us in the defense society.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA] A most pressing problem troubling people is that of inter-ethnic relations. Is this reflected in your preelection platform?

[Kostash] It is a fact that inter-ethnic relations are a source of disturbance to many people. I recognized that for a certainty during my talks with labor collectives and with people.

I feel that the present highly complex and responsible period in our history requires us to exert greater efforts to preserve and strengthen the international unity of all peoples and nationalities of our great Motherland. I am firmly convinced that only in this way can we effect perestroika, development and prosperity in the brotherly republics, and resolution of vitally important problems, such as the economy, science, culture, and effective protection of the environment. I stand for harmonious development of each ethnic group residing in our republic and for respect for every language.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA] Ivan Grigoryevich, you are a military professional—one who has made the Armed Forces his career. Your constituents are mostly rural people. If you are victorious at the polls, will you be able to worthily defend their interests?

[Kostash] I am the son of peasants. I grew up in a rural area, which is still the home of my parents. It is natural that the needs and cares of rural people are understandable to me and lie close to my heart. In addition, I already possess some experience as a deputy. One year ago the toilers of Floreshtskiy Rayon endowed me with a great trust when they elected me to the Supreme Soviet

of the Moldavian SSR as a representative of the Markuleshty Electoral District. I consider as my sacred duty the accomplishment of their mandate and resolution of problems which they present to me. The door of my office is always open to citizens who wish to speak with me as their deputy. Also, I make regular visits in the rayon, meet with labor collectives, hold discussions with my constituents, and help to resolve problems that are on their minds.

As the elected representative of the people, my goal is to do all I can to strengthen the peace and render people's lives happier and more joyful.

Construction Unit Chooses Own Commander
18010701 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 10, May 89 pp 13-14

[Letter to editors from Sr Lt A. Yaichenko, Military Construction Units: "The Choice Was a Good One"]

[Text] I have frequently read in the military press suggestions from officers and even first-term servicemen that junior commanders be elected by collective deliberation. I did not attach any great significance to these "democratic" utterances, because during my years as a cadet I had firmly accepted the inviolability of the rules that "the actions of commanders are not to be questioned" and "the commander is appointed and not elected."

But any opinion or any kind of voting is in one way or another a criticism of the previous chief's actions and automatically serves as a pointer for the future. I am writing because I too found myself in an unforeseen, unconventional situation. It began when military construction worker S. Golovach came to me and said:

"Comrade Senior Lieutenant, we have decided to meet this evening to discuss an important problem. You must be there."

"Of course. I have no objections," I answered.

"You should know, however, that it is an activity in the spirit of glasnost and democracy," he warned me meaningfully.

I was intrigued. It is not often that the Komsomol members favor us with initiative today. They apparently had something serious in mind.

The incident, unprecedented, one might say, took place far from our military unit. I was on TDY with the personnel of Pvt U. Suleymanov's section to perform certain work at a military air installation. Because there was no contact with headquarters, I naturally made all of the decisions on my own. After 12:00 Golovach came to me again.

"Comrade Senior Lieutenant, we ask you to come...."

"Will you at least tell me what this is about?" I asked him, to make certain I would not make a fool of myself.

"It is about our commander, Suleymanov."

I immediately understood everything. Pvt Suleymanov was from the same conscription as his subordinates. His appointment to the position was supposed to be temporary, until he could prove himself. A month passed, however, and then a second.... Suleymanov was an efficient and conscientious soldier, but he was not endowed with the ability to command. The first signs of arrogance and conceit appeared. To these deficiencies were added a poor knowledge of the Russian language and lack of competence in construction work. The longer the TDY lasted, the more I became convinced that Suleymanov would not uplift the brigade. He would have to be replaced. I had my eye on Pvt K. Ibragimov and was generally preparing him to be a junior commander.

Everything indicated that he, Ibragimov, should head the section. In the first place, he knew Russian well; in the second, he demonstrated outstanding abilities as an organizer on the job and skillfully supervised the brigade in my absence.

I do not like to draw hasty conclusions, however, and I therefore did not hurry with the commander's replacement. It would not hurt to consult someone or choose a more appropriate time.

The meeting was held in a relaxed atmosphere. It is difficult to describe in a letter the climate which reigned at the meeting. I shall therefore cite excerpts from what certain soldiers had to say.

Pvt B. Narseyan: "Lately Suleymanov has begun treating us with contempt. A wall of alienation has sprung up between him and our small collective. It cannot continue this way. While we dug a ditch, he walked among us, whistling. When my shovel handle broke, he snapped his fingers scornfully and made me 'trot' to the storage room for another...."

Pvt V. Klim: "I believe that the brigade leader should be a good worker, and this cannot be said of our Suleymanov. He is not only incapable of explaining things to the foreman; he does not even try to communicate with him. Our common interests are no longer his interests. He does not care about the performance indicators. The main thing for him is that we 'toil.' Everyone knows that the foreman himself bypasses Suleymanov and assigns most things to Ibragimov. They have a common language. So why complicate our relations? Would it not be better to entrust the brigade to Ibragimov?"

I did not intervene during the meeting. This encouraged the speakers. Sensing my tacit approval, they let out everything which was bothering them. They unanimously expressed their objections to Suleymanov and insistently demanded that he be replaced with someone more fitting.

When the last speaker had finished, Komsomol member F. Namazov said that Ibragimov was the only person who could do the job properly, and I was glad. There was reason to be glad. The collective's opinion coincided with mine, after all.

Sometime later Ibragimov was officially appointed as section commander. And he turned out to be just the kind of person we had imagined he would be. We are becoming more and more convinced that the choice was a good one.

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Medical Commission Reports on 9 April Gas Victims, Wounded

18300680 Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
27 May 89 pp 4-5

[Article by Professor B.R. Naneyshvili, academician of the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences, subcommission deputy chairman: "Findings of the Georgian GSSR Supreme Soviet Medical Subcommission on the Investigation of Events Which Took Place on the 9th of April in Tbilisi"]

[Excerpts] The Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission for the Investigation of Events Which Took Place on 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi reviewed and approved the findings (Protocol No 5, 15 May 89).

A public expert commission made up of prominent experts, doctors of various cross-sections [of society], and members of society was established by order of the Georgian SSR Minister of Public Health (10 April 89). The commission studied all medical issues related to the tragic events of 9 April: pathological and anatomical examinations; examination of individuals who received traumatic or toxic injuries, and/or gunshot wounds; organization of their in-patient or out-patient treatment; participation in conferences of doctor specialists and in determination of treatment methods; and, toxicological examinations, etc.

[Passage omitted]

On 21 April, members of the Public Medical Commission presented its written request on the need to be provided with information regarding use of chemical agents to the USSR General Procurator, the USSR Minister of Defense, and the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs. An answer was not forthcoming. And, once again on 28 April, while cleaning up the area in front of the House of Government, many residents complained

about poisoning and dozens were hospitalized. These patients were treated by a group of specialists who arrived at the conclusion that acute poisoning of people by an irritant or neurotropic effect gas or gases had occurred. The clinical picture of the patients who arrived once again did not fit within the framework of the effects of chloroacetophenone. All of this aggravated the whole situation and promoted the development of neurotic conditions (psychogenic) evidenced by a sharp increase in the number of treatments due to poisons.

Through the persistent activities of the republic's leadership, the USSR Ministry of Health, with the cooperation of the All-Union Red Cross and Red Crescent, succeeded in obtaining information on the 9 April use of special agents with the code name "cheremukha" [bird cherry tree] which consists of chloroacetophenone [phenacyl chloride], khladon, isopropyl alcohol, vegetable oil, and in some—gunpowder. Khladon is a neutral gas and an atomizer, chloroacetophenone is a poisonous agent with an irritating action (tear gas). Isopropyl alcohol is a solvent and is toxic. Vegetable oil promotes fixing.

The use of a second chemical agent (CS, dinitrolor-tochlorbenzolmalonic acid) was officially reported for the first time. CS is ten times stronger than chloroacetophenone in its irritant action and also has a neurotropic effect when used in high concentrations. Under certain conditions, CS is stable in the environment (more than four weeks). CS is used both as a police gas and as a combat agent used by the U.S. in Vietnam. According to the literature, individual deaths have been noted under certain conditions and when the gas is in high concentrations.

Taking into account the nature of the clinical manifestations the patients exhibited and possible mixtures and various concentrations of the agents mentioned above under different levels of exposure, we can conclude that the picture we have of the injuries fits into the impact range of chloroacetophenone and CS. Additional investigations are also being conducted.

We must emphasize that chloroacetophenone and CS are well studied agents both here and abroad which provides us with the possibility to adjust treatment as necessary after we receive information about the use of CS.

There are 584 victims undergoing in-patient treatment at institutions in Tbilisi (Republic Central Clinical Hospital, Second Hospital and Polyclinic, Fourth Main Administration, Hospital of the Tbilisi Doctor Training Institute, 1st, 7th, and 8th city hospitals, Railroad Hospital, NII [Scientific Research Institute] surgeons, NII neurologists, and NII therapists). During the tragic events of 9 April and in subsequent days, 3,515 victims asked for and received out-patient care (students at the First Middle School, students and workers at the Theatrical Institute, and participants in the clean up at the House of Government, etc.).

Medical documentation is being maintained at the medical institutions listed above. On the basis of the study of post-mortem tissues and histological preparations, out-patient records, and the histories of diseases, the sub-commission can note the following preliminary findings.

Altogether 4,099 people sought medical assistance and 583 of them were in-patients. Of the 198 victims in hospitals suffering from trauma of varying degrees, there were: 28 wounded (including five gunshot wounds), 12 with fractures, 94 with closed injury of the skull, and 64 with contusions. Of the 198 who suffered traumatic injuries, there were combined injuries in 10 cases (trauma along with gas poisoning).

Out-patient treatment was given to 92 people with traumatic injuries, of which there were 22 wounds, 10 fractures, 10 closed injury of the skull and 50 contusions.

Among those hospitalized, more than 300 were people who suffered poisoning as a result of the use of toxic chemical agents. More than 3,000 people went to city treatment institutions with complaints of poisoning.

Traumatic injuries were frequently combined with toxic chemical agent injuries.

There were over 60 cases of neuro-surgical lesions: cerebral concussions with contusions and wounds of the soft tissues of the head and numerous abrasions and bruises on the body and extremities. In one case, fractured forearm bones were noted which were caused by a blow from a blunt instrument. Skull fractures were noted in two cases which required surgical intervention. In one of them, an open cerebral injury was noted in the form of a slash wound of the soft tissues and fracture of the skull with damage of the hard brain meninges and brain matter which terminated in death; in the other case, a depressed fracture of the skull. In still one other case, there was a gunshot wound which passed through the brain which resulted in death (the wound to the head was received 30-40 minutes after announcement of curfew).

The victims also have slash wounds in the spinal area and on the extremities, contusions of the torso, abrasions and incised face wounds, etc.

A victim was taken to the republic eye hospital with blunt eye injury, with an injury to the sclera and the eye it contained had fallen out; the other victim had retrobulbar hematoma of the right eye, hemophthalmus, and many abrasions on the torso.

A patient (a 29 year old male), who has been in the resuscitation department of the Republic Central Clinical Hospital until the present time, received a perforating gunshot to the head on 9 April 1989. Diagnosis: severe cerebral injury with damage to both eyes (a lacerated wound of the right eye with hemorrhaging of

the contents and loss of the left eyeball), with cerebral contusions, cerebral fluid hemorrhage, and with numerous fractures of the base and crown of the skull and face.

Neurological examination of poisonous gas victims reveals organic damage of the nervous system represented by the following most typical neurological syndromes: central, tubal-vestibular, amnestic and abulia, subcortical with tonic disorder and hyperkinesis, spasmodic, spinal-segmented and spinal chord, diencephalic hypogalamic, vegetative ganglion, polyradical-neurotic, and disautonomous-polyneuropathetic. A combination of brain injury and chemical irritating agent intoxication has been assumed in 4.8 percent of the cases with etiopathogenetic factors and in 95.2 percent of the cases neurological pathology can only be associated with toxic and psycho-stress factors. Asteno-neurotic syndrome could have been established in practically all of the victims.

[Passage omitted]

Of 19 people who died as a result of injuries and gas poisoning received on 9 April, the judicial medical post-mortem confirmed 17 (post-mortems were not performed on two bodies at the insistent demands of relatives).

The results of the micromorphological investigation of tissue from the 17 deceased shows that 12 had a completely uniform type of change: in the absence of the weight of serious or medium bodily injuries, a total necrosis of the mucous membrane of the trachea and also of the primary, segmental, subsegmental bronchi with blockage of necrotized masses and saturation of the denuded muscular membrane with blood; the necrosis is also diffused in the epithelia which line the bronchioles with blockage of necrotized tissues and denude the muscular membrane. In all cases, the above mentioned processes are accompanied by infiltration of the walls of the breathing paths by cells responsible for the production of histamines (Basofil leukocytes [white blood cells], lavrocytes) lymphocytes, and eosinophil leukocytes. The micro-morphological changes noted qualify as very acute alternative (necrotic) trachia-bronchia-bronchiolite which arise as a result of inhaling poisonous chemical agents (T. Chovelidze, T.I. Mamulashvili, T.G. Dolidze,

M.L. Loladze, Yu.A. Samarguliani, M.T. Samarguliani-Chkoniya, M.M. Dzhincharadze, Ye.G. Chinashvili, Ye.T. Bezhaniashvili, H.Sh. Dzhangirashvili, A.R. Adamiya, and N.T. Bashaleyshvili).

In one case (T.S. Yenkidze), death occurred due to traumatic shock: Multiple rib fractures with rupture of lung tissue.

M.A. Melkadze died due to traumatic injury complications. Sh.I. Kvasroliashvili died as a result of a slash wound to the skull with serious injury to brain tissues.

In two cases, in the presence of symptoms of a light degree of poisoning, death occurred from acute heart incompetence: Chronic ischemic heart disease—diffused finely resistant subcompensated cardiosclerosis with borax induration of the lungs (Z.A. Kikvidze, a 61-year-old female); diffused mild centered subcompensated rheumatic cardiosclerosis with borax induration of the lungs (M.M. Nozadze, 22-year-old male).

On the basis of the study of clinical cases and pathological and anatomical tissue, the subcommission is arriving at the conclusion that while dispersing a peaceful demonstration which occurred on 9 April 1989, force was used which was unprecedented in the scale of its brutality. It led to the deaths of 19 innocent people among whom were 16 women from 16 to 70 years of age (one was pregnant). Over 4,099 people requested medical assistance or were hospitalized in medical institutions (of which 583 are in-patients) for chemical agent poisoning.

After the barbaric dispersal of the demonstrators, 16 bodies were picked up in the square. Consequently, three people died (N. Bashaleyshvili, M. Melkadze, and Sh. Kvasroliashvili) as a result of the heavy poisoning and complications of mechanical injury, slash wounds to the skull, and brain damage.

On the night of 10 April, 30 to 40 minutes after announcement of the curfew, G. Karseladze was killed by a gunshot to the head.

We should particularly note that in 12 cases death occurred from suffocation which developed as a result of inhaling poisonous chemical agents which was proven by microscopic study of autopsy tissue.

Lack of Creativity in Aviation Training
18010670 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 May 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Gen Avn V. Kozlov, air force commander, Northern Group of Forces: "An Air-to-Ground Range Is Not a Shooting Gallery"]

[Text] The explosions on the air-to-ground range died down, and turbines above the airfield fell silent. The tactical air exercise had come to an end. The actions both of the regiment and of every pilot and navigator had to be evaluated in the course of its critique.

Information coming from the range was encouraging this time: The strikes made by the crews, by the flights and by the squadrons against ground targets were precise, and they deserved a high score. In a word, the conclusion seemed to beg for itself. The regiment's personnel needed to be thanked for their improved skills. But I must admit that my hand was reluctant to write down a high overall score. This is called a tactical air exercise, you see, precisely because not only the flying and gunnery skills of the crews but also their tactical proficiency is tested during it.

And what could be said about the exercise's tactical side? Judging from the map and the commander's plan, which reflected the way that the "enemy" air defenses were to be surmounted, and the way attacks by his fighters were to be evaded, all of this had seemingly been accounted for in the course of the exercise. But what was true in fact? I asked Lieutenant Colonel V. Orlov, the range officer, how the crews performed in the air.

"Normally," he replied, "safety rules were not violated."

But at this moment I was interested not only and not so much in safety rules. How well had the pilots performed their combat maneuvering? Had there been a real opponent, would he have been able to knock down the airplanes? The range officer was unable to answer this with anything specific or intelligible. It was as if he was in a shooting gallery, basically monitoring bomb and rocket launching accuracy and compliance with safety rules.

The same could also be said for the actions of the crews en route to the object of attack, and during their return to their airfield. Of course, the tactics of surmounting "enemy" air defenses and evading attack by his fighters had been foreseen. But analysis of the flight recorders showed that many of the crews acted stereotypically along the route, only going through the motions of antifighter and antimissile maneuvers. Moreover, no one monitored any of these actions.

Perhaps it might not have been worth dwelling in such great detail on this episode, had this case been an isolated one. But here is what the problem is. No matter how realistic we try to make the combat situation, no

matter how complex a tactical background we create, the pilot still knows that the enemy is simulated. And this psychological disposition is sometimes transferred to commanders. They also feel that the main thing in tactical air exercises is to ensure flight safety and receive a high score for combat use, if it is foreseen by the exercise. Then a grade of "excellent" or "good" would be assured. And no one has ever suffered from simplification, no one has ever been punished for it. There might be an occasional scolding for a "weak tactical background," but so what? The exercise leader, upon whom the regiment's or subunit's grade depends, basically follows this principle: If crewmembers have learned to accurately hit their targets from a simple maneuver, the rest will come with time. Unwittingly, tactics are dropped to secondary importance.

Nothing more can be said: Fire skills are an important component of airman proficiency. The pilot's ability to make a timely and precise strike on a ground or aerial target is valued highly in aviation. But there is good reason why people say that tactics are a second weapon. He who is able to not only fly and to handle sighting and navigation equipment but also to employ victorious tactics, the sole possible tactics in a situation in which the enemy is offering strong resistance, achieves success in combat.

We must base ourselves on the realities of combat. And today they are such that supersonic speeds, great spatial scope, powerful bombing and missile armament and improved sighting and navigation equipment (including in the enemy's hands) have dramatically increased the role of the time factor. In order that assigned missions could be carried out successfully, what the aviator must do is to evaluate what is happening on the ground and in the air, predict events and make nonstandard decisions with tactical competency.

Are we preparing pilots, navigators and commanders for this? You attend an exercise here and there, and you note bitterly that the tactics are sometimes artless. Sorties are flown along the same familiar routes over and over again. Standard methods of surmounting "enemy" air defense zones grate upon the nerves. Stereotypic tactics of aerial combat make the exercise uninteresting and not very beneficial. It's the same old thing at tactical and gunnery air-to-ground ranges: The terrain has long been familiar, the targets are known, and they are struck over and over again from the same bearings.

And when you begin to attack the problem of simplification at the range, "objective" causes are found to explain things away, and the justifications sound persuasive. There is no way to avoid unrealistic simulation, they say. In fact, the location of air-to-ground ranges, for example, limits the pilot in his choice of direction of target approach due to presence of nearby population centers. Moreover there is not all that much freedom of

movement along the flight routes and in the piloting zones. Presence of both civilian aviation and airplanes from other air units must be accounted for.

Nonetheless I feel that talk of the absence of room for tactical creativity is groundless. Let me cite the following example in this connection. A tactical air exercise was under way. The regiment under the command of Colonel V. Bespalov (he has since been promoted) was assigned the mission of destroying and mining an "enemy" landing strip. The commander took account of many factors: the methods of surmounting "enemy" air defenses, the lines at which fighters of the opposing side might be encountered, and the procedures to be followed in the vicinity of the objective. But when he modeled the actions with regard for all of the components of the forthcoming encounter, he found that the regiment would suffer high losses. What was to be done? How could they be minimized?

It was then that squadron commander Lieutenant Colonel K. Savitskiy suggested using diversionary groups during the raid on the "enemy" airfield. They calculated and modeled the variants of the forthcoming actions. And confidence in success increased significantly with regard for the newly introduced tactics. The subsequent actions of the aviators in the course of the tactical air exercise showed that the calculations were correct. Of course, introduction of new, additional elements into the combat formation in the air necessitated considerable effort and resources, and additional calculations. But the labor was compensated a hundredfold.

Note that the air regiment did not have to face a real opponent. Consequently, in principle it may have gotten away without complicating the situation: Even with the added complexity, they still would have reached the objective normally and done their work with the same proficiency. But the commander based himself chiefly on the requirements of real combat, he was concerned for the tactical skills of the subordinates, and he taught them what they needed in war.

An excellent grade for fire accuracy should not be an end unto itself. Consequently the issue should be stated in this way: The pilot should approach an unfamiliar range with practice targets in unknown locations, and the targets should be well protected by air defense resources. Each flight for combat use (not only in the course of tactical air exercises) should proceed with a particular tactical plan. The range officer should be mandatorily informed of the essence of the plan, since at the range he is the director of the combat work of the crews. Knowing beforehand what maneuver the attackers are to employ, the range officer would be able to evaluate the actions of the pilot during the attack and on breaking off from it with greater accuracy, with regard for tactics.

There is one other "ailment"—the inability or the reluctance of some pilots, and of commanders as well, to think independently, creatively. In the many years of

leadership by the methods of administrative pressure, we have accustomed subordinates to the notion that in all matters, including in organization of combat, a higher chief would think for them and make their decisions. Now we have provided commanders of all ranks with greater independence. And what is the result? Some of them simply fall into confusion, they are reluctant to assume responsibility, and they await direction from above. And if they do make tactical decisions, they are frequently wrong. Here is an example of this.

Once a fighter air regiment was assigned the mission of supporting the combat activities of bombers. For this mission the commander was provided extensive possibilities for making independent decisions. In the beginning the regiment's actions were successful: The "enemy" fighters were fought reasonably well. But then during the approach to the airfield one more group of aerial targets was suddenly detected. The commander launched the alert flight. As it was revealed subsequently, this was the wrong decision: Fighters that could have handled that mission quite well were already in the air. And because he dispersed his men and equipment, the commander found himself with almost nothing at his disposal on the ground. And when the main "enemy" airplane group was discovered in the air, the commander simply did not have enough fighters by which to guarantee successful interception. Many of the warplanes that were in the air were low on fuel, and it was time for them to return to the airfield.

The ability to think creatively and the capacity for making competent tactical decisions in combat independently are qualities necessary of both the air commander and any pilot and navigator. Are we doing everything we can to nurture these qualities? Frequently in tactical air exercises the commander determines the mission of each squadron, of each flight, of each pilot, down to all of the tiniest details of the flight. All that remains for them is to carry out what the mission requires mechanically, sometimes mindlessly. But consider that even the youngest pilot is also a future commander. Thus it happens that quite early in his career as an officer we accustom him to just mindless performance of flying assignments.

All of this has to do with the tactical training of the crews. But how well are our ranges equipped? Even the practice targets of these "shooting galleries" are not camouflaged as they should be, and maneuver within them is limited. In a word, if we wish to raise the quality of combat training, we must increase the quality of its support as well. There are a mass of problems here. For example, tactical training of a modern pilot would be unimaginable without the latest methods of calculation, without modeling and programming. And what calculation resources do we possess? At the regiment level, the basic "implement of labor" is still the NL-10 navigation slide rule, which has been in use since 20 and even 30 years ago. The greatest technical accomplishment in the regiment is a home computer, acquired by both honest and devious means. But its memory is small, and it does

not satisfy the regiment's present requirements. Moreover the graduates of military schools and academies are unfortunately weak when it comes to working with computers; many times they are unable to perform mathematical analysis of the nature of forthcoming combat activities by means of even this computer.

These problems must be solved without delay if we wish to see any art in the tactics of fighting a strong, well-equipped adversary.

GSFG Renamed 'Western Group of Forces'
18010828 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Jul 89 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed article entitled: "In the USSR Ministry of Defense".]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Defense reports that a decision has been taken on the renaming of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany to the Western Group of Forces. The status of these troops, as it is defined in the Treaty on the Relationship between the USSR and the GDR of 20 September 1955 and other bilateral agreements, as well as

the rights and duties flowing from related agreements and decisions of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France of the wartime and post-war times remain unaffected.

Romanian Deputy Defense Minister Visit

18010834a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Jul 89 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article entitled: "Friendly Visit".]

[Text] On the 4th of July Candidate Member of the Politburo of the CPSU CC General of the Army D.T. Yazov received Member of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Deputy Minister of National Defense of the SRR [Socialist Republic of Romania], Secretary of the Higher Political Council of the Army, Lieutenant-General I. Ceausescu, who is visiting the Soviet Union at the head of a delegation of Romanian political workers. A friendly discussion took place in which the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, General of the Army A.D. Lizichev participated.

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the SRR to the USSR I. Bukur was present at the discussion.

Yazov Rewards Military Journalists

*18010657a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 May 89 First Edition p 1*

[Unattributed article: "Minister of Defense Distributes Awards"]

[Text] In recognition of significant and fruitful work accomplished by military press organs, and on the occasion of Press Day, USSR Minister of Defense Army General D. Yazov, acting by special order, rewarded a large group of servicemen and civilians working for the Soviet Army and Navy. Included were editors, journalists, and staff members of a number of newspapers, magazines, and publishing offices.

Awarded valuable (engraved) gifts w.t.e: Major Generals Yu. Voinov and V. Filatov; Colonels I. Aristov, N. Velikanov, V. Golov, G. Gubanov, P. Zvyagelskiy, V. Ilyk, V. Kalinkin, P. Kotenok, L. Krayniy, R. Makushin, V. Mamontov, V. Martynyuk, Ye. Milkov, V. Senezhko, A. Tren, M. Chachukh, N. Cherevach, V. Chizhevskiy, V. Chikalin, Ye. Chumakov, and B. Yashmanov; Captains 1st Rank V. Kuzar and G. Shestakov; Lieutenant Colonels V. Demko, N. Yefimov, M. Nikonov, and B. Ukolov; Captain 2nd Rank V. Dyubkin; Major L. Romanyuk; Captain 3rd Rank V. Yermolin; Captains A. Kochubey and V. Makarov; Soviet Army civilian Ye. Agapova.

Recipients of certificates included Colonels S. Agababyan, Yu. Babushkin, S.-V. I. Kulpinskas, M. Malygin, A. Orlov, B. Sinyutin, K. Chermashentsev; Colonel of Medical Service V. Belozerov; Captain 1st Rank A. Kravchenko; Lieutenant Colonels B. Anushkevich, V. Bunin, M. Gorbylev, V. Chiligin, V. Larchenkov; Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko; Major V. Poddelkov; Soviet Army civilian Ye. Fedulayev.

Expressions of appreciation from the minister of defense were distributed to Captain 1st Rank I. Kovalenko; Colonels D. Povkhu and Yu. Churkin; Lieutenant Colonels V. Bezborodov, S. Volgin, V. Kozlov, A. Kudryavtsev, S. Neprade, A. Ruchkin, N. Khaustu; Captain 2nd Rank N. Skrypnik; Major Yu. Rubtsov; Soviet Army civilians I. Alekseyev, A. Vasilyeva, Yu. Pakhomov, and N. Stasenko.

Poor Russian Of Military Education Teachers Criticized

18350016e Ashkhabad MUGALLYMLAR GAZETI in Turkmen 3 Feb 89 p 1

[Unsigned article: "In the Turkmen SSR Ministry Of Education"]

[Text] Providing military-patriotic and physical education to the young generation is one of the main tasks standing before education workers at the present time. Thus, in talks on this issue at the college of the TSSR Ministry of Education there was a broad discussion of

positive work done in this sector and on the prevention of existing shortcomings. In an investigation by ministry workers of the organization of this work in schools in Tashauz Oblast and in the group of Ashkhabad rayons subordinate to the republic, basic shortcomings emerged.

The weakness of the study materials base in elementary military education at some schools was strongly criticized at the college. It is not a normal situation when some physical education teachers have been unable to comply with demands that they subscribe to the journals. There is no explanation for the fact that the gymnasiums in some schools in Bakherden Rayon and the playing fields in Gokdepe Rayon are not used appropriately. The fact that people without any specialized training are teaching elementary military education in some schools in Kaka Rayon was condemned at the college. Some elementary military education teachers have been unable to bring about a basic change even after having taken preparatory courses. Many of the shooting ranges attached to schools do not meet demands. Some peoples education departments in Tashauz Oblast have allowed formalism in accounting for the shooting ranges at some schools.

The fact that some elementary military education teachers lack a good knowledge of Russian leads to basic shortcomings in teaching this subject. One should organize Russian classes for such teachers in the schools themselves. Some of those teaching this subject are not acquiring the methodological materials printed especially for them. Some of them do not even know of the existence of such materials. The fact that workers in peoples education departments were aware of the lack of the special charts pertaining to elementary military education at some schools is especially amazing. The fact that no change has been felt in the enrichment of the study materials base for elementary military education over the last 10-15 years at some schools is nothing other than the carelessness of those teaching this subject. A strong directive was given to leaders of peoples education departments on preventing this unsatisfactory situation.

One of the unsatisfactory situations is that not enough importance is given by teachers of elementary military education, physical education and Russian to working together. This situation demands immediate rectification. While the shortages of teacher cadres for this subject has been discussed for many years, the fact that there has been no basic change in this question was strongly criticized at the college. At this meeting of the college useful ideas on a basic improvement in teaching elementary military and physical education were suggested.

Questions of dividing up technical equipment among peoples education administrations and examining the results of socialist competition at places of higher education subordinate to the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Peoples Education were also discussed at the college, and appropriate documents on them were accepted.

Dep Chief of Finance Directorate on New Benefits for Retirees

18010626b Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
15 Apr 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Major I. Ivanyuk in the column: "For Those Facing Discharge—New Benefits for Servicemen Discharged in Armed Forces Reduction Process"; first three paragraphs are *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* introduction]

[Text] The decision relative to the forthcoming reduction in our country's Armed Forces has caused extensive repercussions in Army and Navy military collectives. The editors receive letters from our readers who ask specific questions, in addition to letting us know of their thoughts and suggestions in this matter. This is understandable, since discharge into the reserves or retirement represents for the officer, Army and Navy warrant officer a change in his way of life and brings on a number of everyday problems which experience has shown to be difficult to resolve.

"What financial and other benefits are available to reserve officers?" "Are there plans to introduce any changes in connection with the forthcoming organizational measures?" These questions have been asked by Lieutenant Colonel V. Mikeyev, Major N. Gorbatskiy, Captain Ye. Arkhipov and many others.

We present below information in response to readers' letters as provided by Major General N. Bay, deputy chief of the Central Finance Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense.

[Bay] Speaking of financial benefits for persons who have given the best years of their lives to defending the interests of the Motherland, I would like to say that in the last few years the party and government have made a number of important decisions protecting their rights. For example, I make reference to the more favorable system of reckoning the number of years that count toward retirement, whereby taken into account are time on active duty plus time spent recovering from wounds, concussion, or illness attributed to the front. In this case one month of service is counted as three months. This rule extends to those servicemen that served in Afghanistan and in other countries where there was armed conflict, if our men participated in such actions after 1 December 1979. Those servicemen who suffered a disability are entitled to apply for an age-related pension five years before the usual time. In this connection, the age-related pension granted by social security organs is increased in the amount of 15 rubles a month.

In 1984-1985 we increased the pensions and additional payments for disabled veterans of groups I and II and for officers, Army and Navy warrant officers and men who served an extended tour of duty in the active Army in the Great Patriotic War; we also raised the pension amounts per member of families of servicemen killed in action.

I could enumerate other benefits that bear witness to the fact that a concern for people who carry out their military obligation is basic to our country's social policy. Proof of this is also seen in the recent decisions adopted by the party and government that include a number of guarantees for servicemen discharged into the reserves as a result of the organizational measures carried out by the Ministry of Defense.

In particular, officer personnel subject to the Armed Forces reduction order will be paid for the entire time they are subject to the order, for a period not to exceed one year. Army and Navy warrant officers discharged from active duty who are not qualified for a pension will be paid on the basis of their military rank for a period of one year. Let me remind the readers that this benefit was previously available only to officers. Cadets and students at military educational institutions who do not possess officer status that are discharged from active duty will receive a lump sum as follows: 250 rubles for those who will be commissioned as reserve officers, and 100 rubles for others.

Officers, Army and Navy warrant officers and men who served an extended tour of duty that are discharged on the basis of age, illness, reduction in force, or state of health are entitled to another benefit. Their active duty time will be counted toward length of service at the enterprise, cooperative or social organization required for them to qualify for financial assistance to cover the cost of cooperative housing, to be paid out of the social development fund.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Many readers, including Lieutenant Colonel A. Chernyshev and Majors V. Bondarenko, M. Verbitskiy, and P. Kudrin, wish to know how a pension will be structured in the case of men who have not fulfilled the length of service requirement as of the time of their discharge into the reserves as a result of the reduction in the USSR Armed Forces. Will they benefit from the lessons learned on the basis of the similar measure carried out in the 60s?

[Bay] On 31 March 1989 the USSR Council of Ministers passed a special decree which resulted in an order that was recently signed by the minister of defense, dealing with this question. This states that officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers and men who served an extended tour of duty that are discharged into the reserves or retirement in connection with the reduction in the Armed Forces are entitled to a pension after 20 or more years of service, regardless of their age as of the day of discharge. As we know, this benefit previously applied only to servicemen attaining the age of 40 years. In this connection, the pension for serving from 20 to 25 years is computed on the basis of the following rule: 40 percent for 20 years of service, plus 3 percent of base pay and allowances for each additional year, but not more than 50 percent of the base pay, i.e., an amount not greater than the pension presently paid after 25 years. Thus,

those whose length of service does not meet the time requirement in the amount of a few years will qualify for a pension that is substantially higher than in the past.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What can you tell us about commissioned civilian VUZ graduates that were recalled from the reserves during the years of aggravated international relations? Many readers, including Colonel P. Lagoya and Majors S. Sergeyev and L. Torba, are of a single opinion in their belief that it would be fair to include length of time they worked in the civilian sector before entering the Army.

[Bay] I can say that this problem has been resolved affirmatively. In accordance with the above decree, officers who attain the age of 50 years as of the day of discharge are to have their pension increased from 30 to 40 percent of base pay if they have served a total length of service of at least 25 calendar years and from 40 to 45 percent for those that have served at least 30 calendar years. In this connection—as under the existing legislation—the serviceman must have to his credit at least 12.5 and 15 calendar years, respectively.

I would like to add that the above decree extends to those servicemen whose discharge orders were signed after 20 March 1989. A draft of the new Law on Pensions is being written; it will be presented for public discussion. It provides for a considerable increase in standard of living for all categories of pensioners and for a review of previous retirements issued by the Ministry of Defense.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nikolay Maksimovich, what can you tell us about benefits and compensation related to housing for those who are about to be discharged from active duty? This question has been asked by Captain S. Sakhnenko and L. Perfilyeva.

[Bay] That is somewhat out of my area and should be dealt with more fully in another session. However, I will attempt to provide some information. Thus, the party Central Committee and government recently adopted a resolution that obligates ispolkoms of local soviets of peoples' deputies to take immediate action to provide temporary housing and registration to officers, Army and Navy warrant officers and men who served an extended tour of duty, regardless of size of living quarters, as soon as the retirees arrive at their chosen place of residence, for the period covered by the housing provision.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] has already reported that servicemen credited with 15 and more years of honorable service who join a residential housing construction cooperative will qualify for cost-free financial aid in the amount of 50 percent of indebtedness incurred by acquiring the cooperative housing.

A considerable benefit available to officer personnel credited with at least 25 years of military service who are discharged on the basis of age or illness is their entitlement to special monetary payment for housing.

A provision covering officers of field grade and higher credited with at least 25 years of military service that are discharged for reasons of health, age or reduction in force grants such personnel entitlement to a plot of land for erection of a separate house. In the case of urban- and resort-type settlements, the size will be up to 0.12 hectare; in the case of other localities, the size will be up to 0.25 hectare for generals and admirals, and up to 0.15 hectare for senior and junior grade officers. In areas possessing irrigation facilities, the above lot sizes are reduced by half. Also provided for is availability of loans for the above, regardless of length of service.

The USSR Gosplan and USSR Ministry of Defense are in the process of drafting a government decree that is intended to address a number of pressing problems. Included are observance of time periods for furnishing housing to discharged servicemen; obligating ispolkoms of local soviets of peoples' deputies to assume responsibility for such personnel, dispensing with the requirement for presenting documents attesting to release from previous housing, surrender of living quarters, and registration in city of residence at time of callup, with no exceptions allowed; and a number of other items. Let us hope that the problems will be resolved in the affirmative.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What other benefits in addition to the above are available to men discharged into the reserves under the Armed Forces reduction ruling?

[Bay] Let me say on this score that the Ministry of Defense is working jointly with the USSR Goskomtrud to develop and approve a detailed plan of measures intended to provide employment and resolve other problems of social security for servicemen undergoing discharge from the Armed Forces.

In particular, provision has been made to assist servicemen being discharged from units and institutions located in areas of the Far North and in localities considered to be in the same category by way of arranging for employment in these areas and localities. A system of supervision will be set up to assure condition-free reemployment in previous jobs in enterprises, construction projects, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, in the specialty claimed by the servicemen, after they serve their compulsory and extended term duty. Also to be provided to officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers and extended-duty personnel is precedence for admission to schools for purposes of retraining and improvement of qualifications.

The resolution of these and other problems will be assured by special commissions which will be set up at ispolkoms of soviets of peoples' deputies. Successful

realization of the above decisions will also depend to a great extent on the practical activity of military councils in districts and military commissariats, which are designated to make the above important resolutions a reality. We must see to it that no one suffers from indifference, callousness, or red tape.

Insufficient Official Use of Afghan Combat Experience

*18010626a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Apr 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Col G. Miranovich, Col O. Vladykin, and Col A. Oliynik: "Utilizing Combat Experience"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Concentrated in the area of Vyazniki, Yuzha, Gorodets, and Dzerzhinsk are troops and weapons participating in a training exercise of the Moscow Military District. Data supplied by intelligence are being analyzed by the staffs of units and large units. In all subunits there is constant activity in party political work having the purpose of maintaining a state of high vigilance and combat readiness. In the combat training of personnel, prime importance attaches to studying the combat experience acquired by those who carried out their internationalist duty in Afghanistan.

We were at the headquarters of the Guards Kantemirov Tank Division. The time was 10 am. Division commander Guards Colonel N. Loktionov was with the chief of staff and other officers, working on the details of a march route. The plan took into account the terrain features, in addition to the tactical situation and the assumed nature of actions the "enemy" would take. Due to the ecological situation in the Volga Basin area, it was decided to move almost all the tracked vehicles by rail.

All the division services were operating smoothly. Much depended upon the staff, of course, and the chief, Guards Colonel V. Klimentyev.

"Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich has not forgotten his Afghan war experience," said the division commander during a short break. "His vast military knowledge was enriched by his combat experience, and this, as we all know, is of great importance to our work."

Guards Colonel Klimentyev is of medium height, stocky, with a determined look on his tanned face. After graduating as a gold medalist from the Armored Troops Academy, he volunteered for service in Afghanistan. There he commanded a motorized rifle regiment and was in charge of a motorized division headquarters. He was twice awarded the Red Star Order.

"The Afghan experience shows again," said Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich, "that success in modern combat cannot be achieved without proper organization. But what do we often see during tactical exercises and drills? We see

commanders missing a great many details which can decide the outcome of a battle. In my opinion, the most common shortcoming exhibited by company and battalion level commanders involves weak skills in controlling attached subunits and in effecting coordination between the various combat arms. In Afghanistan, for example, commanders of all ranks would not execute an advance without assuring close coordination with artillery and aircraft. It must be admitted that in the first few years there were breakdowns in coordination—something that cost us much in blood. That is why I see one of the tasks in this instruction as consisting of teaching officers to maintain constant coordination with all troops and weapons at their disposal."

In the exercise we were watching, all the participants were operating under near-combat conditions. We observed how subunits on the advance would clear an abatis in difficult terrain. How smoke screens were generated during a forced halt in open terrain. How carefully routes were examined for mines. In the final analysis, where else but in a training exercise is it possible to create a situation approximating that of combat.

There was much that was instructive in the first phase of the troops' actions. There also were errors. This was discussed freely by another officer, one we met at the field training headquarters.

"Some commanders," reflected out loud Colonel V. Varennikov, "cannot do without guidance, at times even turning over all their responsibilities to those who are watching, helping, and observing. Let me give you a specific example. One of the columns—one of no more than 80 vehicles—was being led by the unit chief of staff. Several generals and colonels were 'watching over' the march. But what about Afghanistan? The same kind of columns, only two or three times as large, often under fire, with the constant threat of mines, were led by captains and senior lieutenants. They were trusted, and they lived up to the trust. Here, however, many of us are constantly circumspect, afraid that something might happen. Much has yet to be done to teach people to become independent, to see to it that an officer's sense of responsibility for accomplishing assigned tasks is stronger than fear of punishment."

Yes, we spoke to quite a number of officers and men that have been touched by the flames of the Afghan war. One cannot help but wonder: Where—in which textbooks and manuals—can you read about their combat experience? Various explanations are offered for the poor utilization of combat experience. Probably the most common "theory" is that in Afghanistan there were peculiar geographic conditions, and the opposition waged combat activity employing primarily guerrilla tactics. That is all true. The combat experience acquired by our troops in Afghanistan, the same as everything that is new and atypical, requires careful and thoughtful evaluation.

Let us consider a simple example. In Afghanistan, as we know, an important item of personal equipment for motorized riflemen and other combat arms was the vest [lif] that was used to carry spare ammunition magazines and grenades. It was light and convenient, and even offered reliable protection from flying fragments. However, this item as a rule was either captured, usually of Pakistani or Chinese origin, or was handmade by the men. The usefulness of the item is clear. Nevertheless, in training exercises we still see the same old podsumki [small belt-attached ammo pouches].

Nevertheless, the Afghan experience is coming through. Major General V. Sheherbakov, first deputy chief, Moscow Military District Political Directorate, who was awarded the Red Banner Order for accomplishing his military obligation, said during a conversation:

"All personnel of the companies and batteries are striving to emulate the internationalist soldiers."

In a mortar battery we met Sergeant A. Poldolin, who had been called to active duty from the reserves. He holds the Distinguished Service Medal. He returned from Afghanistan in December of 1987, having served as a signalman. He—the same as most "Afghans"—does not tolerate shortcomings. He was quick to admit this in his conversation with the correspondents.

"I was lucky," said Aleksandr, "being called to active duty to participate in the exercise using my specialty—signalman. The fact is that some boys with combat experience are not used in their specialty."

Alas! that is so. It is true that men who returned from Afghanistan in January and February and still serving in line units—not only many soldiers called to active duty from the reserves—are not being utilized in their specialty. For example, in the regiment in which Major A. Pirchenko is chief of staff, there are 11 internationalist soldiers listed as artillerymen, but none of them are being utilized as such.

It would be wrong to discuss only the shortcomings of the plan, of course. At the training exercise we did see cases where there was a concern for utilizing the experience gained by internationalist fighting men. For example, in a motorized rifle regiment commanded by Lt Col L. Bratukhin, they are all serving in assignments suitable to their specialty—armored personnel carrier drivers. They exhibit great mastery and skill as they negotiate roads turned to mud by rains.

It was already growing dark when we arrived at headquarters of one of the regiments. Inside the headquarters tent we saw a number of leaflets bearing the words: "They are carrying out their military obligation in an exemplary manner." Named among the best was Radar Officer Major R. Zarifov, who holds the Red Star Order and the Order For Service to the Motherland in the

USSR Armed Forces, Third Class. Entered in his efficiency report is the notation: "He knows the value of experience acquired in combat."

The above is well said. We can only hope that this experience will be valued by all persons involved with training and educating defenders of the Motherland.

Pensions, Benefits Available to Veterans of Afghanistan

18010654b Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Apr 89 p 4

[Unattributed report under the "Consultation" rubric: "Benefits for Internationalist Servicemen"; first paragraph is TRUD introduction]

[Text] Letters received by the editors from former internationalist servicemen indicate that the servicemen themselves, and—what is particularly disturbing—officials, still have an insufficient knowledge of benefits due the "Afghans." We present below information on this subject as provided by A. Rybchinskiy, who is a senior military procurator in the Main Military Procuracy.

One of the many results of democratization and glasnost is the availability of information on benefits due internationalist servicemen. Almost all decrees have been declassified. These normative documents are freely available for reading in all military commissariats. It should be noted that, in all cases where additional privileges for disabled veterans are discussed, a disabled veteran is defined as a serviceman who became disabled as a result of wounds, concussion, crippling injury, or illness resulting from combat activity or the carrying out of other duties associated with military service.

Benefits that are provided to solve the housing problems of international servicemen and their families were discussed in detail in a previous "Consultation" (TRUD, 4 January 1989). Therefore, let us begin with the topic of benefits relating to pensions. Officers, warrant officers of the Army and Navy, and enlisted personnel who served an extended tour of duty in the Republic of Afghanistan are credited with three months for every month of service relative to computing the length of service for military pension purposes. In the case of servicemen suffering with wounds, concussion, crippling injury, or illness, time spent in therapy is credited to their length of service, on the same basis.

However, the above benefit is not available to men that were discharged from active duty or those that were recalled from Afghanistan due to commission of acts discrediting the service.

The state also is concerned about next of kin of men killed in action or those that died as a result of wounds or illness and of Soviet Army laborers and workers. Their mothers and wives are entitled to a pension, on the grounds of loss of the provider, as soon as they attain the age of 50 years. Wives of men killed in action or of those

who died as a result of injuries incurred in combat receive the same benefit, regardless of the date of death. Parents and wives who are unable to work are to be paid a pension for loss of the provider whether they were dependents of the deceased or not.

Pensions are paid to school children of deceased servicemen until they complete their secondary or higher education, but not after they attain the age of 23 years.

In addition, on the basis of the merits of a Soviet Army serviceman, laborer, or worker who has suffered a disability, a personal pension may be paid out of the republic or local budget to the individual or to families of the deceased.

Internationalist fighting men who have been medically certified as disabled are entitled, on a no-wait basis, to cost-free prosthesis and a Zaporozhets car fitted with manual controls.

"Afghans" who wish to continue their education should be aware that they are entitled to enroll in higher and secondary specialized schools without the requirement of taking an examination, and they take precedence for admission to vocational and technical schools and courses.

Special stipends have been set up for VUZ and specialized secondary school students who carry a disability as a result of service in Afghanistan, in the amount of 100 rubles a month; if they are receiving full government support, they are to be paid 40 rubles in the case of a VUZ and 30 rubles for a teknikum. Similar benefits have been set up for Soviet Army laborers and workers who suffered wounds, concussion, or disabling injury, or those who were awarded USSR orders and medals for participation or support of combat activity.

Benefits have also been devised for persons engaged in labor in the economy. In particular, former internationalist servicemen have the right to take an annual vacation in summer or at any other convenient time of the year. In addition, they may take a second vacation at no pay for a period up to two weeks every year. Working disabled are released from the income tax obligation.

Transportation benefits are extended to all internationalist fighting men that suffered wounds, concussion, or crippling injury as a result of combat, even though they are not certified as disabled veterans. They, and group III disabled veterans, are entitled to receive a 50-percent reduction in price of a two-way ticket once a year for travel by railroad; in areas not served by railroad, the reduction applies to travel by water, air, and intercity bus. Group I and group II veterans have the privilege of cost-free railroad or water transportation once a year.

The graves of servicemen that lost their lives in line of their internationalist duty are to be provided with a tombstone, to be paid for out of the republic or local budget. The cost can be as much as 1,000 rubles.

Readers are reminded that the benefits available to families of servicemen that were killed in action are extended to the families of fighting men missing in action in Afghanistan.

Now the final point. Military district headquarters have been assigned non-staff working groups whose purpose is to effect centralized supervision over the observance of the resolutions passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers relative to benefits for internationalist servicemen. Therefore, it is advisable to submit questions that come under the purview of military directorate organs directly to these commissions.

Retirees Invited to Settle in Non-Black Earth Region

18010645a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Apr 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Maj A. Vorobyev: "Poisk Invites Retirees to Settle in Russian Non-Black Region"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Men discharged into the reserves are being given an opportunity to establish themselves if they are willing to live and work in rural areas of the Russian non-black earth region. Contact the following: 119021, ul. L. Tolstogo, AIS Poisk.

"Is it really as simple as sending off a letter and application?" That is the question I first put to Sergey Ivanovich Yashchenko, who is chief of staff for socio-economic reorganization of the RSFSR non-black earth region, VLKSM [All-Union Lenin Young Communist League] Central Committee.

"The procedure is quite simple. Persons who wish to work in the non-black earth region are to submit a complete application, or simply a letter if a blank form is not available, to the address indicated for the AIS [automated data system] Poisk. All you have to do is indicate (preferably briefly) why you wish to move there; the number of persons in your group; where you wish to work and in which capacity; the general location; and the type of housing you prefer: a house, apartment, or dormitory. You should specify where you prefer to live: in a rayon center, on a central farm, or on an individual farm. Indicate your need for a kindergarten, school, medical treatment facility, and hospital. List your biographic data and the kind of work you do."

"All the above information is entered into the Poisk AIS. It provides you with three choices for where you can live and work."

"Sergey Ivanovich, what advantages does the Poisk offer? Is it not better for organizations that have a need for workers to advertise in the newspaper and let the job seekers make their own choice?"

"Experience has shown that this kind of procedure tends to flood some farms with letters, while other farms do not attract any candidates. The Poisk system performs an optimum match of the farm and the future rural worker. After receiving an offer, the former serviceman becomes eligible for a number of benefits."

"Could you tell us something about the benefits?"

"Under this procedure, families resettling in rural areas of the non-black earth region where there is an undersupply of labor are paid for their resettlement expenses a one-time amount of 2,000 rubles for the head of the family and 500 rubles for each family member. Young people who accept an offer from a rural area are compensated for expenses related to moving to their new location.

"The volunteers are entitled to take their first vacation any time after they complete their move. Their length of service is credited for purposes of receiving percentage increases in pay. The families are also given housing or credit to build housing and a private garden plot as specified.

"The volunteers are also entitled to benefits related to resettlement, taxation, fuel, utilities, and construction materials.

"In addition, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agricultural enterprises and organizations are authorized to provide to families, on a cost-free basis, a cow and a pig, and to render assistance with animal feed, so that they can set up a subsidiary farm."

Readers Debate Utility of Disciplinary Battalions
18010657b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 May 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt S. Vorobyev, student, Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin: "The Road to Rehabilitation: Legal Reform—Crossroads of Opinion"]

[Text] The suggestion made by Colonel of Justice A. Bilokon (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 January) relative to eliminating disciplinary battalions and imprisoning servicemen guilty of committing a crime is not proper, in my opinion.

I believe that assignment to a disciplinary battalion has a definite place under today's conditions. The point is that servicemen on compulsory duty that have committed a crime are young people who are just starting their lives. Rehabilitation and reeducation in a service environment

are in line with humanitarian principles and afford the opportunity of keeping them away from the influence of hardened criminals, something that is inevitable in a prison.

The application of the above form of punishment does serve a purpose, as attested to by the fact that the overwhelming majority of service offenders respond to correction in a short period of time. More than half of them are released on probation to join regular units. In this connection, they do not repeat offenses. Recidivism does not exceed 1.5 to 2.5 percent, while following imprisonment it amounts to 23 percent.

I believe that this is because service in a disciplinary battalion is a lesser form of punishment than imprisonment. Living conditions of persons serving time in such a battalion are the same as those of personnel on regular duty. As a general rule, time served in a disciplinary battalion does not count as active duty time. However, in the case of those persons who master a military specialty, have a good knowledge of and live up to the requirements of military regulations, and are honorable in carrying out their duties, an exception can be made. Those who have served time in a disciplinary battalion do not carry a record of offense.

Thus, agreeing with the suggestion advanced by Colonel of Justice A. Bilokon requiring mandatory imprisonment for offenders would mean unjustifiable reinforcement of criminal responsibility of servicemen. Unjustified exacerbation of punishment, as shown by experience, is as ineffective as unwarranted mitigation.

V. Parfenov
Major General of Justice

Are disciplinary battalions needed? I say NO! NO! A thousand times NO! I am the mother of three soldiers; the youngest is serving in the Air Defense Forces. He does not complain, but judging from a phrase he dropped in a letter I feel that he is having a difficult time of it.

I have seen for myself how difficult service is for our sons: At one time I worked in the library of a military unit. I witnessed a number of cases of arbitrariness and injustice on the part of the unit commander with respect to his subordinates. Some soldiers could not bear the humiliation and took absence without leave. For this they were tried and sentenced to two to three years of service in a disciplinary battalion.

It is possible that during the war strict punishment was necessary for disciplinary violations, but now, in my opinion, this is no longer justified.

B. Butkova
Krasnodarskiy kray

I understand why disciplinary companies and battalions existed during the war. They were intended for persons who committed serious military crimes, to enable them to, to use the phrase of the time, "wash their guilt in blood."

Why are disciplinary units needed now? There are regulations that set the standards for servicemen's life and service; soldiers also take the oath. These instruments determine the disciplinary responsibility of the serviceman. If he commits a crime, he should be held responsible by the same laws as the country's other citizens.

Judge for yourself: If one is to follow the logic of disciplinary units to the conclusion, then other departments would be required to organize their "own" methods of confinement. I am convinced that the military thief and the military ban'it is no better than other violators of the law.

N. Lebedev (Col, Ret.)
Veteran of the Great Patriotic War

I am of the opinion that the suggestion proposed by Colonel of Justice A. Bilokon relative to doing away with disciplinary battalions is not justified for practical reasons. In the strict interpretation, both of existing criminal legislation and the new draft of the Fundamental Legislation under consideration, assignment to a disciplinary battalion stands by itself as a punishment for persons who do not present an immediate threat to society. There are no grounds to intensify criminal responsibility of such persons.

In addition, the elimination of disciplinary battalions in many cases would present persons who have committed a crime with unjustified privileges. Thus, a soldier in his second or third month of active duty receiving a sentence of a one-year imprisonment can "save" almost one year.

V. Kopayev
Moscow

This is my eighth year of service in disciplinary subunits; my present position is that of propagandist in a disciplinary battalion. In all those years there have been many occasions when I saw the need for this kind of unit. In these units we create conditions conducive to rehabilitating and reeducating soldiers; we offer them the opportunity to return home wearing the uniform, without a criminal record.

The process of rehabilitating offenders does have its problems, of course. However, all the shortcomings can and would be rooted out, if somewhat more attention were devoted to the subunit. There are as yet no approved methods for teaching offenders; there is even

an absence of elementary sociological studies that would enable us to make knowledgeable conclusions for the purpose of resolving Army and Navy problems. There is no process for selecting officers and warrant officers for duty in disciplinary subunits, which require special teaching abilities and a particular type of personality.

The years I have served in disciplinary battalions taught me that they are definitely needed, if we are to save for society's sake that component of Army youth which has had a brush with the law.

Captain S. Vorobyev
Student, Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin

Study of Turkic Languages in Military
18010659 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 May 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Col I. Grigoryev, candidate of historical sciences, docent, in the column: "In Service Schools": "Rakhmat—Thank You"]

[Text] "Salom!"

"Assalomu alaykum!"

The above greetings are often used by cadets at the Gorky Higher Military Construction Command School. The cadets do more than voice greetings. The future officers are engaged in a thorough study of languages of Central Asian peoples. This difficult activity comes about as a result of necessity. Among the young replacements from Central Asian republics joining military construction units there is no shortage of youth who possess a poor knowledge of Russian. As a result, commanders and political workers must take on the job of teachers. That is why the school made the decision to endow the cadets with methodical skills to learn the Russian language on the basis of their knowledge of the basic phonetic, grammatical, and word-building peculiarities of the Turkic languages.

The Turkic Language Study Division was organized in the Foreign Language Department, which is headed by Soviet Army civilian Docent D. Miklyayeva, candidate of philological sciences. The Uzbek language was taken as the basic language, since a knowledge of its principles is sufficient to understand Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Turkmens.

The program is designed for 88 hours of instruction. Cadets after completing the program possess a level of knowledge sufficient to handle simple situations in Uzbek. More attention is devoted to mastery of vocabulary, which includes military terminology. Also included in the program are reading of socio-political texts with the aid of a dictionary and the study of techniques for teaching of Russian.

The division was organized on the basis of experience gained by pedagogical VUZ's in Alma-Ata, Tashkent, and Samarkand. The cadets study in classrooms specially equipped with technical instruction aids. Much instruction material is available on audio cassettes, which were prepared by the students under the supervision of instructors. Students that possess a knowledge of the proper literary language and good diction function as chief consultants, translators, and pronunciation experts. They include Uzbek N. Turdiyev, Kazakh S. Dyusembayev, and Kirghiz M. Dzhumbayev.

The studies afford the cadets the opportunity of using tape recorders to listen to their spoken Uzbek or Kirghiz.

For independent study the students have available in the department a reference facility where they can practice proper pronunciation. There they can listen to recordings of conversational language and ethnic songs in the language of their choice. The facility is also supplied with a wide selection of newspapers, magazines, and books printed in the languages of Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Hanging on the walls are portraits of great people and pictures offering views of capitals of Central Asian republics and other cities. Attractive displays made by the students present information on republics, the land, makeup of the populace, cities, rayon centers, urban-type settlements, and facts on the history of art, culture, and events taking place in the particular areas.

A valuable tool for the study of Turkic languages is available in the form of the textbook "One Family of USSR Peoples," which was written by Lt Col V. Samusem, a senior instructor in the Department of Marxism-Leninism and candidate of historical sciences, and by Docent D. Miklyayeva. The textbook features a variety of historical information; some peculiarities of inter-ethnic relations; and descriptions of traditional and modern rites and customs practiced by peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The book also offers short listings of Russian- Uzbek, Russian-Kazakh, and Russian-Kirghiz phrases incorporating useful vocabulary enabling a person to make himself understood by military builders who possess a poor knowledge of Russian.

What has the division taught us? The instructors and students share the same opinion: This is an extremely important and worthwhile activity. The students' study of Turkic languages encourages respect for national dignity, traditions, and culture of USSR peoples; strengthens friendship and military comradeship; and fosters practical application of bilingualism. Finally, all this tends to bring together commanders and their subordinates and improve mutual understanding in the educational process. These advantages became apparent during the last officer-training tour of duty the cadets served in line units. Before returning to school, many cadets were approached by military builders thanking them with the warm words "rakhmat—thank you."

Deferment Decree, Spring Conscription Considered

18010598 *Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII* in Russian
13 May 89 p 3

[Gruzininform interview with Col V. Sulaberidze, chief of the Political Section of the GSSR Military Commissariat: "On Conscription, Deferments, Benefits and Assemblies"]

[Text] The spring conscription for the nation's Armed Forces has begun. As always, the future soldiers and their parents have many questions about it. They are answered by Col V. Sulaberidze, chief of the Political Section of the GSSR Military Commissariat.

[Sulaberidze] "The main distinction of the current conscription, as we know, is a deferment for students at all daytime (on-campus) VUZs," Viktor Georgiyevich said, beginning the discussion. "I want to mention, however, that the same deferments for continuing one's education are extended until graduation to students up to the age of 20 years at secondary specialized educational institutions, including evening and correspondence schools, if they did not have a secondary education prior to enrolling, as well as at daytime (on-campus) VUZs, if they are enrolled in a reserve officer training program. In fact, for the latter category and for VUZ students taking compulsory military training in military departments, a deferment for acquiring an education is the equivalent to an exemption from active military duty in general. Those who graduate from VUZs without military departments (and such VUZs are a minority) will enter the service, but only for 1 year.

[Gruzininform] Does the military commissariat decide on deferments?

[Sulaberidze] No, this is within the jurisdiction of the draft commission. The rayon military commissariat only heads it, but its membership includes also the deputy chairman or a member of the rayon ispolkom [executive committee], representatives of the party and Komsomol raykoms [rayon committees], the chief of the rayon internal affairs department or his deputy, and a physician. The makeup of the commission is established by the ispolkom of the corresponding soviet of people's deputies. Its decision may be appealed to the republic draft commission, whose decision is final. Furthermore, the draft commissions grant exemptions from military duty because of illness or physical impairments and consider candidates for military educational institutions.

[Gruzininform] For what reasons other than to continue one's education are deferments granted?

[Sulaberidze] For family reasons and reasons of health. The authority to grant deferments on any other basis not specified by law is granted only to the USSR Council of Ministers.

[Gruzinform] Many parents request deferments for sons on grounds that the parents are of pension age....

[Sulaberidze] The law provides for a deferment only if the pension-age parents are dependent upon the son.

[Gruzinform] When does the military service term begin?

[Sulaberidze] On 1 July for those drafted during the first half of the year; on 1 January of the year following the year of induction for those drafted during the second half of the year. I want to point out, however, that the USSR Minister of Defense has the authority to delay discharge into the reserve for a period of up to 2 months when necessary.

[Gruzinform] The frequent military assemblies for which reservists are called up evoke many complaints....

[Sulaberidze] The duration and the number of assemblies conducted for refreshing or improving military skills and for studying new models of military equipment and weapons depend upon the age of the reservist, the complexity of his military occupational specialty and the skills level required by his position. For example, reserve NCOs and soldiers up to the age of 35 are called up for 4-6 assemblies lasting up to 3 months each; from 36 to 45 years, 1-2 assemblies of up to 2 months each; and from 46 to 50 years, one month-long assembly. Reserve officers in category 1 may be called up each year for an assembly lasting up to 3 months; category 2, for two assemblies lasting up to 3 months each; and category 3, for one 2-month assembly. The total combined length of assemblies for reservists may not exceed 30 months.

By decision of the government of the USSR all categories of reservists may be called up for special assemblies to help mop up after natural disasters and industrial accidents like those at Chernobyl and in Armenia. In addition, reservists must be prepared to help the rural workers harvest the crops.

[Gruzinform] What benefits are extended to those drafted into the army?

[Sulaberidze] I shall mention the main benefits. Individuals on active, first-term military duty and their wives are exempted from taxes on bachelors, unmarried citizens and those with small families. If the serviceman is discharged for reasons of illness this benefit is retained for a period of up to 1 year. Property taxes are not collected from first-term soldiers, NCOs and petty officers or their families. The plot of a family with a member on active military duty is exempted from the agricultural tax if no able-bodied people are left in the family except for the serviceman's wife or mother with children below the age of 8 years.

Living space is retained by those drafted for first-term service, and their names may not be removed from waiting lists for housing.

After being discharged into the reserve, servicemen with a secondary education are accepted in the preparatory departments at VUZs by recommendation of military units or managers of industrial enterprises, organizations and construction projects, and also at the recommendation of party, Komsomol and trade union organs. The ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies must place the children of servicemen drafted into the military in kindergartens or nurseries within 1 month from the date their wives apply, regardless of the departmental affiliation of the pre-school facilities, and must find jobs for the wives of the servicemen within the same length of time.

Finally, the time spent by citizens in the Armed Forces counts toward their total length of employment and toward the mandatory term of work following completion of an educational institution.

Editorial Comments on Benefits for Demobilized Servicemen

18010668a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 May 89 1st Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "In a Zone of Special Attention"]

[Text] Each person discharged from the Armed Forces must be in a zone of special attention.

A letter arrived from Capt A. Rumyantsev, from the "N" aviation unit, Moscow Military District. In it he spoke about violations of the established procedure for discharge into the reserves due to the reduction in armed forces strength. Contrary to the opinion of the majority of members of the recommendation commission, to give Rumyantsev the opportunity to serve the remaining year and nine months until he reached the age limit, the unit commander decided to discharge him immediately. For this purpose, he "edited" the recommendation pertaining to his subordinate in his own way, and, although Rumyantsev was not even familiarized with it, organized a hasty compilation of discharge documents. "Why then have recommendation commissions?" The author of the letter wonders. "And to whom are the appeals addressed to display attention and fairness toward each individual discharged into the reserves?"

Yes, guided by peaceloving goals, the Soviet Union is reducing its armed forces. And, speaking about this, one can again recall the thousands of tanks, hundreds of aircraft, and other equipment subject to reduction, but it is extremely important to concentrate primarily on the fact that the reduction effects the destinies of many people, and especially those who are being discharged into the reserve. A half-million military personnel are being discharged. The ratio is one officer to five soldiers. Understandably, it is simpler for those who are in

compulsory service to return to their pre-army activities, work or school. It is otherwise with those who chose the service, the profession of defender of the homeland, for virtually their entire lives. Taking all this into account, the party and government are taking specific steps, which bear witness to their concern toward each service member being discharged into the reserves or retired. They are concerned that not a single individual be hurt morally or materially. The practice of previous reductions, during which there was unfairness with respect to cadres, is being taken into account. For example, people were discharged who had two or three years left, or even less, until they would receive a pension.

Today the reduction of officers is being accomplished mainly through those who have completed their prescribed service and are authorized pensions. Conscientious people, who are carrying out their duties satisfactorily, are being given the opportunity to complete these periods of service. To provide pension support for those discharged into the reserves as a result of the force reduction, a USSR Council of Ministers resolution has recently been approved, and a Minister of Defense order issued, granting a number of benefits. Thus, officers, warrant officers and extended service personnel have the right to a pension for serving 20 or more years, regardless of age on the date of discharge. In granting pensions to officer-graduates of civilian VUZes, called up from the reserves, who have reached 50 years of age at the date of discharge, an increase in pension has been provided from 30 to 40 percent of their pay, if their total length of service is no less than 25 calendar years, and from 40 to 45 percent, if it is no less than 30 calendar years. This is under the condition that active military service must comprise no less than 12-1/2 and 15 calendar years respectively.

Warrant officers not having the right to a pension will be paid over the course of a year a salary according to their military rank. Students will receive a one-time allowance upon discharge.

A number of benefits and compensations associated with providing housing for those discharged into the reserves are also provided for. In accordance with the decision of the CPSU Central Committee and government, ispolkoms of local soviets of peoples deputies are required to take urgent steps to provide temporary housing and to register those discharged into the reserves, regardless of the amount of available housing, for the period they are being provided housing. In the next 2 years the Ministry of Defense will build 7,500 apartments for the discharges. Those who served satisfactorily for 15 years or more and have joined ZhSK [housing construction cooperatives] are granted financial assistance gratis, in an amount equal to 50 percent of the debt, to acquire cooperative housing. Assistance in finding work and solving other social services matters is also being provided.

Commanders, staffs, and political and cadre organs must explain to service members being discharged into the reserves their rights and benefits in matters of material support, choice of place of residence, and obtaining housing and work, and do everything they can to see that these rights and benefits are realized. The reduction presupposes that strict lawfulness will be observed, social justice ensured, and maximum attention paid to people. In the majority of instances this is happening. In the "N" air defense large unit, for example, a priority list for discharges into the reserves was compiled with extensive participation of the officer community and communists. Officers V. Tolmachev, N. Kolesnikov, V. Sokhomovich, and others, who are honorably and with initiative carrying out their duties, have been granted the opportunity to serve until they become eligible to obtain full pensions. Individual discussions are held with those being discharged into the reserves, well-qualified consultations are given, and assistance is being rendered in choosing a place of residence. Many other large units, units and ships are treating this important matter just as responsibly, and with equal concern. But, unfortunately, the letter by Capt A. Ruymantsev to which we referred at the outset is not the only one of its kind.

Guards Capt T. Dudka, from the "N" guards unit, Baltic Military District; Sr Lt V. Blinshev, from "N" unit, Group of Soviet Forces Germany; Col L. Korshunov, from the Military Aviation Engineering Academy imeni Professor N. Ye. Zhukovskiy, and other military personnel write about deviations from the requirements regulating discharge into the reserves or retirement, that result from the reduction. The standing recommendation commissions, which have been given the authority to largely decide the fate of people, at times display haste, lack of principles, and subjectivity in their decisions, and do not always listen to the opinions of the party organizations. Callousness, red tape, and errors in preparing documents are occurring. Information is being poorly provided, as a result of which military personnel in some units and on some ships are badly informed about the procedure for discharge into the reserves or retirement resulting from the reduction, and do not know what benefits have been provided in this regard. People "orient themselves" based on all manner of rumors and conjecture.

Needless to say, these shortcomings have nothing in common with the current concept for reducing the Armed Forces. The reduction requires of commanders, staffs, political and cadre organs, and party organizations, greater responsibility, thoughtful organizational work, and reliance in it on public opinion. Thus, the practice justifies itself, when people are invited to sessions of the recommendation commissions who have served with the person being considered for many years and know him well. It is also useful to discuss questions associated with the reduction at party and officers' meetings, and meetings of warrant officers and the family members of military personnel. It is advisable to have in each unit and on each ship a list of regions where

it is less difficult to obtain apartments, and easier to find work in one's specialty and solve other problems. It is necessary to be concerned literally about everything—from a carefully worked out plan for the discharge, to the timely issuance to the dischargees of the appropriate documents, monetary allowance, materiel, and clothing and related gear. The sendoffs themselves must be organized so that they are remembered positively both by those who are leaving and those who remain. And, of course, it is necessary to dispose people to conscientious service until the last day. The reduction process must in no way reduce the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the forces. The Armed Forces are being reduced, the defense of the country remains reliable.

Direct Call-In Line to Military Commissariat
18010668b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 May 89 1st Edition p 1

[Article by Sr Lt A. Veklich, Turkestan Military District: "Over the 'Direct Line'"]

[Text] A "direct line" has been organized at the initiative of the district newspaper FRUNZEVETS, jointly with the editors of the republic newspapers PRAVDA VOSTOKA, and TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA.

It linked the residents of the cities and villages of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia with the republic military commissariats. The topics of the questions troubling people were rather broad and diverse: about the special features of the call-up, taking into account the recently approved additions to the USSR law "On Universal Military Obligation;" the rules for admittance into military schools; the procedure for carrying out training in DOSAAF organizations, and many other questions.

Military commissars, Maj Gen Ye. Rybyak and Col V. Kolesnik answered the questions.

A variety of questions were asked via the "direct line," and some of them required that specific measures be taken. Thus, S. Vakhidov was alarmed that his soldier-son's illness was exacerbated while he was in service. The military commissariat ordered on the spot that a letter be sent immediately to the unit, requesting a medical examination of the soldier.

Kh. Fagreyev was interested in knowing where his grandson would return to after his service, if during this time his parents changed their place of residence. The mother of soldier D. Ibragimov was concerned about whether her son, who had been a student before entering the service, would be discharged before the start of classes at the institute. The widow of Col Alekseyev, who was killed while fulfilling his international duty in Afghanistan, asked what benefits her son would enjoy upon entering a Suvorov military school.

All these people received accurate and specific answers.

And the questions of reserve soldier-internationalist Sh. Kayumov, war veteran P. Ogurechnikov, M. Igmatova, the mother of a soldier, and several others, which could not be answered immediately, were taken under advisement by the republic military commissariats, in order to check the facts.

"I am convinced that we simply need the 'direct line,'" Maj Gen Rybyak said in the evening, when the calls stopped.

On that same day the program "Telemost" [Television Bridge] was broadcast on Karakalpak television. On this program officers of the republic military commissariat answered the questions of the residents of the autonomous republic. And the leader was political worker Lt Col M. Utkin.

Detailed reports about the "direct line" and "Telemost" were published in the newspapers.

Ural MD Competition Finds Officers Weak on Tactics

18010668c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 May 89 1st Edition p 2

[Unsigned Article: "Officers' Competition—Second Stage"]

[Text] The second stage of the competition on the field training level of officers took place in the Ural Military District. Military journalist Maj V. But asked Maj Gen V. Lisovskiy, chief, district combat training department, to comment on its results. He stated:

"Approximately 100 officers took part in the second stage of the competition. The competition not only determined the best, it also uncovered serious problems in the field training level of officers. The main index of their professional maturity and official duty qualifications is the ability to organize combat operations [boyevoye deystviye]. Alas, the competition showed that the tactical training level was the weakest place in the training of the officers. Only a few participants, among them captains A. Kungurtsev and Ye. Meralikin, found a correct, original solution to the tactical task that was presented.

"As for firing skill, this was demonstrated by many officers. However, it is bewildering that among those who were unsuccessful one could find officers who had tens and even hundreds of soldiers in their charge. The question arises: How did they train their subordinates?

"Undoubtedly the competition has a great future. The victors of the second stage have been awarded valuable presents. The best of them were captains A. Gereshchenko and N. Popovichenko, and senior lieutenants A. Myasnikov, A. Anufriev, and A. Kapitanets, who have

been recommended for early awarding of the next military rank. According to the results of this competition, next year Sr Lt A. Konyshov will be sent to a military academy.

Naval Rescue, Safety Equipment Problems Common to Other Services

18010687 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 May 89 p 2 First Edition

[Article by Maj. M. Tikhonovskiy: "Something To Think About"]

[Text] I was profoundly shaken by the tragedy that befell the personnel of the submarine "Komsomolets". Many died due to the imperfection and shortage of rescue equipment, and their inability to use it in extreme conditions.

I have served in officer positions in the Strategic Rocket Forces and have seen what is used for rescuing men who work with that fearsome equipment. I know that in an emergency situation, the spillage of components of rocket fuel and the outbreak of fire, there are few who survive, because the missilemen use rubber masks and protective suits that do not withstand high temperatures. Thus what can we expect now in the Rocket Forces from the new tragedy? Such examples can also be found among pilots, airborne troops, engineers...

It is becoming simply incomprehensible why we cannot allocate money in the military budget for special development of rescue gear. Or in our military industry are there no talented scientists and designers, no plants to implement their creative ideas and plans with practical products?

Let the managers of the military scientific research institutions and plants say why the overalls of pilots, submariners, tankers, and missilemen go up like gunpowder in a fire. Why medical preparations preventing over-cooling of the organism are not used for rescuing people. Why inflatable rafts and life vests do not inflate. Why our seaplanes cannot land on seas up to level four. What is it, are we training to fight on lakes and rivers? Why even on the ship's bill is there not enough rescue equipment for all hands?

For example, in the U.S. they have developed bullet-proof fabrics that are used to make suits, ponchos, overcoats, and even women's fur coats, while our officers and soldiers died in Afghanistan from enemy bullets, and police are practically defenseless against bandits.

Perhaps it would be better for the state to refit the Votkinsk machine-building plant that produces missiles not for the manufacture of baby carriages, but to develop and produce rescue equipment for the army and navy.

In short, we have things to think about.

Arms Procurement Procedures Questioned

18010728 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Jun 89 Second Edition p 6

[Article by A. Gorokhov: "Dangerous Depths"]

[Text] The loss of the nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets and most of its crew in the Sea of Norway was still hurting, when a message came from the area of the same Bear Island: Another accident, and once again it involved a nuclear-powered submarine with conventional and nuclear weapons on board.

Again the hearts of parents, wives, and children jumped, and the telephones in editorial offices rang off the hook. What can we say in consolation? What do we know at all about accidents in the Soviet submarine fleet?

Indeed, there are data in my personal archives on a 1961 incident in the Baltic Sea, on a 1972 fire on the submarine returning from an independent cruise, and an emergency in the Sea of Japan in September 1984. Quite recently, in October 1986, we lost in the Atlantic a submarine with ballistic missiles on board.

However, so much for the archive. Scant lines from various newspapers. People want to know more. Who is going to tell them? Having received the official report, we called Chief of the Main Naval Staff Admiral K. Makarov. In keeping with the old rule to say nothing to the press without a command from on high, the admiral categorically refused to comment.

About 4 years ago, at a remote garrison of our strategic missile forces, I unwillingly witnessed a large group of civilians (at any rate, dressed in civilian clothes) leaving early in the morning in a large bus from the hotel to firing positions. It turned out these were industry employees who were making some kinds of adjustments on what we would call product "X."

"Heretical" questions could immediately come to the mind of even a layman not too privy to the intricacies of operation of our military-industrial complex. For example, how could a missile in need of some adjustments happen to be on alert duty? What kind-hearted person (could it be Leonid Ilyich?), trusting the chief designer or his highly placed sponsor, authorized the acceptance of the "premature" product for service, and thus yet another handing out of grandiose monetary bonuses, awards, and honorary titles? What kind of the "overly kind" Ministry of Defense did we have which yet again had obediently written off some more billions of rubles off its account, content with what was given rather than what was required for the efficient (qualitative rather than quantitative) defense of the Motherland?

How are we going to spend the 32.6 billion rubles which are allocated this year for the procurement of armament and materiel? Will we pay for what is truly necessary for the sufficient defense of the country, or will give a shirt

off our backs, but at the same time skillfully eliminate the consequences of yet another accident?.. How do the client and the producer of military technology interact? Is everything in order here? If nothing else, the alarming count of emergencies at oceans and seas make one wonder.

Should we not take our submarines to the docks, inspect them comprehensively, and take a close look at signatures on the forms, so as to finally figure out: Who personally accepted for service the materiel fraught from the very beginning not with the danger of starting a war, but rather the danger to the safety of both the crews and extensive areas of independent cruises?

Certainly, it is not the business of the press to teach the troops combat training and combat applications. This is not a matter for us. However, the fate of people who have entrusted themselves to regulations, who have assumed very difficult responsibilities of defenders of the Motherland, their concerns and joys are such a matter, whichever way you look at it.

Can you recall the tone of extensively publicized comments by the Northern Fleet command on the course of rescue operations at the Komsomolets? Really, one got the impression that in the Sea of Norway yet another major victory has been won by Russian arms.

The well-trained voice of the commander has not been an argument anymore for a long time—on occasion, ideas may have been few and far between in the unpretentious text, but the words were firm and energetic, even in high forums or from the TV screen.

Why do the reactor compartments of nuclear-powered submarines fail? Alas, they do not talk about this. This is,

perhaps, what they have in mind when they promise a radical turnaround which is, supposedly, in store. The problem is where and when?

To be sure, it is possible to "assign" to the press only the role of a "chronicler" of the Armed Forces, the same as before, under the conditions of proclaimed transition to qualitative characteristics exclusively in the course of defense development. It is also possible to regard any criticism of this or that leader as an attack on the armed forces, as undermining their authority. Quite the opposite, the prestige of the Armed Forces will only become greater if some leading army comrades stop considering themselves the guardians of the ultimate truth.

I understand that the leadership of the Soviet Navy is far removed from the concerns of mass media. They have enough of their own concerns. However, the Navy Political Administration could at the very least take interest once a year: What are the military seamen writing to PRAVDA about? Without going into detail, I will say: There is a lot of mail, and, which is the most important, it is sensible.

In the remote year 1918, V.I. Lenin asked himself the question: "Are we persecuting cowardly military leaders and gawks? Have we cast slurs before Russia on regiments good for nothing? Have we 'caught' a sufficient number of bad examples which should be removed from the army for being unfit, careless, slow, and so forth with the greatest publicity?" He responded to his own question: "There is no businesslike, merciless, truly revolutionary war on specific perpetrators of evil."

It is not my style to overuse quotations. However, the classics will always remain what they are indeed. The quotation may be old, but there is not a word in it that does not hit "the bull's eye."

Description of Spetsnaz Subunit Training

18010627 Moscow KRAZNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Apr 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRSNAYZ ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col V. Astafyev in the "Daily Service" column: "A Special Subunit"]

[Text] The "enemy" was pressing hard. It was at this time—a time of difficulty for the defenders—that special subunit commander Vadim Zuyev was requested to report to Major Anatoliy Yefimenko as soon as possible.

"I have a mission for you," said Major Yefimenko. "You are to find and destroy an 'enemy' communications center."

The situation was complicated by the objective's location—in the mountains—as reported by intelligence. That was the reason the commander of the defensive force selected Zuyev. He, having been tested in the crucible of Afghanistan, was quite familiar with the peculiarities of mountain combat.

On 15 February of the preceding year, a team of scouts that included him discovered a train of 30 pack animals near the settlement of Shakhidan on a night mission. About 60 rebels were guarding the train. The Soviet troops were greatly outnumbered. The skirmish was soon over. When the scouts started to examine what they had captured, they realized why the rebels had offered such desperate resistance: Along with weapons and ammunition they found two Stinger rounds. The rebels considered them to be worth their weight in gold. This action earned Zuyev the Red Star Order.

Zuyev did not have to think for very long relative to deciding whom he should take along on the raid. He would choose only those that had proved themselves, those that had experienced the difficult trials of war. Sergeants Vladimir Dorogavtsev and Petr Romanyuk were holders of the Medal of Valor; Junior Sergeant Vasiliy Zakhochiy, the Distinguished Service Medal. First Sergeant Mikhail Savin, Junior Sergeant Viktor Lyubka, and Privates Viktor Guta, Dmitriy Noskov and Andrey Streletskiy could be relied on in combat.

After landing at night in the search area, reconnaissance patrols led by Romanyuk and Dorogavtsev immediately blended in with the mountains. Zuyev took up a position on rocks at the radio set and awaited their report. At daybreak Romanyuk was the first to respond: "I am looking at the objective." All the scouts were in the indicated grid in one hour.

Zuyev studied the situation, then assigned his men the mission. A carefully camouflaged assault element led by Zakhochiy was the first to move toward the objective. The "enemy" sentries were on the ground in the twinkling of an eye. The destruction element rushed forward

to the communications center's special machines. Demolition charges were placed within several minutes. Recovering from the surprise assault, the "enemy" attempted to attack the scouts. Zakhochiy and his men employed small arms fire to frustrate the enemy's action.

Meanwhile, the backup element, which included Savin and Romanyuk among others, engaged reinforcements that were moving rapidly in support of the communications troops.

Before the second hand of a watch could make 10 revolutions, a signal flare shot skyward, signifying that it was time to withdraw. Several explosions rocked the communications center area soon after the scouts hid behind the mountain. The "enemy" made an all-out attempt to wipe out the bold team. He went after them in pursuit.

Zuyev's men were forced to conduct several fiery contests with their pursuers before they were able to disengage. They sat out the rest of the day in a narrow gorge. After that came an exhausting nocturnal marathon in the mountains. It was morning before the team was able to join up with friendly forces. The first to greet them was Major Yefimenko. He—decorated with the For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces Order, Third Class, and the Distinguished Service Medal, for courage and heroism displayed during the discharge of his international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan—would be the evaluator of their performance.

They had been without rest for 36 hours and had seemingly used up every ounce of their energy. All they could do was to throw off their equipment and literally fall to the ground, which was covered with new grass that was pushing itself through the surface of the rocky slope.

"Brothers, today is Petr's birthday, you know," Zuyev said suddenly.

"The boys jumped to their feet and were at a loss as to what to say, with this "combat instruction" thrust at them without warning.

"Flowers for the celebrant!" said Vladimir Dorogavtsev, finding a way out of the situation.

Several minutes later Zuyev was holding a bunch of flowers in his hands.

"Happy birthday, Petro," said the officer as he handed the flowers to a smiling but embarrassed Romanyuk.

We could end this story of the special subunit's combat days on this high note, but this would not be true to life. All is not well when it comes to their common needs; they are experiencing difficulty in setting up their combat training and organizing facilities. Many officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men arrived here last May after carrying out their

international duty. What kind of welcome did they receive? At first there were orations and a sea of flowers—but then... The troops lived in tents for nearly six months. They themselves are still erecting barracks, storage buildings and a training facility. It would be good if they were given help in the way of construction materials, as it should be; as it is, many items they must "acquire."

We are grateful that neighbors are rendering assistance. They make it possible to jump, shoot, and work on tactical problems on their facility. Without that, the

situation would indeed be much worse. The men have set up two firing lanes for target practice, but they lack lifts. There is a problem with parachutes, and the men do not have a place where they can store their equipment.

The subunit received a good rating in the fall inspection, in spite of the above. The troops also have not let up in the winter training period. Why not? That is the way it should be. They wish to hold tightly onto the spetsnaz mark.

Difficulties of Duties of Pilot-Instructors
18010658 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 May 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Maj N. Chebotarev, Volga Military District, in the column: "Combat Training—Hindrances to Acceleration": "When Is the Pilot-Instructor to Study?"]

[Text] Pilot-instructor Captain G. Mamonov set aside his ball-point pen: His hand was numb from constant use. He massaged his fingers and continued to write the text of a lecture in his notebook.

Lectures, teaching activities, seminars—this is what takes up all the time of pilots in the Nth aviation training unit. The instructors relieve each other. They include the regimental propagandist, chief of air weapons and tactical training, and chief of physical training and sports. It seems that the headquarters officers in these days and weeks are working as rapidly as they can to share their knowledge and give practical guidance to the pilot-instructors.

Why are the specialists in such a hurry to carry out the lessons? Is it a case where the lecture presentation program has been enlarged and the officers are afraid they may run out of time set for the combat and political training plan? No. The fact is that the cadets will soon start their training flights. This is an important phase of professional development for the future officers, since they will be acquiring hands-on experience in piloting the combat helicopter. Pilot-instructors will be the cadets' principal mentors in this period.

However, there is this paradox: For the cadets the flights are training filled with the joy of learning of their abilities, while for the pilot-instructors this is as a rule exhausting work frequently consuming all their mental and physical reserves, when thoughts of normal study time for the officers themselves is out of the question. This is the situation according to pilot-instructors Captains V. Konstantinov and N. Zakharov and Senior Lieutenant N. Khudyakov, experienced officers who are considered to be authorities in the regiment.

In this period each pilot-instructor is required to lead several future helicopter pilots through a particular level of training. Pilot-instructors will spend hundreds of hours with the cadets aboard the craft. The students will be on the receiving end, and the instructors, the giving end, so to speak. In this connection, the giving is quite demanding, as mentioned above.

Year after year the student flight training plan is satisfied only by reducing the time devoted to other subjects. This is what happens in practice. A typical week of combat training in the training regiment during student flight time consists of five flying days plus one day of preparation. The aviators concentrate exclusively on carrying out the tasks of flight duty personnel; there is no time

whatsoever for other activities. It is possible that someone may not agree with me by stating that the aviators can organize the study of other disciplines on flight preparation day. Yes, this is possible, but only on the condition that they be organized after spending eight hours working with aircraft. This would be during free time. I will say here that in such a case it is more reasonable to aim for study time for the aviators themselves. However, how can a pilot-instructor find an hour or two of free time per day? This is how his time is taken up: First there is reveille, out of bed before the chickens; preflight preparation; several hours with students in the air. Next comes working with the students, preparing for the following day's flight shift duties. The exhausted aviator as a rule returns home after seven in the evening. The pilot-instructor has neither time nor energy to devote to his own studies.

On top of that, many aviators periodically serve on temporary duty assignments in places where there can be no thought of studying. Thus, in the last training year pilot-instructor Captain V. Gerilo ferried aircraft five times. Also, Lieutenant Colonel A. Nikitin, aviation training squadron commander, along with subordinates Majors A. Rudyi and N. Gerasimov and Captain V. Parfenov, were away from the unit 40 days on the eve of the new training year, with no plan studies available to them, of course.

A reasonable question suggests itself: Why have ranking personnel of the regiment become reconciled to diminution of the other subjects? It is no secret that the personnel are operating on the principle of the lesser of two evils. The inspecting officers are primarily interested in progress of the student flight training plan. If there is lack of progress, many questions must be answered. That is when it becomes necessary to "look for reserves."

The stress on completion rather than quality of flight training leads to accidents due to carelessness on the part of crews. This occurred in the case of Captain V. Komzov, who damaged some assemblies as a result of failure to control a rotary wing craft. The accident was attributable to pilot error.

However, there is more here than blunders committed by officer aviators working with craft. Some of them cannot deal with students on a personal level. Some pilot-instructors resort to crudities, while others become overly friendly with subordinates. This is a case where instruction in teaching techniques and psychology would be of assistance to the officer during the period of intensive flights. Alas! The difficult lesson must be learned by trial and error.

Many pilot-instructors cannot improve their qualifications due to the intensiveness of the student flights. Thus, Majors V. Onuchkov and B. Demidov still carry a 2nd class rating, while their peers in line regiments have long since attained and continue to maintain qualification as 1st class military pilots.

How to break out of this vicious circle and create for pilot-instructors normal conditions to carry out combat and political training the way it should be done are the subjects of contradictory opinions held by the regiment's officers themselves. Some of them are pessimistic, feeling that the problem cannot be solved, since the utilization of flight instruction personnel to exhaustion is the result of years of practice. Others—the majority—are of the opinion that we simply have become accustomed to the situation, permitting it to continue, without addressing the problem for a number of reasons, some of them objective.

Now—in the perestroika period—is the time to set matters straight, for the relentless pursuit of quantity in student training practiced for many years represents—more than shortcomings of instruction—a poor system that has been raised to the status of a principle under which pilot-instructors in aviation training regiments operate.

Aviators are suggesting more than anything else a thoughtful analysis of whether all aspects of flight training are actually necessary for quality training of students—for attaining the end result. Pilot-instructor Captain V. Konstantinov, for example, has something to say about reducing the number of training sorties involving weapons delivery. He bases his reasoning on his belief that launching a single unguided rocket, as prescribed by the program, is hardly sufficient to teach a student to conduct accurate fire on ground targets.

Another pilot instructor, Captain N. Zakharov, suggests that the mock-combat course and the combat training course be run one after the other. This would offer the advantage of saving pilot-instructor time with students on individual exercises, since later in combat units the trainees practice certain aspects of flight training virtually from the beginning.

Aviators feel that it would be advantageous to effect a review of the Marxist-Leninist training program for officers of aviation training regiments, with a view toward strengthening the psychological and teaching aspects of the particular subjects. They also raise the question of a good textbook of military psychology and teaching techniques for flight instruction personnel.

Of course, the interest of pilot-instructors in combat training should be aroused by applying an applicable system of offering incentives for conscientious and vigorous labor. Included in the suggestions made by aviators is the provision of a monetary bonus if students pass the state flight training examination with distinction, and the introduction of the honorary title of Distinguished Military Pilot-Instructor for officers who are personally responsible for producing 70 graduates or more. The pilots feel that instructor slots in aviation training regiments should be filled by officers who have several years of service in combat units. And introduce for pilot-instructors the rank of lieutenant colonel, since

they often carry out more responsible education and training tasks than some instructors in certain departments of VUZ's. In addition, the time has come to make pilot-instructors eligible to receive additional pay for proficiency to place them on a par with officers serving in combat units.

The resolution of these problems depends to a great extent upon the glavkomat [expansion unknown] of the Air Force, of course, but much can be done now to promote this plan in training regiments proper. For example, improvement should be made in the working day of instructors in deed, not in word. This should be accomplished by effecting heavy reduction in numerous ineffective meetings and formations. There should also be a rational assignment of duty details and social tasks. In a word, there is much food for thought here for ranking officers at the regimental level.

Pilot-instructors are still preparing lecture material during these spring days. Later they will have no time for theory.

Thoughts On Prevention Of MiG-29 Defection
18010691 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
26 May 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by I. Andreyev: "Is It Easy To Hijack A Fighter?"]

[Text] The fact that a MiG had been hijacked to Turkey had left us dumbfounded, and all of us who wrote about the incident asked our interlocutors from the military leadership the same question: What were our air defense forces doing?

Albeit after some delay, I was disturbed by something else: To what extent are we protected against the ill will of people who have access to lethal weapons? Not nuclear weapons, but weapons capable of wreaking havoc such that a train wreck would seem like mere fireworks by comparison. And generally speaking, is it not strange that, at a military airfield—I repeat: a military airfield, and not, say, some airstrip for biplane training craft—a person could commandeer a fighter aircraft fully prepared for combat and standing by for duty just as easily as it once was to seize an AN-2 cropduster? How could it be that the swift, though not instantaneous, takeoff of an aircraft on standby status—an extraordinary, alarming event that could mean anything, up to and including the outbreak of war—was not prevented by even "domestic" means, at the airfield itself? How much time did the airfield services have, considering the fact that a MiG-29 is not a vertical-takeoff fighter but requires a concrete runway, taxiways, and so forth?

"I understand your doubts," said Colonel General of Aviation V. Pankin, Chief of the Air Force Main Staff. "A fair amount of time did elapse, perhaps enough time, say, to roll a truck out on the runway. Such a 'domestic'

expedient would have prevented the hijacked fighter from taking off. But the trouble is that Zuyev, an experienced flier who had undergone training for pilot 1st class, acted unconventionally in an unconventional situation, so to speak; he did not follow strict flight instructions. It would never even occur to any aviation specialist that an aircraft could take off with the protective covers and engine plugs still in place. True, I should clarify this by pointing out that a fighter on standby status isn't supposed to have the main plugs in its engine air intakes and nozzles. This saved Zuyev time: He simply didn't remove the protective covers. And he taxied up to the runway not with the utmost caution, as regulations require, but at a very high rate of speed. He took off as the aircraft was still moving, without the obligatory stop at the foot of the runway. In short, it took him four to four and one-half minutes from start to finish, too little time even for the ploy with the truck.

[Andreyev] Does it turn out, then, that there are no guarantees against incidents of this sort—or even more serious ones? In my opinion, Valentin Yefifanovich, this incident has a very happy ending. True, a guard was wounded, unfortunately, but the aircraft was returned and there were no deaths. One gets the impression that officer Zuyev was not quite of sound mind when he decided to take this extraordinary step. His actions smack of a bad detective novel: a cake laced with sleeping pills, severed telephone lines, first hand-to-hand combat with the guard, then a knife, and finally a pistol. In my opinion, that a very sick, mentally unstable person who was failing to live up to his military oath and wasn't getting along with his wife—and perhaps everyone else, as he saw it—decided "only" to fly across the border is not the worst thing that could have happened. It's a frightening thought, but what if he had taken the senseless decision to drop a salvo of bombs on the first target that came into view, as if to say, "here's to all of you."

[Pankin] We do, of course, take precautions against hijackings. But let me answer your question with another question: What should we do now? See the elite of the air force—our pilots—as potential hijackers? Not trust them, watch their every step, suspect a man only because he is quarreling with his wife, for example? I myself, when I was a rank and file pilot, was on standby duty often. If I had ever found out that someone had such misgivings about me, I would have been insulted, and would have told him: Either trust me completely, or relieve me of my flight responsibilities.

[Andreyev] Yes, the colonel general is right. Vigilance is one thing, no one disputes that. But universal suspicion won't help matters.

Details of MiG-29 Crash Discussed

18010712 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Jun 89 single edition p 4

[Article by Colonel A. Andryushkov: "He Was Thinking of the People: Our Special Correspondent Reports Details of the MiG-29 Crash in Bourges"]

[Text] At noon on 9 July as I crossed the threshold of the apartment of V. Lisin, naval attache in France, I was met

by Anatoliy Kvochur, test pilot for the OKB [experimental design bureau] imeni A.I. Mikoyan. It was that same Kvochur who, on 8 July, the opening day of the 38th International Air and Space Show at Bourges, won over tens of thousands of Frenchmen and foreign observers with his courage. Calm and smiling as always, he shook my hand firmly. Only a visible blue discoloration around his eyes indicated what had happened.

The weather that day was clear, as though the previous night's rain had washed the sky clean. The demonstration flights began according to plan. The world's best pilots showed their skill.

Anatoliy Kvochur was just completing his program. Passing over the runway in terrain-following mode, he put the MiG-29 into an abrupt, steep climb. And at that moment the right engine failed. Kvochur tried to restart it without success. At an altitude of 200 meters, the aircraft began to sink on its right wing.

"To my right I saw the stands full of people," recounts Anatoliy. "The path of the jet's fall was taking me in their direction. I turned the aircraft about and sent it into a steep dive toward an unpopulated area."

With only two seconds left in the air, Kvochur made a last check: The aircraft could not be saved, and no lives were threatened. He prepared himself and seized the lever of the ejection detonator. He even saw the nose of the aircraft crushing under the impact.

Anatoliy landed 30 meters from the burning jet. He had a hard landing because, with the low altitude, the canopy of the parachute had not had time to open fully. Fearing possible injuries, he deliberately refrained from getting to his feet. Fortunately, as an examination at a French military hospital showed, he escaped without injury. The pilot suffered only minor bruises. He spent less than a day in the military hospital and then was driven to the Soviet embassy. There they "hid" him, so to speak, from the countless telephone calls and importunate journalists.

Very soon Anatoliy Kvochur will return to his steady work—flying. I met with P.A. Belyakov, general designer of the OKB imeni A.I. Mikoyan, and asked him about possible explanations for the failure of the engine. He reported that the pilot bore absolutely no blame. Kvochur piloted the MiG-29 with consummate skill, faultlessly. The precision of Anatoliy Kvochur's work aloft and the tactical and technical capabilities of the combat aircraft evoked the admiration not only of the tens of thousands of spectators but also of foreign professionals and correspondents, as the foreign press shows.

According to the opinion of the general designer, the failure of the engine may be the result of a foreign object thrown up into the duct of the engine by the jet blasts of other aircraft taxiing past on the ground, or a collision in the air with birds.

An investigation being conducted by French specialists with our participation will provide a more exact diagnosis.

Causes of MiG-29 Air Show Crash: Pilot Error Eliminated

*18010804a Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Jun 89 Morning Edition p 11*

[Article by V. Belikov, IZVESTIYA special correspondent, Paris: "Le Bourges Air Show: The Pilot Was Not at Fault in the Accident"]

[text] Soviet test pilot Anatoliy Kvochur, having experienced an accident in a MiG-29 on 8 June during a demonstration flight over Le Bourges Airfield near Paris, was released from Bejans Military Hospital on Friday and plans to continue participating in the 38th International Aerospace Show.

Instead of answering the IZVESTIYA correspondent, A. Systov, minister of the Aviation Industry and head of the Soviet delegation, produced an official document testifying to the satisfactory health of the pilot, who saved himself by ejecting from an aircraft which was diving toward the ground at an altitude of 120 meters. Several typed lines on a hospital form are more eloquent than any commentary and talked about the outcome of the incident at the international aircraft review.

However, journalists from many countries continue to invade the official residence of the Soviet Union at Le Bourges while attempting to ascertain details about the unique rescue of the pilot of the supersonic fighter aircraft which was flying at a relatively low altitude.

V. Morgun, the Soviet delegation's doctor, said: "I conducted a medical examination of the pilot two hours prior to engine start as usual. I was convinced that he was perfectly healthy and he was cleared for all flights without limitations. Here is the entry from the pre-flight medical exam log: "Blood pressure 130 over 80, pulse 64"—It could not be better! For his 37 years, he is in outstanding physical condition and he is actively involved in karate.

"Anatoliy Kvochur is not prone to senseless or thoughtless risk," emphasized the doctor. "Calculating composure, self-control, an ability to critically assess a situation and, of course, a pilot's natural talent. After ejecting and a very hard landing with a barely deployed parachute, his only injury was an abrasion over his right eyebrow. He can resume his flying duties after he returns home."

K. Marten, supervisor of flying at the air show: "The accident undoubtedly occurred due to some sort of malfunction in equipment operation and not due to pilot error. The pilot strictly adhered to established flight safety regulations. The program of demonstration performances is already continuing at Le Bourges, but it is possible that the exhibition committee may ban the performance of certain complicated flight maneuvers which are fraught with danger."

M. Valdenberg, deputy chief designer of the OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni A. Mikoyan: "Our confidence in this aircraft type allows me to say that we will continue our demonstration flights in two to three days after a thorough preventive maintenance inspection of the MiG-29 two-seat variant which is also at the air show.

"The 'black box' from the destroyed aircraft has been found and sent to Moscow for deciphering monitored recordings with the participation of a French expert. Right now, I can only say that, during the MiG-29's 12 year 'biography,' not once has its engines had such a deep stall as on this occasion. The automated system, which has operated thousands of times till now and under more critical flying conditions, failed in this situation. Why? We need to look into it.

"I have no doubt about Anatoliy Kvochur's first-class flying skill and outstanding engineering training. The program which he was carrying out and, unfortunately, could not complete, did not present any particular difficulties and it is designed for any skilled pilot."

Pilot-cosmonaut J.L. Chretiens:

"The magnificent newly-designed ejection seat installed in the fighter aircraft saved the pilot's life. The pilot's special sort of sixth sense precisely selected the moment of separation from the doomed aircraft. A bit earlier and he would have landed where the aircraft exploded, a bit later and he would have been thrown to the ground by the ejection seat. The difference was a fraction of a second!"

Test-pilot A. Kvochur:

"As soon as I understood that one of the two engines would not go on afterburner and its thrust was not being restored, I did everything to prevent the aircraft from rotating to the right. I initiated the ejection process. Incidentally, I used it for the first time in my flying career. Striking the ground was very painful, my muscles still ache but, as you can see, I am getting around on my own. I will return to Le Bourges in a day or two."

Causes of MiG-29 Air Show Crash: Fuselage Air Intakes Open to Debris

18010804b Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Jun 89 Second Edition p 6

[Article by N. Dombrovskiy: "One MiG Moment—'Black Box' Epilogue to the Accident at Le Bourges"] txt
[Text] They traditionally call this metallic box painted a garishly bright orange a "black box." The recording devices located inside "remember" the details of all flight stages and, in case of an accident, help the experts recreate a picture of it. Today was one such case. With the help of experts from the OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni A.I. Mikoyan, we recreated, second by second, everything that occurred to the Soviet MiG-29 fighter-aircraft in Paris on opening day of the International Air Show.

He flew like God. The 26-year-old graduate of test pilot school was youngest of all but had flown many more hours in the air than his classmates. Aleksandr Vasilevich Fedotov, famous test pilot and chief-pilot of the Mikoyan "firm," immediately paid attention to him. But Anatoliy Nikolayevich Kvochur was first sent to a serial production plant as a test pilot.

Anatoliy had been flying from the plant's airfield for two years when he finally became a KB [Design Bureau] test pilot six days prior to his 29th birthday at the end of April, 1981.

Experience and skill, frequently gained both on the ground and in the air in unusual situations and in getting out of them, helped him to complete the unthinkable in the skies over Le Bourges when hundreds of human lives depended on Anatoliy's courage and skill.

Eight June, 15:45 Paris time. The MiG-29 is on the runway. The engines have been started and Kvochur is waiting for the supervisor of flying to give him permission to take-off. A large, turboprop transport aircraft was taxiing along the field in front of our fighter aircraft. It raised a cloud of dust, pebbles, and even rocks from the ground. Both of the MiG's air intakes are protected from foreign object damage but there is yet another air intake apparatus on the top of the fuselage. It was difficult to suggest to the designers that unneeded objects would fall from the air...

The engines were operating normally and the cockpit instruments did not indicate any deviations.

Take off at 15:48. Kvochur accelerates, the fighter aircraft takes off easily, and performs aerobatics. And, suddenly, observers on the ground noticed a short, but powerful tongue of flame blow out of the right engine nozzle. From that moment, calculations were in seconds.

Carefully read the following paragraphs. Everything said in them took approximately one second on a real-time scale.

When Aleksandr Nikolayevich pushed the engine control lever forward forcing the engines to increase RPM's, the unforeseen occurred. The right engine compressor operated normally but another device, the fan, suddenly sharply decreased RPM's. As aviators say it, an engine stall occurred. In other words, it "swallowed the wrong way."

Kvochur caught on to what had occurred in hundredths of a second. The aircraft with the failed right engine began to sharply lean to the right. At that time, the altitude was exactly 180 meters and speed was approaching 200 kilometers per hour. The rudder does not operate very effectively at this speed and Anatoliy Nikolayevich used all of his strength and skill to not let the fighter aircraft slide to the right. It was there, precisely there, that the spectator stand was located.

He was able to keep it from going to the right. I have again and again looked at videotape, frame by frame, and I see the pilot ejecting from an aircraft moving vertically toward the ground at an unthinkable low altitude—45 meters. The parachute canopy has barely succeeded in filling with air as the pilot touches the ground. Fractions of a second earlier, the MiG, which had struck the ground sharply, had exploded.

What caused the engine failure? Analysis of the "black box" recordings and examination of the fragments showed: The fan blades were seriously damaged by a foreign object which ended up in the engine. What was it? There are two versions—either a rock, blown in by the propellers of the heavy aircraft, or a bird. Incidentally, there was a similar incident during training flights near Moscow. But, frankly speaking, despite all of my desires to do so, I did not manage to see a single bird on the videotape. According to expert testimony, there were quite a few birds at Le Bourges that day.

A reasonable question arises: Can our aircraft really not fly on one engine? Even pilots of line units can basically handle such situations. But demonstration flights occur in unusually complicated regimes. That is how it was on that day. I dare believe that no other aircraft, neither the F-14, F-15, nor others similar to them, could get out of that critical situation in similar flying conditions.

The French press, noting the Soviet pilot's skill, thanked him over and over again for his courage.

Soviet-French Document on MiG-29 Investigation Signed

*18010810 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Jun 89 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Colonel A. Andryushkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent: "Cause—Engine Compressor Stall: Joint Soviet-French MiG-29 Accident Investigation Document Is Signed"]

[Text] The most varied rumors are being spread about the causes of the MiG-29 accident. Test pilot Anatoliy Kvochur piloted the aircraft on the 8 June opening day of the 38th International Aerospace Show. During the first few days, the Western mass media even managed to report the pilot's death.

Only the commission created on the day of the accident and chaired by French General Rujeban Beauville can establish the true cause of the accident. From the Soviet side, MiG-29 Chief Designer M. Valdenberg; OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni A.I. Mikoyan Chief

Pilot, Hero of the Soviet Union and decorated USSR test pilot V. Menitskiy; and, Central Institute of Engine Building Head D. Ogorodnikov were members of the commission.

The commission worked intensively for seven days before arriving at a conclusion. To understand the entire complexity of the task it faced, let us return to the starting point. That day the weather near Paris was rainy and heavy rains had fallen the day before. There were thick low-lying clouds over the ground. Nevertheless, there was not a cloud in the sky at Le Bourges. Tens of thousands of spectators filled the observation areas and the surrounding areas. There were fewer tickets (each cost 35 francs and higher) than those desiring to attend the aviation holiday.

Flights began on schedule. I have a copy of the schedule on the desk in front of me and I have found Anatoliy Kvochur's interrupted flight. The American F-18 and several other aircraft had flown before he did. The Soviet MiG-29 taxied out to the take-off position. Local time was 15:30.

Immediately prior to engine start, Aircraft Mechanic A. Zverev removed the covers from the air intakes as usual. Under these conditions, the engine itself cannot "ingest" anything from the ground, it simply does not have enough power. In the opinions of the many specialists with whom I had the opportunity to discuss the accident, it could have occurred due to an air current from a Northrop turboprop aircraft taxiing by at the time because a dust whirlwind raised by its propellers wrapped around the MiG-29.

Anatoliy Kvochur took off at 15:42 and immediately flew the MiG-29 into a series of aerobatic figures. Two minutes later, he flew over the runway at minimal speed and put the aircraft into a climb.

"I heard a bang in the area of the right engine," Kvochur told me, "and immediately felt a sharp reduction in thrust. The aircraft began to turn and stood on its wing..." We already know the rest. Less than two seconds later, the MiG-29 hit the ground and exploded. During that time, Kvochur managed to turn the aircraft away from the viewing stand toward an empty spot on the airfield and eject.

Television and videocameras recorded the Soviet pilot's dramatic flight for posterity. I have watched the cassette recording of the MiG's last seconds many times and could not fight the feeling of unreality about what was occurring. But reality convinced me: The pilot's skill and the ejection system's high reliability saved his life.

The aircraft's remains and engines were carefully gathered and delivered to the cargo compartment of our giant "Mriya" [Soviet nickname for the AN-225] for study. The commission worked each day from morning to late evening. And the investigation report has been signed.

Incidentally, journalists were not allowed access to the commission's work. I met with V. Menitskiy, official commission member, after the session and asked him to answer several questions.

"Valeriy Yevgenievich, what conclusion did you come to about the causes of the engine shutdown?"

"The answer is simple: The right engine compressor stalled in the air with a subsequent sharp reduction in thrust."

"Could the pilot 'cut-off' the engine and land on one engine?"

"That possibility was excluded in this situation. Kvochur was in extremely unfavorable, temporary spatial conditions. What he did was the only competent decision."

"Next question. What caused the stall?"

"Time will be required to answer that question," answered Menitskiy. "We need to carefully examine the remains of the power plant. Meanwhile, the opinion formed by the commission is that there are possible several causes each of which could have led to an engine compressor stall. The specific cause will be established after complete dismantling of the engine and its study in Moscow by leading experts of TsAGI [Central Institute of Aerodynamics imeni N.Ye. Zhukovskiy], NIIRAT [Scientific Research Institute of Jet Aviation Technology], and other institutes..."

Thus, V. Menitskiy, as an official accident investigation commission representative, described only what has been done and how the work will be continued but did not specifically answer my question. The French side is also silent in this regard.

Talking with pilots and experts of many aviation companies, I also heard this version from them which, in my view, is entirely possible: A small bird flew into the engine. After the rain, many of them were hiding in the airfield's grass. With the warming of the air, they began to fly. I myself saw small flocks of birds among which there seemed to be aircraft involved in aerobatics. The possibility that one of them could have entered the aircraft's engine has not been eliminated. But this is a personal opinion which is possibly at odds with the conclusion that the commission made and wrote in the accident report.

Recently, many have been worried about Anatoliy Kvochur's health. He is calming everyone right now. This is the third day that Kvochur has been greeting spectators at the airfield from morning until the air show closes. Incidentally, the pilot knows English quite well, is granting interviews to journalists, and has been studying flight documentation for hours.

"Anatoliy," I asked Kvochur today, "What commercial flight are you flying home on?" He looked at me with surprise.

"I have one aircraft: a MiG-29. I will fly home to our country in it!" This wish of Kvochur's who runs cross-country daily, does 40 pushups, and feels that he is in good health, is also supported by R.A. Belyakov, OKB chief designer.

"Look for yourself, Tolya," he said to the pilot in a fatherly manner.

Division General Vuni Phillippe, commander of French SAC [Strategic Air Command] Air Force and Corps General Gegen Christian, commander of French Air Force Air Defense Forces, recently visited the Soviet Pavilion at Le Bourges. They said that the SU-27 is the best aircraft at the air show. The experts are amazed at its survivability, the multitude of redundant systems, the might of its weaponry, and its superior maneuverability. Referring to the MiG-29, Gegen Christian said that it is a very reliable aircraft. Besides, it is cheapest in comparison with other aircraft in its class.

Today, 16 June, we are anticipating a visit to the air show by the Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Armed Forces. The AN-225 "Mriya," the largest and most powerful aircraft in the world, is being prepared for a demonstration flight. All these days, spectators have been waiting for the AN-225's flight, just like pilgrims at a holy place. Everyone has free access to the Mriya, as, incidentally, to all other Soviet aircraft at Le Bourges. Children are especially happy about that.

We are continuing to conclude sales contracts with foreign aviation firms for our aircraft. Yesterday, I learned from official sources: Such a business contract has been signed with Bulgaria for sale of TU-204's and IL-96-300's.

Results of Joint Commission Investigation of MiG-29 Crash

18010826 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian
30 Jun 89 Second Edition p 8

[Article by A. Gorokhov: "When Seconds Count... About the Accident at Le Bourges"]

[Text] The Soviet-French Commission investigating the MiG-29 fighter aircraft accident at Le Bourges Airfield (France) has completed its work. The accident occurred during a demonstration flight performed by Anatoliy Kvochur, a 37-year-old test pilot of the OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni A. Mikoyan, on opening day of the International Aeronautics and Space Show on 8 June 1989. The final communiqué was signed in Moscow on the French side by General Rujeban-Beaumville and on the Soviet side by D. Ogorodnikov, head of the Central Aviation Engine Building Institute.

The language of the official documents is impassive, there is no emotion in them, no stirring of the human spirit or intentions. The main thing in them is the word for word translation.

Yesterday at the Experimental Design Bureau imeni A. Mikoyan, the one which develops fighter aircraft with the MiG designation, I was handed a document which I will list below in full, all the more so since it is quite short. Thus, the joint communiqué:

"The Commission established that the cause of the aircraft accident was a bird strike at the intake of the right engine which caused the engine's destruction and a sharp reduction of thrust. Due to the low flight speed (180 kilometers per hour) and low altitude (160 meters), the pilot could not prevent the accident.

"The pilot, having taken all necessary steps and convinced that the falling aircraft would not harm either people or physical assets, abandoned the aircraft which was in a vertical dive at an altitude of 92 meters. The pilot was not hurt and continues to carry out his duties.

"We must note the rapidity and effectiveness of the actions of the Le Bourges airfield's rescue and fire services."

That is the complete text. And how much does it represent! Both tears, joy, and a real heartstopper.

Sufficient time has already passed since that June day when Kvochur's first demonstration flight ended in such an unbelievable manner. Passions have subsided. Anatoliy, to the great joy of his wife, Valentina, and the children, has returned to his Zhukovskiy home near Moscow. He did not return on a hospital stretcher (I emphasize this circumstance but I am knocking on wood at the same time anyway), but in a MiG-29 two-seat combat trainer. Roman Taskayev, a test pilot from the same OKB, flew back with him. The sufficiently unusual and psychologically very difficult mission fell upon Roman to demonstrate in the "sparka" [two-seater trainer] what Kvochur did not succeed in doing in the combat variant of the aircraft, and to restore, so to speak, the firm's reputation. Although, by the way, purchasers of Soviet fighter aircraft have a good command of not only monetary assets, but an understanding of aviation issues as well. And I think that this unintentional demonstration which exceeded normal limits and posed unthinkable conditions for the rescue equipment installed on the MiG (the K-36 ejection seat designed by G. Severin) made a great impression upon them.

But this is, I repeat, by the way. Let us get acquainted with the test pilot. Anatoliy Kvochur is a graduate of Yeysk Military Aviation School for Pilots. After four years of service with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, he made his way into the Ministry of Aviation

Industry Test Pilot School, worked for three years at an aircraft serial production plant and, "selected" by our distinguished pilot A. Fedotov eight years ago, ended up at the OKB.

Major General G. Sedov, Hero of the Soviet Union and Lenin and State Prize laureate, was chief pilot at the MiG firm at one time. Having moved into an office in the design bureau, he left talented pupils and followers on the test airfield which allowed, within aviation circles, naming the approach to flight testing which took shape at the enterprise during those decades the "Sedov School," and afterwards, the "Sedov—Fedotov—Menitskiy School" (by the last names of senior pilots). Kvochur became widely known after last year's aviation exhibition at Farnborough (Great Britain) where Soviet MiG-29 fighter aircraft and, naturally, test pilots, were at the center of attention.

I am convinced that the communique about the accident at Le Bourges plunged both the Mikoyan aircraft builders and the designers from the OKB imeni V. Klimov, in particular, who created the MiG-29's RD-33 ducted fan engines, into a state close to shock. According to its technical and operational characteristics, it is considered to be one of the best engines in the world in its class. This accident turned out to be even more disappointing since it immediately became clear that its cause was right engine failure.

I met with Anatoliy Kvochur at the enterprise. Having heard that Kvochur had arrived, KB [Design Bureau] experts continuously attempted to drop by Chief Designer A. Belosvet's office throughout the course of our two-hour conversation, on business, under the guise of business, and in every way possible to demonstrate their happiness that the pilot was alive and well. This detail may appear to be insignificant but it is characteristic of the firm and of the designers' attitude toward the pilots who enjoy enormous prestige within the collective.

So that the essence of our conversation would be clear, I will remind you about everything that occurred at Le Bourges to the accuracy of a second. At 13:30 local time, Kvochur taxied out to the take-off point and took off at 13:42. He completed a loop immediately after take-off, afterward, a "bell" with a turn onto a reverse course, a double horizontal roll, a "square" loop, a 360 degree bank and went into a segment called "at minimal speed" ... That very one...

A similar segment is a mandatory part of the demonstration program of practically all aircraft. Here the aircraft's "capability" is demonstrated to maintain itself in the air at a speed at which in principle it cannot fly (on the television screen in the enterprise's museum when we were looking at videotapes, we could see very well how, pulling up the nose, the MiG slows down and almost stops). This is the hardest flight attitude and is obviously

forbidden for line pilots. After a passover at minimum speed and altitude, Kvochur had to turn on the engines' afterburner mode and vertically fly up to altitude.

The third minute of the flight passed. At 13:44:57 a flame exploded from the right engine (a non-designed mode, as the experts say, an engine compressor stall) and the aircraft began to tumble to the right. At 13:45:01—the fighter aircraft "pointed" its nose at the ground, at 13:45:03.5—ejection, altitude—92 meters. At 13:45:05—an explosion, Kvochur was on the ground about 30 meters from the flames. At 13:46, the French rescue team had arrived to extinguish the fire.

Altogether, 7.2 seconds passed from the bang to the "incredible" landing.

Practically all of the Mikoyan employees who arrived in Paris watched the demonstration from the Soviet Pavilion's balcony. Academician and Chief Designer R. Belyakov, Head Designer M. Valdenberg, Test Flight Complex Chief V. Tropitskiy, the firm's Senior Pilot and Hero of the Soviet Union V. Menitskiy, Roman Taskayev (operated the videocamera), and Doctor Valentina Morgun... In short, everyone. Do they remember the details of those seconds when the MiG, to their horror, suddenly tumbled and fell down? No, they do not remember. Stupor and confusion... The Canadians at the next viewing stand were in such confusion that they did not know how to help.

Valdenberg rushed down, jumped over several obstructions, and having avoided the police, rushed across the field at perhaps record speed for his quite considerable age. Nevertheless, the police caught Tropitskiy... It was visible from the balcony that there was some kind of fuss or "commotion" on the airfield, not at the aircraft which was skillfully extinguished, but where the pilot landed. Something happened there. But what? No one knew anything for 10 to 15 minutes.

And the following occurred there. Already having been hurriedly placed on a stretcher by his French rescuers, Kvochur suddenly caught sight of Valdenberg (V. Utkin also ran there, he was the MiG's senior mechanic at the air show) and asked:

"Mikhail Romanovich! What is the matter with you, you look awful!"

Kvochur himself was showing off a bandage over his right eye; the oxygen mask had torn off and it barely injured his eyebrow...

Several hours later the chief designer received a note from the hospital from Kvochur. Rostislav Apollosovich, naturally, kept the note and he showed it to me yesterday. A very curious document! Here are both analysis, emotion, and intention. Here are several fragments from it:

"I knew that the (air)craft would not fall on the spectators. I eject(ed) using my left hand."

"I am convinced that we did not have even one instance of such a deep engine compressor stall, even during the initial stage of aircraft flight testing."

"...I suppose that the cause could be a foreign object striking into the engine intake."

"...I think that the power plant allows operation of the aircraft without limitations through regulation of thrust throughout the whole range of altitudes and angles of attack."

"I will be ready to demonstrate this in a couple of days."

"I think the remaining MiG-29 can continue the demonstration flights."

And here I am talking with the test pilot. Of course, he is bursting to go into action, to which G. Sedov pointed out: We are forbidding him to fly at heavy positive G-loads for now and we will look more closely into his state of health.

"When I heard the bang," the pilot recalled, "I felt a slight movement of the aircraft to the right and the right engine's rpm's abruptly dropped in an abnormal manner."

"According to the recordings," commented A. Belosvet, "It looked as if someone "grabbed" the fan. Skidding developed. Tolya immediately pressed the left pedal (0.2 seconds, faster than a booster) and pushed the stick to the left, completely, that is balancing the aircraft while there was the possibility, although the ailerons' effectiveness was two and a half times less than the minimum required for formation flying. According to the decoded "black box" recordings, it is obvious that Anatoliy balanced the aircraft during those four seconds and did not allow it to move toward the reviewing stand."

"This is a normal reaction for a pilot," thinks Kvochur. "If it pulls to the right, then that is bad since there are spectators and aircraft on the ground there. Some time was spent analyzing the trajectory. When I understood that the right engine would not "re-start" and when I became convinced that the aircraft would not fly any farther, but would fall on the spot it was flying over, I made the decision to eject."

"Was it a difficult decision?"

"Of course. It is always difficult for any pilot to eject, to abandon his aircraft. It is even harder for a test pilot. And, furthermore, at this air show. It was a very severe disappointment! I ejected at an altitude of a bit more than 90 meters. That altitude is, of course, substantially less than that which we officially recommend to line pilots in our technical documentation."

I heard him and thought about a concept which is so necessary to all of us, "professionalism." In this instance, it includes planning each flight, planning each flight mode, and working out actions in various unusual situations. Flight planning, let us say, was such that the most complicated and risky portions and trajectories turned out to be, at any moment, a bit farther from the spectators, buildings, and aircraft. Last year at Farnborough, Kvochur and Taskayev flew immediately after the tragedy at Ramstein (FRG) where dozens of people died as a result of an aircraft collision. All of this was taken into account.

"I think," continued the test pilot, "that there must be a balanced risk. In the sense that we need to demonstrate equipment at the limit, even beyond the limits, but on the other hand, we need to do it while ensuring maximum safety. And yet, I have not once ejected [prior to this]. My comrades have jumped. And this is also a learning experience. Let us say, I fell, I felt myself, I did not spring to my feet, and did not manifest any extraordinary bravado. We do not need to twitch in such situations so that we do not harm ourselves. The force [of striking the ground] was quite strong..."

According to data which the firm has, at the moment that the aircraft's nose made contact with the ground, Kvochur was at the level of the tail, that is, at an altitude of 17 meters. His rate of descent was 26 meters per second. The parachute canopy had practically filled and succeeded in decreasing his speed to 11 meters per second. Of course, he hit the ground firmly...

Afterwards, I asked Academician R. Belyakov:

"Well, if a line unit which flies MiG-29's has a bird strike in one of the engines, what happens then, another accident?"

"No, it will not happen," said the chief designer. "The fact is that during the demonstration flight, the pilot demonstrated the maximum capabilities of the aircraft, in this instance flight at low speed and at low altitude, and at large angles of attack where controllability through banking is significantly reduced and the disturbing moments are greater during loss of thrust in one of the engines."

"In the flying modes which we demonstrated," continued R. Belyakov, "all twin-engine aircraft have these peculiarities. Asymmetrical moments do not arise in single-engine aircraft, but during reduction of thrust, altitude and speed are also reduced. The aircraft simply falls. All of the world's military aircraft builders proceed from the fact that, bird strikes are unlikely at such flight modes during demonstration flights."

"You certainly survived some tough moments there, not knowing the fate of the pilot for several minutes. And having only received news about the happy outcome and having caught sight of him, obviously your composure returned?"

"I agree. Anatoliy Nikolayevich manifested the exceptional qualities of a courageous professional test pilot worthy of his famous teachers. He did not leave any time at all for himself..."

Two days after the accident, Roman Taskayev and Navigator Yury Yermakov, with the approval of the French side, completed a controlled flight in the zone in a "sparka" [two-seat trainer], a MiG-29 combat trainer. He flew at tolerable G-loads which he paid for with a couple of punches on the ground from the navigator. But later, alone again, he "turned out" six demonstration flights in the MiG during the flying section of the program.

When it became time to return home, Kvochur asked to fly in the fighter aircraft. "Decide for yourself!" the chief designer told him. In the past a famous springboard

jumper, Academician R. Belyakov distinctly represented how to work, fly there, or play soccer while injured. That is why he said: "Decide for yourself!"

"I have already decided!" is all Kvochur said.

Ministry of Defense Statement on Errant MiG-23
18010834b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Jul 89 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article entitled: "In the USSR Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] On the 4th of July in one of the aviation units of the Northern Group of Forces during a training flight over the territory of the Polish People's Republic a military pilot was forced to eject from a MiG-23 fighter aircraft at low altitude as a result of a fault in aviation equipment. The pilot survived.

The aircraft continued uncontrolled flight in a westerly direction and crashed on Belgian territory.

The Soviet side has entered into contact with the governments of the states, through whose airspace the flying apparatus passed.

Sub Sinking: Interview with Rescue Aircraft Officer
*18010647b Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
12 Apr 89 p 4*

[Interview with rescue officers by SELSKAYA ZHIZN special correspondent Capt 3rd Rank Vladimir Yermolin: "Reporting the Details—Courage of the Submariners"; Severomorsk; first two paragraphs are SELSKAYA ZHIZN introduction]

[Text] As previously reported, on 7 April a fire broke out aboard a Soviet attack-type nuclear submarine navigating in neutral waters of the Norwegian Sea. Actions taken by the crew to extinguish the fire were unsuccessful. The craft sank.

Our special correspondent, Captain 3rd Rank Vladimir Yermolin, reports from Severomorsk.

[Yermolin] According to information provided by Northern Fleet Headquarters, there were 69 crew members aboard the craft, and 27 of them were rescued.

The ship was armed with two nuclear torpedoes. Their design is such that they present no nuclear hazards when immersed at great depths. For purposes of radiation safety, the nuclear power unit was shut down and the reactor securely damped. The reactor vessel cannot become contaminated. Radioactivity levels in the area are being monitored by qualified specialists aboard ships equipped with a broad spectrum of devices. Sampling of the atmosphere and waters in the accident area indicates that radiation contamination is absent and the radiation levels do not exceed natural values.

I spoke to those who participated in rescuing the submariners.

[Major General of Aviation V. Pupynin] "The Naval Air Force was the first to undertake rescue operations. Major G. Petrogradskikh's crew took to the air upon receiving the order. Upon arriving at the position of the submarine in distress, he established reliable contact with the craft and maintained communication for several hours. A second task undertaken by the flyers was directing the ships that were speeding toward the disaster area. When the submariners started to abandon ship, the airmen dropped lifesaving gear."

[Major G. Petrogradskikh] "We were given the alert. The theme was 'rescue,' with only minutes left before takeoff. We established contact with the craft some distance away from the scene of the accident. We were informed by the craft that a fire had broken out in a compartment and that the crew was fighting to save the ship. There were victims. The crew was still functioning without outside help. There was cloud cover in the area. We found a 'window,' descended and made a pass over the boat. She came through clearly. I subsequently established contact with the Northern Fleet service craft

'Kolguyev,' which was carrying fishermen in the area. The tender "Aleksey Khlobystov" and a small seiner headed toward the distress craft. My calculations indicated that their average speed was about 14 knots. This speed was such that they would require several hours to arrive at their destination. They were the ships closest to the scene of the accident.

"The messages we were receiving from the submarine were relatively low-key. They all related to the crew's fight to save the ship. The crew made several requests for additional firefighting equipment, and we discussed the possibility of towing. Then, at about 1700, we received messages of a more urgent kind. The crew was preparing to abandon ship.

"To us, observing events from above, the end of the craft was near. The crew started to abandon ship only at the last moment. Some of the personnel were aboard liferafts, some in the water. The water temperature in that area does not exceed 2 to 3 degrees. In addition, the wind was picking up. Judging by the crests of the waves, it was a case of sea state 3. We employed all the means at our disposal to accurately guide the incoming vessels toward the seamen afloat on the water. The search was also complicated by sudden snow squalls. By this time our fuel supply was on the borderline. Having done virtually everything that we could, we still could not fly away. It was a situation where we were the only support—at that moment merely moral—for the personnel below hanging on for their lives.

"On Saturday the 8th of April, the last of the aircraft operating that day in the search area landed."

[Officer I. Masliy] "We combed an area of several dozen square kilometers, flying at low altitudes. Visibility was good. Unfortunately, we detected no personnel or materiel."

[Yermolin] Late in the evening of 8 April the Main Naval Hospital of the Northern Fleet was making preparations to admit the crew members of the sunken craft. It was already known that the submariners had been transferred from the "Aleksey Khlobysov" to the cruiser "Kirov," which was proceeding toward Severomorsk at full speed. Major General Medical Service V. Zheglov, Naval Medical Service chief, and Major General Medical Service V. Ivashkin, Armed Forces chief treatment specialist, met with the hospital's doctors. Their discussions concentrated on countering the effects of stress caused by extended exposure to low temperatures.

[Yermolin] I asked Major General V. Zheglov the question:

"How long, medically speaking, can a man survive in water at a temperature not greater than 5 degrees?"

[Major General Zheglov] "Much depends upon the person himself, including his mental fitness. About 20 minutes, on the average."

[Yermolin] It was the morning of 9 April. The hospital was admitting the first patients, crew members of the sunken submarine.

[Officer B. Kolyada] "Thanks to all who came to our assistance, especially the fishermen of the tender 'Aleksey Khlobystov.'"

[Captain Lieutenant A. Verezgov] "I feel well. Phone my wife Natasha in Leningrad and tell her that I am alive and well."

[Warrant Officer V. Kadantsev] "We did all we could."

[Yermolin] It was the 10th of April, and I was still at the hospital. I asked about the health of the submariners. Major General Ivashkin and his colleagues judged the health of the submariners to be satisfactory.

List of Submarine Casualties Published
18010571 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Apr 89 First Edition p 6

[Unattributed article: "In Eternal Memory of the Fallen Submariners"]

[Text] SEVEROMORSK. Yesterday the Northern Fleet held a funeral ceremony for the officers, warrant officers and seamen that died in the sinking of the submarine on 7 April in the Norwegian Sea. The farewell ceremony was held on the remote base of "registry" of the submarine, which had been named the "Komsomolets" a short time before she sailed on her final mission.

On the previous day, members of the State Commission, headed by CPSU Central Committee Secretary O. D. Baklanov, met with relatives of the deceased. They were given condolences for their loss and offered the opportunity of expressing their feelings.

The ceremony took place in the hall of the fleet officers' club. Displayed on the stage was the Navy flag at half-mast. There were many flowers and wreaths from relatives and friends, brothers- and comrades-in-arms, party and soviet organs. Set up at the heads of the 19 coffins were peaked caps and sailors' caps; for officers and warrant officers there were dirks crossed with sheaths.

It is difficult to relate the depth of the pain and grief suffered by the parents, widows, and children of the deceased submariners that were carrying out their military duty. If there can be any consolation here, it can be only that their sons, husbands, and fathers died real heroes.

A funeral meeting was held in a square located in front of the fleet officers' club. Admiral of the Fleet V. N. Chernavin, the commander in chief of the Navy and deputy USSR minister of defense, speaking as a representative of the State Commission, pointed out the courage and steadfastness of the submarine's crew. He said that the tragic incident brought out the best qualities of the Soviet seamen.

Participating in the meeting were O. D. Baklanov, chairman of the State Commission and CPSU Central Committee secretary; I. S. Belousov, deputy chairman, USSR Council of Ministers; Admiral of the Fleet A. I. Sorokin, first deputy chief, Main Political Directorate, Soviet Army and Navy; A. K. Balagurov, first secretary, Murmansk party obkom; Admiral V. I. Panin, Military Council member and chief of Political Directorate, Navy; and representatives from military collectives. Servicemen from the base and city residents were in attendance to pay their final respects.

The deceased will be buried at locations specified by their relatives and friends.

On the same day, a ship carrying relatives of the submariners whose bodies were lost at sea headed out for open water. Wreaths were cast onto the ocean waters in observance of an ancient naval tradition.

Eternal memory to the submariners! The Soviet people will not forget their deed or their names, which hopefully will be engraved in stone:

Captain 1st Rank Talant Amitzhanovich Burkulakov—chief, Submarine Political Department.

Captain 1st Rank Yevgeniy Alekseyevich Vanin—submarine commander.

Captain 3rd Rank Yuriy Ivanovich Maksimchuk—deputy submarine commander for political affairs.

Captain 2nd Rank Oleg Grigoryevich Avanesov—senior deputy submarine commander.

Captain 2nd Rank Valentin Ivanovich Babenko—engineer officer.

Captain 3rd Rank Aleksandr Vasilyevich Volodin—communications officer.

Captain 3rd Rank Anatoliy Matveyevich Ispenkov—division commander.

Captain 3rd Rank Sergey Petrovich Manyazhin—division commander.

Captain 3rd Rank Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Yudin—division commander.

Captain-Lieutenant Nikolay Alekseyevich Volkov—engineer officer.

Captain-Lieutenant Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Naumenko—hydroacoustics group officer.

Captain-Lieutenant Sergey Aleksandrovich Nezhutin—group commander.

Captain-Lieutenant Mikhail Anatolyevich Smirnov—navigation officer.

Captain-Lieutenant Igor Leonidovich Speranskiy—hydroacoustics group engineer.

Senior Lieutenant Sergey Yevgenyevich Markov—engineer (electrotechnical) officer.

Lieutenant Vadim Vladimirovich Zimin—communications engineer.

Lieutenant Igor Aleksandrovich Molchanov—mine and torpedo officer.

Lieutenant Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Shostak—remote control group engineer.

Senior Warrant Officer Vladimir Vlasovich Tkach—chief quartermaster.

Warrant Officer Sergey Stepanovich Bondar—turbine technician.

Warrant Officer Yury Anatolyevich Brodovskiy—hydroacoustics group technician.

Warrant Officer Mikhail Nikolayevich Valyanin—technician.

Warrant Officer Mikhail Anatolyevich Yelenik—senior cook instructor.

Warrant Officer Sergey Vasilyevich Zamogilnyy—CPO in charge, electrotechnical group.

Warrant Officer Yury Fedorovich Kapusta—security chief.

Warrant Officer Gennadiy Vyacheslavovich Kovalev—communications technician.

Warrant Officer Vladimir Vasilyevich Kolotilin—remote control group technician.

Warrant Officer Aleksandr Vitalyevich Krasnobayev—technician.

Warrant Officer Sergey Vasilyevich Nakhalov—CPO in charge.

Warrant Officer Sergey Ivanovich Chernikov—chemical technician.

Petty Officer 2nd Class Sergey Petrovich Golovchenko—cook instructor.

Senior Seaman Igor Olegovich Apanasyevich—quartermaster.

Senior Seaman Nadari Otariyevich Bukhnikashvili—machinist.

Senior Seaman Yevgeniy Edmundovich Vershilo—electrician.

Senior Seaman Stasis Klemenovich Shinkunas—radar operator.

Seaman Aleksey Aleksandrovich Grundul—torpedo officer.

Seaman Sergey Yuryevich Krasnov—radar operator.

Seaman Vladimir Yurevich Kulapin—machinist.

Seaman Andrey Vyacheslavovich Mikhalev—machinist.

Seaman Valeriy Ivanovich Sukhanov—cook instructor

Seaman Vitaliy Fedorovich Tkachev—quartermaster.

Seaman Roman Konstantinovich Filippov—electrician.

Sub Sinking: Fire at Launcher Station
18010647a Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Apr 89 p 6

[Article by N. Dombkovskiy: "Moments of Courage—The Crew of the Nuclear-Powered Submarine 'Komsomolets'"]

[Text] The latest independent cruise was to be largely experimental; the purpose was to adjust the equipment and train the personnel.

There were 69 men. They all had different pasts, personalities, knowledge, and habits. They were of various ages and not all their native languages were the same. What was the bond that held them together even when mortal danger struck, with each one forgetting about himself and helping his comrade?

Although I did not know Captain 1st Rank Yevgeniy Alekseyevich Vanin, the life of the commander of the "Komsomolets" is of great interest to me.

On 28 October of last year, Senior Cook Mikhail Anatolyevich Yelenin climbed the conning tower of the "Komsomolets" to present a basket of fresh flowers to the commander! Far from shore, under water over which the darkness of polar night reigned, and suddenly—roses!

After taking a closer look, the watch realized that the basket and multicolored flowers were nothing else but a cake. It must have required much work in the galley, but the wicker basket with handle, which was made of shortbread flour, and the cream roses all looked real.

"To say that Yevgeniy Alekseyevich was well-liked would probably be putting it mildly," said Captain 3rd Rank Vladimir Ivanovich Yelmanov, the submarine's radio officer. "I met him about ten years ago, when he was serving as executive officer aboard our boat. Later, when he was appointed commander, I requested a transfer so that I could serve with him on the other boat."

People who are unfamiliar with military service often ask the question: Why are political officers needed? This kind of question would be asked by someone who knows nothing about military life. Today the political officer is a psychologist, one who boosts morale in the military collective, one who helps each serviceman find himself, lifts the spirits of personnel, assists in coping with separation from home.

Captain 3rd Rank Yuriy Ivanovich Maksimchuk, deputy commander for political affairs of the "Komsomolets," was indeed that kind of man.

"Life on a long cruise consists of two alternating periods: duty and rest," contributed Aleksandr Kopeyka, the submarine's Komsomol organization secretary. "You just cannot sleep all the time, since boredom sets in if you do. People's time must be somehow occupied. This is where Yuriy Ivanovich never ran out of things to do. Suffice it to say that he organized an endless number of games, with virtually everyone responsible for one of them."

There was no warning of trouble. Suddenly, . . .

At 1103, fire broke out in compartment No 7. The fire system was activated.

At 1121, the launcher station in compartment No 4 suddenly burst into flames. The fire spread. The commander decided to surface.

Captain 1st Rank B. G. Kolyada related that:

"The ship's company worked smoothly and heroically. Burning oil vapors engulfed one of the spaces in flames; a wall of fire similar to a mortar barrage swept through the space. Just at that time, officer Sergey Dvorov bent down to cover pipelines, and the fire went by him. Sergey immediately set about pulling victims up to top deck."

Until 1845 the crew—in spite of everything—maintained the hope that the ship would be saved. Only when resounding noises were heard in the aft section and the "Komsomolets" exhibited trim by the stern did it become clear that the strong hull was destroyed. It was necessary to abandon ship.

All the above events occurred at enormous depth. When the commander heard voices coming from below, he again quickly boarded the ship, and the "Komsomolets" was submerging.

A powerful explosion occurred under the rescue chamber. Specialists were to tell me that later that at that instant the boat had apparently struck sea bottom. The instant it struck, the hull was destroyed and the rescue chamber became detached. This meant that the men were coming up from a depth of 1,500 meters! An unheard-of occurrence!

There, at that depth, the inrushing water displaced the air to produce in the rescue chamber an overpressure of almost half an atmosphere. When the rescue chamber burst to the surface, the compressed air knocked out the upper hatch. Chernikov and Slyusarenko were thrown out, the water rushed into the chamber, and the latter sank to the sea floor to become the tomb of Captain 1st Rank Vanin, Captain 3rd Rank Yudin, and Warrant Officer Krasnobayev.

Slyusarenko kept himself afloat for about 40 minutes; he was the last to be picked up.

When the explosion that freed the rescue chamber occurred at the depth, there were about 40 men gripping the life raft.

Vladimir Yelmanov held onto the raft with one hand while maintaining a grip on a comrade with his other hand. When Warrant Officer Vladimir Tkach—who had sailed on 11 cruises—surfaced, the cry "Boys, make room, the boatswain is not well!" resounded over the raft. The half-dressed submariners, who had a difficult time of it in the icy and stormy sea, made room so that the 47-year old veteran could take hold of the island of hope.

How many more examples there were! As Warrant Officer Yuriy Kapusta was squeezing out of the boat wearing his life vest, he saw two men close by. Yuriy Fedorovich, without second thought, thrust his equipment at them and said, "Grab this, comrades!" The warrant officer lost his life saving his comrades.

When they heard the explosion occur below, the seamen thought that the life raft had burst. Captain 1st Rank Kolyada told them, "The boat is gone." Then, without prompting, the submariners started to sing: "Topside, comrades, to your stations! This is the final review!"

Captain 3rd Rank Vladimir Yelmanov related the following:

"It seemed that my mind split in two. I remember clearly all that occurred, but I had the feeling that I was watching from a distance. A launch approached us. All personnel were taken aboard and the launch set out toward the tender 'Aleksey Khlobystov.' We were listed aboard."

Running ahead of my story, I will say that on Wednesday the 26th of April, the tender is to return to Murmansk. The crew of the "Komsomolets," which was discharged from the hospital yesterday, is already preparing to again meet their rescuers.

"There, while still at sea, we devised a system of tagging the names of the men," said Boris Grigoryevich Kolyada. "The letter 'P' signified a fatality, body identified; the letters 'P/V', a fatality, body missing; a circle around a name meant that the man was alive. However, there was one name followed by three exclamation marks, something that produced a burst of emotions! One of the cabins—the one furthest away—was missed during the inspection carried out aboard the 'Khlobystov.' Only on the morning of 8 April was it determined that Seaman Andrey Korytov had been taken to that cabin and that he was alive. There were 27 that had been rescued, not 26!"

Naval authorities are receiving letters and information from relatives of the deceased.

"I, Artur Burkulakov, a 10th grade student, want to become a cadet at the Naval School of Submarine Navigation imeni Lenin Komsomol and continue the work of my father, chief of the political section, who died at sea."

The following information was provided by Great Patriotic War veteran and Reserve Colonel G. Avanesov, father of the executive officer of the "Komsomolets": "I am endeavoring to secure admission into the Leningrad Nakhimov School for my grandson Filipp, son of Oleg Grigoryevich Avanesov."

No, there will be no break in the timeline; the Navy will not lose its dynasties of navymen. The fathers' places in the ranks are being taken up by their sons.

Savings Through Scrapping of Obsolete Ships Urged

18010570 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Apr 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 2nd Rank S. Turchenko in the column: "The Problem Requires Solution": "Dead at the Dock"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The Navy has old ships that can no longer accomplish their mission. Can they be used more efficiently? Or is it wiser to get rid of them?

I was walking on the wharves of a naval port with a group of Pacific Fleet officers. Red separations aboard one of the veteran ships caught my eye.

"That is not rust, it is gold," one of the officers said bitterly. "Maintenance of an old ship requires quite a bit of money, with almost no benefit to combat readiness."

A short while later, after spending some time on some of these ships, I was able to see his point.

For example, there was a destroyer whose commanding officer was Senior Lieutenant I. Pupkov. It was built in 1956. At one time her flag flew above the waves of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This is the eighth year that this destroyer is virtually tied to the dock. When she is taken out to sea (for the mere purpose of "completing" the combat readiness plan), she stays out a few hours, but only in daylight. She would be incapable of standing up to an enemy in modern combat with her hopelessly obsolete armament. With all due respects to her past merits, the time has come to ask the question: Is it not too expensive to keep this kind of ship in commission?

I was told the story of the destroyers in Pacific Fleet Headquarters and the Political Directorate. This type of ship was the commander's first love. It was very dear to the heart of the former commander in chief of the Navy. No one would dare mention scrapping any of the obsolete destroyers. That is why they were retained in service.

Even if we were to accept the above explanation at full value, the question still remains: Why is it taking so long to rectify the error?

The ship of which we were speaking above is—so to speak—walking a tight rope between two decisions: to scrap or to retain. Meanwhile, her upkeep is associated with sizeable outlays. A single repair performed on the aging destroyer cost the government a considerable sum of money.

Another example. For seven years the large antisubmarine vessel "Admiral Oktyabrskiy" was in repair status, which was quite expensive. It was all they could do to push her out of the plant. However, the shortcomings (especially with respect to the missiles and guns) are such that the ship must undergo more repairs. If one were to compare the expenses with the actual contribution the BPK [large antisubmarine vessel] makes to combat readiness, it would lead to one conclusion: It is high time to scrap her.

In addition to purely material aspects, vessels such as this bring on for the fleet service and personnel problems that compel officers of ship's companies and higher headquarters to perform lip service and window dressing.

For example, read what Captain-Lieutenant I. Kuznetsov, political worker of the destroyer we were discussing, had to say:

"In 1956, when our ship was built, service conditions were the furthest from the thoughts of the builders. That is why we are suffering such hardship. Aboardship there are only two wash stands; the galley lacks electrical appliances; there is no mess hall; there are no laundry facilities; the cabins are the size of clothes closets. And what effort is required to maintain the old ship! This takes up much duty time and the lion's share of off-duty time. However, the work of seamen is rated according to end result, but what can that amount to if a vessel has passed her 40th birthday! Hence a feeling of pointlessness on the part of officers and warrant officers."

Aboard the vessel docked alongside I was given depressing examples. The following is a composite story as told to me by officers:

Maintenance of the ship is very burdensome. The mood of the personnel is understandably less than optimistic. At one time our BPK sailed the Indian Ocean and she was in her glory. However, at the end of the 70s she became suitable for nothing more than coastal duty, since she was no longer capable of operating at a modern level to accomplish missions on the high seas. Repairs were slated for the middle of the 80s. They were recently completed. We are attempting to carry out combat exercises and accomplish missions; we are exerting incredible efforts to maintain the materiel at some kind of minimum level. The equipment is old and constantly breaking down; insulation is crumbling, which is fraught with difficult consequences. The ship recently underwent an inspection by a group of officers from Pacific Fleet headquarters. The inspection revealed something we have known about for some time—shortcomings in maintenance of the guns—which cannot be eliminated due to the age of the ship. Gunnery Officer Captain 2nd Rank V. Arkita was subsequently recommended for relief from his position (although he did the most, working selflessly with the materiel and people); also relieved from his position and recommended for demolition was Fire Control Division Senior Lieutenant I. Shalak. In other words, the personnel are doing their best and accomplishing the near impossible to maintain the old materiel so that it can function at least at a minimum level, but they are "hauled over the coals" and deprived of the desire to serve. It is clear that the inspecting group did not allow for age of the equipment; it was interested in nothing less than combat readiness, not the ship's "vital data." This means that this bundle of problems can be unravelled only by scrapping the ship, which is nothing but a burden to the fleet.

Aboard all the old ships I was able to visit, our discussions invariably led to corruption in the form of lip service and window dressing on the part of personnel, something they had to practice to "get around" modern requirements for combat readiness, if the latter is to be

attained by using materiel of yesterday and often of yesteryear. I was even told that, to go through the motions of completing the combat readiness plan, one of the destroyers accomplished gunnery practice while in tow, since she could not sail under her own power.

The general economy has already set a course for eliminating unprofitable enterprises. The ships which we are discussing are also unprofitable to the fleet. This means that they should be "closed out." We spoke about this with Rear Admiral B. Pekedov, who is a member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Department, Pacific Fleet. The following is what he said:

The fleet command authorities recognize and are doing what they can to resolve the problem of obsolete ships. However, scrapping them must be contingent upon delivery of modern materiel. The difficulties associated with these two questions are rooted in the so-called time of stagnation and cannot be resolved in one stroke. We require funds and time. Nevertheless, I can confidently say that the majority of old ships will be scrapped in the next few years.

The above position is clear. However, it must be added that each passing day an obsolete ship is retained represents hundreds and thousands of rubles lost down the drain in the true sense of the term; money which could be used by the fleet to effect a true increase in combat readiness. Thus, if we proceed a little faster in this matter, we will be able to effect savings of the people's funds.

Soviet, US Navies to Exchange Visits

18010730, Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jun 89 First Edition p 3

[Unsigned article; "Exchange of Official Visits".]

[Text] In accordance with an agreement which has been reached, in July and August there will be an exchange of official visits of Soviet and US naval squadrons. The Soviet Naval squadron consisting of the guided missile cruiser "Marshall Ustinov", the destroyer "Otlichnyy", and the tanker "Genrikh Gasanov" will visit the port of Norfolk for the period of 21 to 25 July. The visit will be led by the First Deputy Commander of the North Fleet Vice-Admiral I.V. Kasatonov. The squadron of US ships will make its official visit to the port of Sevastopol in the first half of August.

Echo Sub Returns to Base

18010731 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jun 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Capt. 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko; "Submarine Returns to Base".]

[Text] On the 28th of June, the SSN on which occurred the seal-failure in the first circuit of the nuclear reactor was towed by the rescue ship of the Northern Fleet,

"Karabakh" to the outer roads of the base where it is permanently stationed. Under its own power—up to 5 knots—it would not have returned before the 29th of June, and therefore the decision was taken to tow it which allowed for a two-fold reduction in time. At 1400 hours, after conducting additional reviews of the mooring, the submarine was to be taken to the pier.

This entire time at the fleet command post a search and rescue post was set up and worked intensively. It

included the most experienced specialists of the Search and Rescue Service.

With the arrival of the submarine, the commander of the Northern Fleet Admiral F. Gromov, and the Chief of the Political Directorate and member of the Military Council of the fleet, Vice Admiral S. Vargin, made a visit to the base. Measures for restoring the technical readiness of the ship have been planned.

Discussion of Medical Experience Gained in Afghanistan
18010702 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 10, May 89 pp 15-17

[Interview with Col Med Service F.D. Tebeshevskiy, chief of the district Order of the Red Star Military Hospital, Kiev Military District, by SWO V. Tkachenko, AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA supernumerary correspondent and member of the USSR Journalists' Union, under the rubric "The Reader Raises a Question": "First Aid in Combat..."]

[Text] ...A scene from the film "Everything Is Paid For" was on the screen. A group of Soviet soldiers were battling the dushman. A wounded soldier fell to the ground. "He's in shock from the pain!" one soldier yelled to a comrade next to the wounded man. "Relieve the pain!" His colleague gave the soldier a shot, and the latter regained consciousness....

The film is fiction, but it is based on reality. The ability of our soldiers performing their international duty in Afghanistan to provide medical aid to themselves and to one another sometimes saved their lives. This is the subject of an interview by our supernumerary correspondent with Col Med Service F.D. Tebeshevskiy, chief of the district Order of the Red Star Military Hospital, Kiev Military District.

[Tkachenko] Fedor Dmitriyevich, what did the combat experience in Afghanistan teach us with respect to the medical training of our soldiers?

[Tebeshevskiy] This subject has already been partially discussed in AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA. Lt Gen Med Service I. Sinopalnikov, first deputy chief of the TsVMU [Central Military Medical Directorate], commented in an interview that "a soldier cannot always render first aid for himself or to a comrade; he does not know how, is not able to...." (AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA, No 23, 1987).

First aid in combat.... The sooner it is administered, the greater the guarantee that the soldier or officer will live and remain in the formation. This aid was not always rapidly provided, however. Unfortunately, I have become convinced of this bitter fact personally, during talks with the soldier/"Afghaners," with enlisted men and officers at our hospital for treatment or rehabilitation and with the medical personnel. And many of them complain that losses and possible complications during subsequent treatment could have been reduced, had the paramedical and first aid been provided effectively and as soon as possible after the injury occurred.

I recall what Maj Med Service Sergey Yevgenyevich Sokolov told me. He is a medical specialist in the hospital's anesthesiology and resuscitation department who served at a medical facility in Afghanistan. He provided medical aid for troops both at their garrison

and at the sites of combat operations. The hospital operated at the stage of skilled medical aid, but it most frequently received wounded directly from the sites of combat operations.

"The condition of the wounded," Maj Sokolov recalled, "indicated that they had not received skillful treatment. It frequently amounted to the administration of intramuscular drugs from the personal first-aid kit. Wounded with fractured limbs were brought in without being immobilized. These cases were frequently fatal."

[Tkachenko] What do these facts tell us?

[Tebeshevskiy] That the importance of medical training was underestimated. Even when the men were preparing to leave for combat operations, I made a sort of study during my talks with soldiers undergoing treatment at our hospital. Among other things, I asked how they had been trained to help a wounded comrade. Had there been practical classes? Their answers were most frequently vague: The commander refreshed our memory on what to do in a specific case. This was very infrequent, however. Nor did the medics always demonstrate specific procedures. One cannot generalize broadly, of course. I feel, however, and a study of various kinds of wounds has indicated that systematic medical training was not engaged in everywhere.

Why is this so? I personally cannot find a good explanation for the situation. Any person preparing himself to protect the homeland, particularly a soldier or officer, must be completely prepared for the practical rendering of first aid. And this needs to be taught from kindergarten and school on into the vocational and technical school, the VUZ and the military school, with complete state accountability and with tests and exams, as it is throughout the entire civilized world.

[Tkachenko] The way medical support was organized for combat operations in Afghanistan is undoubtedly being studied. Certain conclusions will be drawn and practical recommendations offered. This is apparently still in the future, however. In your opinion, what needs to be done without delay in the forces?

[Tebeshevskiy] I believe that it is of prime importance to resolutely get down to enhancing the practical training in medical self-assistance and mutual aid. The experience of recent years has shown that the soldiers frequently have to operate in extreme situations. Remember the earthquake in Armenia, various accidents and disasters. The military are the first to come to help, and they should have medical training. But what is the KPD [efficiency coefficient] for our classes? Very low. Just how are the visual aids used? Everything is depicted on posters: types of aid for a wounded person, improvisation with available means, and so forth. The instructor frequently goes through the subject routinely, and stops with that. Everything is spelled out in the drawings, he

reasons, everything is clear. This is idling. I repeat, our soldier will be helpless on the battlefield without systematic practical reinforcement of his skills.

I was once a member of a commission for the final inspection in the unit in which Sr Lt V. Kozlov serves. Only 30% of the personnel in one company demonstrated solid skills in self-help and mutual assistance in combat during the exercise. The figure was approximately the same in another company during exercises involving live firing. The umpire arrived at a very serious conclusion on personnel "losses" caused by this.

Adjustments absolutely have to be made in the medical training program. This cannot be done casually; it must be thought out. The fact that it must be resolved is indisputable, however.

[Tkachenko] Your conclusion raises the question of whether the role of the medical instructor is being enhanced?

[Tebeshevskiy] Of course. He must be nothing other than a professional. Only then will he perform his duties effectively. Incidentally, we have had several medical instructors here for treatment. They included PFC S. Voldolazhskiy and Pvt A. Novoselov, who shared their impressions and recollections from combat operations and from their work on the battlefield. Some of the medical instructors admitted there are gaps in their practical training.

We conducted an exchange of experience among mid-level medical specialists. I believe that it was very helpful to our nurses and medical instructors.

[Tkachenko] Adjustments in the training.... I have the feeling that you are inclined toward more decisive measures, however....

[Tebeshevskiy] Yes, I am. Not just the medical workers, but every soldier and officer must grasp the enormous importance of this problem. We know that approximately 1 week into the service the U.S. military gives an exam in emergency medical aid under combat conditions. Think of it: after 1 week?! And the exam is given every year! The soldier or officer who does not pass it is sent for a repeat test. If the serviceman fails the exam a second time, he is discharged from the armed forces.

Too harsh, you say? Stringent? Perhaps. But the demands of modern warfare obviously inexorably dictate this approach. The medical training of the military cannot be neglected.

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Effects Of Cost Accounting On Military-Construction Organization

18010692 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel F. Kapura, chief of a military-construction organization: "Economic Reform Step By Step: Why Is Cost Accounting Spinning Its Wheels?"]

[Text] At a conference of military-construction organization officials held in late February under the direction of the USSR Minister of Defense, it was pointed out that the transition to full cost-accounting, on Jan 1 of this year, has yet to produce a fundamental breakthrough in either construction quality or labor productivity. Has the changeover, then, been of a purely formal character?

That cannot be said, for preparations for the new management arrangements began well in advance. Back in January of last year, a number of military-construction organizations, including ours, switched to collective contracts. In the second quarter we introduced a new labor remuneration system, and after that the second model of cost-accounting and self-financing.

As for the year's results, while the volume of construction and installation work grew by 3 million rubles, the administrative and managerial staff was trimmed by 180 people, and 113 employees were released from our basic production operations. Last year opened our eyes to a great deal, first of all to our untapped potential, which has to do not so much with the new economic approach as with the imposition of elementary order.

It would seem that prescriptions for lowering unit production costs and increasing construction efficiency are well known to all. But they remain mere slogans until every chief operations directorate and every section starts devoting serious attention to planning. Even our construction and finance plan, which was drawn up last year a month behind schedule, and strict monitoring of its fulfillment have enabled us to increase our organizations' profitability to 14%. As civilian organizations' experience shows, this is close to the "subsistence minimum" under the new arrangements. And most important, no superhuman efforts were required of us: The situation itself forced us to get rid of unneeded construction machinery and above-norm material stocks and to cut other overhead expenses.

In order for us to introduce the second cost-accounting model, it is essential to establish in-house cost-accounting in all organizations. The difficulty is that, without determining incomes for each division and for the chief operations directorate as a whole, it is impossible to credit final wages to their accounts. And balancing income and expenses takes time. For example, we were forced to take a decision to pay our people their regular salaries and wages at the end of the month, and to settle final accounts with them a few weeks later.

Another lesson we learned during this time is that full cost-accounting is unthinkable without offering economic instruction on all levels. We set up two-week courses for military-construction workers and a one-month course for foremen, chiefs of construction and installation sections, and company and platoon commanding officers. People were excused from their jobs to attend the classes. Now that all the Ministry of Defense's construction organizations have switched to the new management arrangements, the time has apparently come to publish specialized texts that would describe not only cost-accounting theory but also experience gained to date.

Nevertheless, let me try to answer the following question: Why is cost-accounting spinning its wheels in the most important respect—namely, why is it failing to yield a proper return? If the introduction of new economic models depended solely on the degree of perfection of the models themselves, everything would be simple. As it is, in my opinion, the chief stumbling block to the introduction of the new management methods remains the lack of efficient planning, not only for the five-year plan, but also for the near future. Hiding behind all sorts of "objective" circumstances, clients in all service branches continue to confirm their project lists in February or even March of the year in progress. By that time, all material stocks have already been distributed. At the same time, a large quantity of materials that are allocated only for projects soon to be commissioned (pipe, heating equipment, asphalt, glass) are for some reason distributed evenly by quarter, despite the fact that everyone knows perfectly well that these materials are needed before the heating season begins; otherwise, it is impossible both to provide heat and to ensure quality work. The territorial directorates also contribute to disorganized supply by scheduling materials distribution not only for the final month of the quarter, but also for the final days of that month. How can deadlines be met under these circumstances?

All this combined prevents the establishment of an evenly paced construction process, evokes just indignation among brigade workers, and spawns rush jobs and defective workmanship. The old "sore spots," then, are still making themselves strongly felt under the new arrangements as well. One way to solve this problem, in my view, would be to transfer all material stocks directly to the construction directorates, so that they could conclude contracts with the supplier-plants directly, and to introduce wholesale trade on a broad scale.

There is another important problem that we have not yet been able to solve under collective contract arrangements. There is a lack of cooperation on an economic basis between the officers and warrant officers of the military-construction brigade and those of the chief operations directorate. These divisions are even financed in different ways. Under the new arrangements, in my opinion, we need to take a more flexible approach

to the formation of construction organizations, one that takes into account the volume and structure of the work they do, geographical conditions, and other factors.

Among other circumstances that impede the introduction at military construction projects of economic as opposed to command methods, I want to mention the unwarranted limits on payments to servicemen from the incentive fund based on additional earnings. This leads to a situation in which supervisors, foremen, and senior engineers receive far higher bonuses than do the supervising officers, on whom the success of a project depends to a far greater degree. The picture is the same with the "ceiling" on working pensioners, which prevents the use of highly skilled personnel on construction projects.

These and other problems are now becoming increasingly urgent. Other difficulties will inevitably arise as we continue to work under the new arrangements. We must prepare for them now. The speed and effectiveness with which they are overcome will also determine whether cost-accounting becomes the full-fledged master of our military construction projects.

Krasnoyarsk Defense Plant Conversion to Nuclear Waste Disposal Facility
18010825 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 26 Jun 89 p 8

[Article by TASS Correspondent Yu. Khots specially for *PRAVDA*, Krasnoyarsk Kray: "The Nuclear City: A Trip to a Populated Area Which Is Not on the Map"]

[Text] Silvery steel cylinders, like bodies of huge sharks, are concealed under a multimeter layer of pure spring water. We are looking into the darkening openings in them where the superhuman power is hidden.

"Former power," corrects Shop Chief V. Yershov, "Now, after work at nuclear power plants, those rods inside the cylinder are faced with a prolonged holiday. Although even today they still have enough power. If it were not for these several meters of water, we could not stand here for even a few seconds."

Having worked here for more than a decade, could he, an engineer with the highest qualifications, assume that he would meet strangers within these walls, in the sanctum of the city which is not on any maps of the Soviet Union? And he would tell us about his work in still greater detail.

With a stroke of his famous red pencil at the beginning of the 1950's, Stalin signed a decision on creating this city. The leaden clouds of the "Cold War" had thickened over the world. We had to answer strength with strength and new weaponry with newer weaponry.

They built it as was customary in those years. Thousands of people were driven together on the mountainous shores of the great Siberian river to build a radiochemical enterprise for producing plutonium for defense needs. Those condemned by the people to the camps

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have sunk into oblivion, but the city's reliable barrier from the whole surrounding world remained as was demanded by the specific nature of production.

Now there is a city of white rock where several tens of thousands of people live. We drove in through the entry control point. Having looked us over with a stern glance and having examined our documents, a pretty young woman in uniform said: "Welcome!"

This trip would never have occurred if a thaw in the international climate had not resulted in the fact that the great power confrontation, judging by everything, is coming to an end. Missile bodies are already being destroyed by peaceful explosions and their nuclear stuffing is being reprocessed. And now, even this Siberian enterprise has lived to the time when it is being forced to change the specific nature of its production and will be involved with what we call "conversion," a new word for our times which is a transition to peaceful purposes. What are they going to be involved with under the new conditions? There is one answer—the peaceful atom.

The road to the site where the spent nuclear fuel storage enterprise is located meanders between hills. And here we are driving up to the building in which these very elements are stored. They are delivered here only from our nation's AES's. We put on smocks and the managers offered us boots. "Thus, in any case," although the cleanliness here is perfect. We climb up several stories and enter a room which is similar to a soccer field in size. Yershov executes operations with technical terms and numbers, 10 to the minus 9 power curies per liter, the assembly's radioactivity, and the water lining...

Understanding how difficult it is to professionally answer an amateur's questions, we ask to begin from the moment the cargo arrives here. The metallic cylinders with the rods locked inside them arrive at the enterprise by rail in special rail cars. At that moment, a most terrifying thought flashes by: What if these rail cars had ended up in that terrible fire which occurred recently in Bashkiria?

"Look at these steel containers in which the rods are kept during shipment," suggests V. Yershov. "They can withstand several times greater forces. The walls are 300 millimeters thick. Like black boxes on aircraft: They will not burn and they are unbreakable—such are the requirements for their reliability."

A super-powerful crane carefully picks up the arriving multiton container and carries it to a specially prepared spot. Here, experts unscrew 32 bolts which hermetically sealed the cover to the case. After that, the real secrecy begins. This same crane lowers the container under water where its cover is also removed. The cylinder itself is carefully extracted using special equipment. Now it must be in isolation under water armor which also protects us from radiation.

By the way, the cylinder once had a neighbor. V. Yershov dropped his glasses into the water during an inspection. They lay there for several hours until a special claw brought them to the surface—thanks to the very clean water. "And where are these glasses?" we asked the manager. Veniamin Filippovich nods toward the office: "Now, I take them off when I come out here since I do not want to assign unnecessary work to the crane operators."

"And how many more cylinders can you accept for storage here?"

"For the time being, our storage area is less than five percent full. We will finally fill it sometime toward the beginning of the next century."

"And what then, when it is 100 percent full?"

We drove through a tunnel just outside the city which led us under the Yenisey to the opposite shore. This structure is certainly the only one of its kind. Concrete almost a meter thick separates us from the rock. The bottom of the river is 50 meters above us. After a trip of several minutes, the sun greeted us once again.

"Pipes must pass through this tunnel to the radioactive waste underground storage area," says Yu. Chekmarev, chief project engineer, joining the conversation. "It is at a depth of 700 meters. It is a two-story structure. The pipes themselves pass through the first story, and buses, trucks, and light vehicles pass through the second story. Once it has emerged from the tunnel, the pipeline will stretch to the burial site. Before we selected it, we conducted a thorough investigation. What were we guided by? First of all, when we had drilled several dozen holes, it turned out that there was a formation at this depth which is located sort of inside clay strata which are hundreds of meters thick. They will not allow the radioactive solution to go outside the limits of this layer."

"That means there will not be any vertical movement. But what if the solution begins to move horizontally?"

"It will really be as if it is crawling. But this is what we ascertained. The rate of movement of water particles under the ground total approximately a meter per year. Besides that, radioactive substances will be seized by microporous rock which keeps them motionless. Let us calculate: If the underground current reaches sections of the formation near the river, it will be in approximately 15,000 to 20,000 years. By that time, all radioactive elements will have decayed and will present absolutely no danger whatsoever to the Yenisey. And we are extracting those which have a long half-life."

"But, what if something unforeseen occurs anyway and the underground radioactive river begins to move toward the Yenisey more rapidly..."

"Observation holes are located within the confines and along the site's borders. We can affect its movement if the need arises."

"Can a rupture of the pipe occur in the tunnel itself under the Yenisey?"

"While designing the facility, we stipulated such requirements for the pipes' reliability that they should not even need to be repaired throughout the site's entire 30 year operation. Moreover, the pipes are laid inside concrete troughs which are covered with stainless steel. In the event of the smallest leak of the pipe itself, the solution will remain in the troughs. Sensors located along the whole route will allow us to rapidly detect damage and eliminate it afterwards..."

Another burial method is now being developed—solidifying wastes and holding them in special storage areas for 30 to 40 years with subsequent removal to deep formations. This method has already undergone experimental production testing. Final selection of a burial variant will be made after exhaustive analysis and on the basis of the conclusion of an independent commission.

Our amateurish questions caused bewilderment among the experts, although they frankly answered each one. But this is what we thought. This is because we do not have enough dialogues of this sort with knowledgeable people who are at the sources of various projects.

Nevertheless, the beginning of pipeline operations will be during the first years of the next century. Quite a bit of water will flow through the Yenisey by that time. After accidents at facilities with nuclear electrical power plants, people have a natural feeling of opposition toward construction of new facilities such as these. For example, how do you make a shield out of "fools" whose actions you could not calculate even with a computer? It was fourfold at Chernobyl and it did not help.

Since the time this article was prepared, events have taken an unexpected turn... On 22 June 1989, speaking on Krasnoyarsk television, V. Sergiyenko, chairman of the Krayispolkom and USSR Peoples Deputy, emphasized that "Siberians are always justified in raising the question of banning underground storage of radioactive wastes on the kray's territory. After the work of the independent commission and publication of its conclusions, the kray's residents must have the final word which requires a referendum." We should expect this. For too long, the whole truth about the nuclear city and the pipeline which comes from it has remained sealed. People need impartial and thorough information. Only information will give them the capability of arriving at the only correct conclusion.

Informational Report of 4th DOSAAF CC Plenum
18010628a Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
19 Mar 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Informational Report on 4th Central Committee Plenum of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Armed Forces (USSR DOSAAF)"]

[Text] The 4th Central Committee expanded plenum of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Armed Forces USSR (DOSAAF) took place in Moscow on 16 March 1989.

Senior officials from the CPSU Central Committee, the Ministry of Defense, and representatives from a number of other ministries, departments, and public organizations took part in the work of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee plenum.

Members of the USSR DOSAAF Central Inspection Committee and chairmen of the DOSAAF kray and oblast committees, who are not members of the DOSAAF central leadership, candidates for USSR peoples' deputies from USSR DOSAAF, and activists of the defense Society also participated in the plenum's work.

Colonel General N. N. Kotlovsev, chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, opened the plenum.

The following issues were considered at the plenum:

The results of the election campaign conducted in the USSR DOSAAF organizations.

The election of USSR peoples' deputies from USSR DOSAAF.

Instructions to the USSR peoples' deputies from the All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Armed Forces.

S. I. Kharlamov, the chairman of the election commission for electing USSR peoples' deputies from USSR DOSAAF, delivered a speech on the first issue.

The speaker noted that in accordance with the USSR law "On the election of USSR peoples' deputies", the defense Society, for the first time in its history, has been given a real opportunity to participate in the formation of the corps of deputies, who, under the conditions of perestroika, are called upon to defend the interests of the people energetically and with dignity. Fifteen mandates have been allotted to the defense Society. This vividly illustrates both the high appraisal of the patriotic activities of the USSR DOSAAF and the acknowledgement of its right to actively participate in the work of the supreme organs of government.

The election commission for electing peoples' deputies from the defense Society has based all of its activities on the requirements of election laws and on the recommendations of the central election commission. During the election campaign a considerable amount of purposeful organizational work and political campaigning was conducted. Members of the electoral bodies and groups of lecturers and speakers from the DOSAAF Club and from the mass media participated in this work. The defense Society's election platform, which was adopted by the 3rd USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum served as the basis for all these activities.

Information received from the provinces indicates that the leaders of defense organizations everywhere have rendered assistance and practical help to the candidates for USSR peoples' deputies and their agents in elaborating election programs and in conducting meetings in the defense collectives and meetings with DOSAAF workers and activists. Various forms of work were used to these ends—meetings and discussions with members of the Society at the DOSAAF local, educational, and athletic organizations, discussions and conferences at political clubs, and participating in radio and television broadcasts.

According to the approved plan, the candidates for peoples' deputies from the defense Society met with representatives of DOSAAF organizations in regions of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic republics, the Transcaucasus, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia. Approximately 400 meetings in all, in which more than 50,000 people participated, were held between the candidates for peoples' deputies and the DOSAAF staff members and activists. During the course of the meetings, many suggestions and instructions were given to the candidates for USSR peoples' deputies.

For example, the aspirations to insistently increase the prestige of the defense Society, to intensify the propaganda of its patriotic activities, and to bring the DOSAAF training and flying organizations up to full strength by recruiting young people and supplying the organizations with new equipment were conveyed to General of the Army P. G. Lushev, Marshal of Aviation I. N. Kozhedub, Colonel General N. N. Kotlovsev, and Major General B. I. Kharchuk.

Many concrete proposals, concerning the elimination of the serious shortcomings in the construction of facilities for the defense Society, were made to Colonel General N. V. Chekov. M. P. Simonov, a general designer, received many instructions concerning the development, design, and production of aviation sporting equipment that is suitable for competition and supplying it to DOSAAF organizations.

Comrades A. S. Bragin, G. V. Blums, V. G. Koberidze, and other candidates for peoples' deputies have adopted as guiding principles the oft repeated requirements, to improve the work of local DOSAAF organizations, to

regulate the problems of membership in the defense Society, and to involve the majority of the workers and young people in the athletic and popular defense effort.

The election campaign was conducted under the conditions of general satisfaction, both on the part of the public and on the part of the candidates for peoples' deputies. Everyone was able to enter his own candidacy for membership of the corps of deputies, but those candidates, who had already been nominated to the corps of deputies, were also able to withdraw their candidacies. In accordance with article 41 of USSR election law, D. N. Nagimov, chairman of the Tashauz DOSAAF obkom and candidate for peoples' deputy, submitted to the election commission an application concerning the withdrawal of his candidacy. He explained his refusal to continue the campaign for a deputy's mandate by the fact that among the candidates for peoples' deputies from USSR DOSAAF, there were authoritative comrades with more experience in life and in the army, who would champion the defense Society's interests in the supreme organ of government more worthily. The election commission complied with D. N. Nagimov's request.

S. I. Kharlamov further observed that, on the whole, all the pre-election meetings, receptions, and campaign measures, which were conducted in a business-like and constructive setting, were conducive to a critical analysis of the work of the organizations in the defense Society, an evaluation of their contribution to perestroika, and a determination of realistic means for renewing the popular defense effort in light of the principal propositions of the DOSAAF election platform.

On the basis of information, which the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee has received from the defense Society's press agencies, and DOSAAF committees, organizations, workers, and activists, the election commission for the election of peoples' deputies has organized, in accordance with USSR law, an effort to analyze and summarize the principal propositions and criticism, which has been addressed to the candidates for people's deputies and higher DOSAAF committees.

On the eve of the plenum, the election commission received two written statements.

The first letter concerned G. V. Blums, a candidate for peoples' deputy. It stated the opinion of the employees' collective at the Rizhskiy departure DOSAAF concerning the allegedly undemocratic nomination of this candidate, including alleged violations of Soviet election laws.

Ya. Ya. Lochmelis, the chairman of the Latvian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee, reported argumentatively to the election commission that G. V. Blums was nominated by the DOSAAF organizations in Gubene Rayon

and by the expanded presidium of the republic DOSAAF Central Committee. All of this fully meets the requirements of the USSR law "On the election of USSR peoples' deputies".

The election commission reasoned that in light of the explanations given, there were grounds for considering this complaint unfounded.

The second letter concerned V. R. Fesenko, candidate for peoples' deputy. His former wife reported alleged unworthy conduct, his use of an official position for selfish ends. B. I. Kharchuk, the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee, delivered a communique. He stated that the facts, which were cited by V. R. Fesenko's former wife, are not true. The election commission limited itself to the information that was given.

During the meetings more than 500 different proposals and mandates, concerning increasing the role and position of the USSR DOSAAF in the political system of Soviet society and raising the qualitative factors of the basic trends in the defense Society's patriotic activities, were conveyed to the candidates for peoples' deputies.

The plenum took the report of the election commission chairman into consideration.

Afterwards a vote was taken with the participation of the members of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, members of the USSR DOSAAF Central Inspection Committee, as well as the chairmen of the DOSAAF kraykoms and obkoms, who are not members of the DOSAAF central leadership, defense Society workers and activists, and those who have been nominated and registered as candidates for USSR peoples' deputies from USSR DOSAAF.

S. I. Kharlamov, the chairman of the election commission, announced the results of the elections for USSR peoples' deputies from the defense Society.

The defense Society will be represented by fifteen mandates in the USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies. A secret ballot determined who became the recipients of these mandates. The members of the plenum were invited to express their opinion of the 17 candidates, who had survived all the stages of the election campaign. The two candidates, who received the least number of votes, were not included on the list of deputies.

The election commission's report on the election of USSR peoples' deputies from USSR DOSAAF has been published.

Major General D. N. Kuznetsov, the vice-chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, delivered a communique concerning the third issue on the agenda. On behalf of the members of the plenum and the Central Election Commission, he congratulated the deputies on

their election and wished them success in realizing the objectives, which were formulated in the CPSU Central Committee's Address to the Party and the Soviet people, as well as in the defense Society's election platform.

D. N. Kuznetsov stated, we are linking far-reaching goals with the election of USSR peoples' deputies and their forthcoming activities—most importantly, extending perestroyka along the basic lines of our defense Society's activities, increasing in every way possible DOSAAF's role and position in the country's political system, and strengthening its authority and popularity.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium saw fit to submit a summarized draft instruction for the consideration of the plenum's members. It formulated all the main ideas, which were expressed during the election campaign in the DOSAAF organizations.

Increasing DOSAAF's contribution to maintaining the country's defense capability at an adequate level and preparing the workers and youth for the defense of the socialist Fatherland must become the primary thrust of the work of the USSR peoples' deputies from the defense Society.

The draft instruction to the USSR peoples' deputies from DOSAAF was distributed to the members of the plenum. It was actively discussed in a democratic environment. A number of important additions and remarks were inserted in the draft instruction.

The plenum approved the instruction to the USSR peoples' deputies from the defense Society. It has been published.

The proposal to commission a bureau in the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee presidium to summarize the recommendations for improving the defense Society's

activities, which were made at the meetings with the candidates for USSR peoples' deputies, and to work out a plan for their realization was also adopted.

Colonel General N. N. Kotlovsev, the chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, spoke on behalf of the USSR peoples' deputies, who were elected from USSR DOSAAF. He thanked all those who participated in the voting for the trust they have rendered. For all those who obtained a mandate of USSR peoples' deputy it is not only a great honor, but also an enormous responsibility. N. N. Kotlovsev emphasized, we will endeavor to justify your trust.

On this note, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee plenum concluded its work.

Report on Election of Peoples' Deputies from DOSAAF

18010628b Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
19 Mar 89 p 2

[Report signed by S. I. Kharlamov, chairman of the election commission, and V. M. Davydov, secretary of the election commission: "Report to the Election Commission for the Election of USSR Peoples' Deputies from the USSR DOSAAF Concerning the Results of the Election of USSR Peoples' Deputies from the All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Armed Forces. (USSR DOSAAF)"]

[Text] On 16 March 1989, the elections for USSR peoples' deputies from the All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Armed Forces (USSR DOSAAF) were held. 345 members of the 4th USSR DOSAAF Central Committee expanded plenum, or 88.4 percent, participated in the elections.

The following people were elected peoples' deputies to the USSR from the All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Armed Forces (USSR DOSAAF):

Election Results

Number of votes cast "for" Number of votes cast "against"

AKEBAYEV, ZHANGELDY, member of CPSU, chairman of the Sarkand DOSAAF raykom, Taldy-Kurgan Oblast, Kazakh SSR, city Sarkand.

BLUMS, GUNTIS VALDOVICH, member of CPSU, director of Stari State farm, Gultene Rayon, Latvian SSR, Stari State farm.

BRAGIN, ANATOLIY STEPANOVICH, member of CPSU, chairman of the local DOSAAF organization at the Lenin Komsomol Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Yard, Khabarovsk Kray, city Komsomolsk on the Amur.

ZOKIROV, MUNAVARKHON ZAKRIYAYEVICH, non-Party member, manager of the DOSAAF technical sports club, Kasansay Rayon, Namangan Oblast, Uzbek SSR, city Kasansay.

288 57

273 72

331 14

312 33

Election Results
Number of votes cast "for" Number of votes cast "against"

KLIMUK, PYOTR ILYICH, member of CPSU, chief of the political section at the Yu. A. Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center, Moscow Oblast.	328	17
KOBERIDZE, VARDISHELI GEORGIYEVICH, member of CPSU, chairman of the Rustavi DOSAAF gorkom, Georgian SSR, city Rustavi.	328	17
KOZHEDUB, IVAN NIKITOVIDCH, member of CPSU, military inspector-advisor with the Ministry of Defense inspector general group, city Moscow.	314	31
KOZIK, ALEKSANDR MIKHAYLOVICH, member of CPSU, superintendent of the Brest DOSAAF unified technical schools, Belorussian SSR, city Brest.	331	14
KOTLOVTSEV, NIKOLAY NIKIFOROVICH, member of CPSU, chairman of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee, city Moscow.	338	7
LUSHEV, PYOTR GEORGIYEVICH, member of CPSU, USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member-nations, city Moscow.	307	38
NEMKOVA, LYUBOV GEORGIYEVNA, member of CPSU, flight instructor at the USSR V. P. Chkalov Central Flying Club, city Moscow.	341	4
SIMONOV, MIKHAIL PETROVICH, member of CPSU, general designer in the design bureau of the Moscow P. O. Sukhoi Machine-building Plant, city Moscow.	331	14
KHARCHUK, BORIS IGNATYEVICH, member of CPSU, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee, city Kiev.	298	47
CHEKOV, NIKOLAY VASILYEVICH, member of CPSU, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Construction and Bribing of Troops, city Moscow.	333	12
SHAMIN, NIKOLAY VASILYEVICH, non-Party member, manager of military patriotic youth club attached to the Tomsk DOSAAF aviation-sports club, city Tomsk.	282	63

DOSAAF Instruction to Newly Elected Peoples' Deputies

18010628c Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
 19 Mar 89 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Increase the Contribution to Strengthening the Nation's Defense. Instruction to the USSR Peoples' Deputies from DOSAAF USSR"]

[Text] For the first time in history the 4th expanded plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee has elected 15 representatives of the defense Society to the

nation's highest legislative body—the USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies. They, the peoples' deputies to the USSR, will have to take a clear-cut position on all policy issues of the Soviet state and orient themselves to the peoples' interests and to consolidating the efforts of state and public organizations in the cause of the revolutionary restructuring of the Soviet socialist society.

It is important for the deputies to keep uppermost in their minds the interests of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Armed Forces and the

tasks for strengthening the nation's defense capability, which were set by the 27th Party Congress, the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and by the CPSU Central Committee's salutatory to the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress.

In accordance with the election platform of USSR DOSAAF, increasing in every way possible DOSAAF's role in the political system of Soviet society, increasing its contribution to maintaining the nation's defense capability at an adequate level and in preparing the workers and youth for the defense of the socialist Fatherland. Proceeding from the aforementioned, the plenum has inserted the following provisions in the instruction to the USSR peoples' deputies from the defense society:

- To promote through all their activities the most rapid adoption of laws on defense and on public organizations and of a State document, which regulates the activities of USSR DOSAAF, the USSR Ministry of Defense, the other ministries and departments, and public organizations involved in popular defense and military patriotic work. To ensure inclusion of the issues, which take into account DOSAAF activities and interests, in the normative documents on socio-economic and defense problems when they are being developed.
- To solve the problems at the national level of increasing the effectiveness of the military-patriotic and internationalist education of the workers and youth and to actively oppose attempts to reduce their role in Soviet society. To strive for increased attention on the part of State and public organizations toward the setting up of military-patriotic and internationalist education and for the skillful use in this important matter of the prestige and abundant experience of the veterans of war and labor, of combat training, and of the allegiance to friendship and the military comradeship of the soldier-internationalists, and for the inclusion of these matters in the State's program for working with young people.
- To strive, with a view to drastically improve the qualitative parameters in cadet training and education at DOSAAF schools and aviation training organizations, for the inclusion in the USSR law "On universal military service obligation" of changes in the procedure for training specialists for the USSR Armed Forces, and for the granting of a six-month deferment to youths being called up to active military service, who have graduated from a vocational and technical school, to recruit them for subsequent training in DOSAAF schools for military technical professions and to assign them to industry.
- To actively solve, jointly with State and public organizations, the problems of recruitment at DOSAAF training organizations, of introducing a scientifically grounded, professional, psychophysiological screening of cadets and universal basic military training for

young people, of the operation of young peoples' defense sports health camps, of supplying DOSAAF training organizations with equipment, which has been adopted by the army and navy, and of utilizing graduates in the armed forces only in the specialties received in the defense Society, vocational and technical schools (PTU), specialized secondary schools, and other educational institutions.

- To ensure an increased level of work by DOSAAF organizations in the training of personnel from popular technical professions for the national economy. To assist in the forming the type of system for training them which would be able to bring about the transition to direct contractual relations with enterprises and organizations to train various types of specialists for them, including even those which meet the demands of scientific and technological progress; in developing the spontaneous creativity of young people, and in establishing technical study groups, laboratories, workshops, simulation clubs, and commonly owned design bureaus at DOSAAF organizations.
- To adopt effective measures for the further development of kinds of technical and applied military sports, for the expansion of the system of technical sports complexes (STK) and childrens' and young people's technical sports schools (DYuSTSh), and for the establishment of technical study groups and sports sections at the local organizations and united sports clubs in the work collectives.
- To use the influence of local agencies in every way possible to ensure the material conditions for the development of popular defense work and to construct and reconstruct sports complexes for kinds of technical and applied military sports. To personally exert pressure on the country's ministries and departments with a view to their unconditional implementation of the local agencies directives on creating athletic equipment which is suitable for competition as well as for popular sports.
- To promote the revival of the conducting of Armed Forces championships for kinds of technical and applied military sports and the creation of athletic centers for kinds of technical and applied military sports at the sports clubs in the military districts and fleets.
- To promote the development of the logistic and technical support facilities and the industrial and financial administrative activities of DOSAAF organizations, their orderly transition to complete self-sufficiency and self-finance, the removal of all departmental restrictions on the expenditure of funds earned by DOSAAF collectives, and the granting of economic independence to the work collectives in determining wages and bonuses.

- To attract more energetically the attention of the central State, local Party and Soviet bodies, and the contractor organizations to the capital construction in DOSAAF, to the installation of new equipment at DOSAAF factories, to the assimilation of new technology, and to the improvement of the logistic and technical support facilities at the training, aviation, and athletic organizations.
- To submit for the decision of the appropriate State agencies the question of transferring DOSAAF facilities to the list of construction projects for social and cultural purposes and of extending the provisions concerning the top priority of construction to social and cultural construction projects. To ensure through the appropriate State agencies the total satisfaction of the defense Society's requirements for the logistic and technical support resources needed to train specialists for the Armed Forces and the national economy, and the assignment of automobile enthusiasts' training to the leading DOSAAF organizations and of the right to use gasoline from the public supply for this purpose.
- To actively participate in the creation of a very austere economic regimen and in the formation of a new economic school of thought among DOSAAF personnel, and to actively support the initiative of practical and enterprising people.
- In the interests of strengthening international ties with defense and athletic organizations in socialist and developing nations, as well as with athletic organizations in the capitalist states, to promote an improvement in the practice of holding joint athletic and information exchanges and a study of the experience of popular defense and athletic work and of the private sector's activities in producing athletic equipment and literature on a joint ownership basis.
- To work directly and actively in the DOSAAF committees, local, training, and athletic organizations, to constantly follow their guidance and to assist them in every way possible to raise popular defense work to a qualitatively new level.
- To increase the role and activity of the elective bodies in the real management of all spheres of the defense Society's existence and activities and to fight against formalism with respect to defense Society membership. To devote special attention to strengthening the local defense collectives and to the practical participation of DOSAAF members in the process of restructuring, which has unfolded under the leadership of the CPSU.
- In personnel work to strictly adhere to the desires of the CPSU Central Committee and to enhance the role and responsibility of the DOSAAF presidiums and bureau of committee presidiums in the selection, placement, and education of personnel. To devote more attention to working with DOSAAF's leaders.
- The duty of the USSR peoples' deputies is to use their rights in full measure for the rapid resolution of social issues: increasing wages, removing limitations on the payment of wages to working pensioners, providing housing, improving medical care, the way of life, and leisure time for the workers and employees and the cadets and sportsmen in DOSAAF organizations, creating the optimum working conditions in all the DOSAAF collectives and organizations, preventing illness and injuries, and forming a healthy lifestyle.
- To ensure absolute compliance with the government decree on assigning housing, within the prescribed periods of time and in the place of residence of their choice, to retired officers and warrant officers and the removal of the ban on registration for officers and warrant officers, who, prior to being inducted into the army, were living in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and several other cities and have retired from active military service.

The members of the IV Plenum and all the members of USSR DOSAAF are confident that the successful realization of this instruction by the peoples' deputies will allow the creative potential of the defense Society to be more energetically included in the process of restructuring and in the cause of strengthening the economic and defensive might of the Fatherland.

New Admission Rules for Military Schools
18010703 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in
Russian No 10, May 89 pp 26-27

[AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA interview with Col V.I. Samoylov, senior officer with the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, under the rubric "At Your Request": "The New Rules"]

[Text] The editors receive many letters asking about the new Rules of Acceptance at Military Educational Institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Col V.I. Samoylov, senior officer with the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, answers questions for the editors.

[AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA] Viktor Ivanovich, do the new rules contain any changes with respect to enlisted men entering higher educational institutions?

[Samoylov] Yes, they do. The new rules specify that first-term servicemen up to the age of 23 years with a secondary education are accepted at military schools and institutes regardless of their military specialty or their service term. Enlisted men who have served more than a year are given priority. Beginning this year the field commissions are being eliminated, and servicemen will only be accepted at the military institutions themselves. The procedure for screening candidates for training from among the enlisted men has been changed somewhat.

After servicemen have submitted their applications through the chain of command to the unit commanders, the subunit commanders arrange for their comprehensive preparation. Candidates meeting the acceptance requirements are discussed at a general meeting of the subunit's first-term servicemen, where the decision on recommending them for further consideration is voted on in open balloting. This kind of public discussion of the candidates is designed to increase their responsibility in selecting an officer's career. Unfortunately, we have not yet eliminated all attempts to travel around the country and perhaps drop in at home on the way to a military school. The worst part of it is that these candidates begin the training and occupy another's place, but 6 months later they submit notice that they have made a mistake in their career selection. We know that the prestige of enlisted men entering military schools and institutes is not very high among the VUZ chiefs and instructors. This is due primarily to the high drop-out rate for this category of cadets during their training, which is 2- to 2.5-fold greater than for those selected for training from among the civilian youth. A disinclination to study and lack of discipline resulting from their attitude toward their future career are the main factors contributing to the drop-out rate. Under the rules enlisted men dismissed from VUZs are returned to the same units from which they were sent for the training,

including the same group of forces. This is also designed to increase the responsibility of those choosing the training to the collectives which recommended them for the training.

During the preliminary screening in the units and formations the enlisted men undergo primary medical certification by military medical commissions to determine their fitness for training at the VUZ they have chosen, and their references, service records and other documents are compiled during that period.

A decision on whether or not to send first-term servicemen for the 25-day training assemblies which precede the preliminary screening process conducted in the military districts, groups of forces, fleets and large strategic formations of the branches of the Armed Forces is made by the commanders of the large strategic formations.

The training assemblies and preliminary career screening in the large strategic formations are conducted from 5 to 30 June, and the enlisted men who have successfully passed the tests are sent to military educational institutions by 5 July.

Candidates selected for training in training units and subunits are sent to training assemblies immediately upon completing their training in the subunits or units.

Those subjects in which the candidates will take entrance exams for acceptance at VUZs are studied at the assemblies, and physical education activities are conducted everyday. The preliminary career screening is conducted after the assemblies have ended, during which commissions of large strategic formations, together with representatives of the military educational institutions, select candidates to be sent to VUZs based on the findings of a second medical examination, a check of their drill and physical preparation, discussions on general military regulations and other subjects included on the entrance exams, and a test of their knowledge of the Russian language by means of a written dictation. Psychologists from the VUZs evaluate the military career inclinations and individual psychological qualities of the candidates.

After passing the entrance exams in the VUZ acceptance commissions, the competition among first-term servicemen is conducted separately from the civilian youth.

The VUZ acceptance commissions operate from 10 to 30 July. At most higher military schools entrance exams are conducted in the Russian language and literature (written), mathematics (written), physics (oral) and history of the USSR (oral).

[AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA] Our readers would like to know how the reduction of the Armed Forces is affecting admissions to VUZs this year. Will cadets at military educational institutions be removed?

[Samoylov] The reduction of the Armed Forces entails also a reduction in the number of cadets at VUZs, of course. Acceptance at certain military schools and institutes will also be reduced. Only those who have erred in selecting a career and express a desire to change it after soberly assessing their abilities and their attitude toward the service will be removed from the VUZs. Each case will be considered by the command element strictly on an individual basis. With respect to those who sincerely want to become a defender of the homeland and have the necessary knowledge, personal qualities and military experience, they still have every opportunity to become officers after completing their training in their chosen specialty at a VUZ.

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Merchant Sailors Lose Service Exemption, Boycott Classes
18010585 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 May 89 1st Edition p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank M. Lukin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Conflict in the 'Navigation School,' or Do We Need Nineteen Year Old Officers?"]

[Text] April turned out to be troublesome at the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka Navigation School [PKMU]. For several days the junior class students boycotted classes, held meetings, collected signatures on various petitions, and spontaneously formed a "committee in defense of the rights of the students," the representatives of which, with the blessing of the leadership, urgently packed themselves off to Moscow looking for "truth."

What caused such serious troubles within the walls of the educational institution, which prepares specialists of intermediate rank for the Far East fisheries industry branch? As strange as it may seem at first glance, it was the recent decision to cease training for the military naval cycle (only final year students will accomplish this).

The junior class students now state that "All our life's plans will be ruined." That should be understood in this way. Since, upon graduation they will now not be certified as reserve officers, as was the case before, they lose their right to a deferral from active military service, which previously was granted them under Article 35 of the USSR law, "On Universal Military Obligation." We note in passing that "historically" it happened that this deferral for the "navigation school" students actually signified their complete release from service in the future as well.

It is curious that in the past the "navigators" frequently and willingly shared exactly the opposite bewilderments: "Military-like duties" beset them, they said. Why should we, who are essentially civilians and trade union members, have to have formation inspections, short haircuts, leave passes, and other strict regulatory measures? If one

analyzes this, they were justifiably bewildered. Truly, the fact that youths of pre-draft age (youths are accepted into navigation school mainly on the basis of eight years of education) were required to master military naval training according to the program for reserve officers, contained a clear paradox. This was all the more so in that for the entire period of their schooling approximately four months were allotted to classes in the military naval cycle. Let us ponder this. At 19 years of age a graduate of the "navigation school" became a junior lieutenant in the reserves. At the same time, his contemporary, called up to compulsory service in the usual way, who has stood guard duty, sat in foxholes, and ran with a weapon, in the best case by that age is able to rise to the rank of sergeant or master sergeant, and most frequently has under his belt only the course of the "young soldier."

Vice Adm E. Semenkov, deputy commander in chief of the navy for naval educational institutions, and chief of naval educational institutions, who was sent to the school back last month, in his explanation pointed out this absurdity, which contradicted present demands for the quality of training of military specialists, including those in the reserves. I quote the admiral: "Further training of naval reserve officers from this category of students (those enrolled on the basis of eight years of education—author) with notoriously limited capabilities for using them, and the expenditure of significant funds for this, are not in the national interest." Similar explanations also came from other levels of the Ministry of Defense.

To believe that the life's plans of the "navigation school" graduates will be ruined due to call-up for compulsory service, is at the very least not serious. But, if such frames of mind on the part of 15 and 16 year old students, essentially still adolescents, are forgiveable to some extent, what absolutely cannot be understood is that this position was taken in the conflict both by the school leadership, and the leadership of the Kamchatbeprom Association, whose base educational institution is PKMU.

"Our task is to defend the military faculty in any way possible," F. Kiselev, deputy general director, Kamchatbeprom, "reassured" the students, speaking to them at a meeting in the school auditorium. "We will feel guilty before you, since you were accepted for study on one basis, and now, when you have studied a half year, or a year and a half, the conditions are suddenly abruptly changing."

It is easy to guess what an impression this statement had, especially cited in the report on the meeting on the pages of the oblast newspaper KAMCHATSKAYA PRAVDA, on the overheated minds of the adolescents.

And what are the "economic computations" worth, which the local press is also willingly publishing these days. Again we refer to KAMCHATSKAYA PRAVDA: "Training one graduating class of the navigation school

costs Kamchatrybrom 3-1/2 million rubles. If these two classes, for which military training has now been abolished, enter military service instead of industry, the association will suffer losses of 7 million rubles. And it is hardly likely that the military department will answer for the economic consequences of its orders."

In short, they cried about wasted money. It is only too bad that the newspaper did not specify where the graduate small ship navigators, ship's mechanics and radio operators will go after serving in the navy, or will the road back to Kamchatka be closed to them? But how then can the concern of the oblast fishing industry branch leaders about the supposedly increasing shortage of specialists in the coming years be understood? That is also a question that should be looked into impartially. As far as is known, today major reductions in workers are taking place in the Minrybkhoz [Ministry of the Fisheries Industry] system. I am especially interested in the fact that it is not all that easy to get work at any of the Kamchatka fishing industry fleet bases. Moreover, besides the intermediate level "navigators," there are also a higher engineering naval school, and a fishing industry technical school in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka.

Nor does the assertion hold up under criticism that many present first and second year students after completion of PKMU will enter military service since, due to the changed conditions, they have not earned their navigation qualification, necessary for obtaining the working diploma that gives the right to work at sea. Classes in the military naval cycle have nothing at all to do with the navigation qualification; it is gained in the period of practical work on fishing vessels.

Such incompetent, rash judgements splashed on the pages of the local newspapers, and pronounced from rostrums by persons in responsible positions, can only further push the young students to thoughtless actions. How, for example, can the "profound maxim" of that same KAMCHATSKIY KOMSOMOLETS be assessed:

"And if today the state (if only in the person of an individual ministry) will deceive the students, tomorrow they, with a 'clear conscience' will deceive it"? Is this not demagogic they are putting out?

After talking with the chief of the navigation school, Arkadiy Nikitovich Polovyy, I personally became convinced that they are fussing here about the military naval cycle mainly not because they very much want to "safeguard" the graduates from compulsory service (although, of course, they would also be glad for this), but because now, when officers of the military cycle, on whom essentially all concerns about maintaining discipline and internal order lie, would not be going to the school, these problems will shift to the civilian instructors. And they are not used to them; not all will agree to carry out "dirty" work.

"Well, they do not want to listen to our arguments at all," noted Lt Col I. Mozgovoy, oblast military commissar sincerely. "When we meet with the students and their parents, and explain to them the provisions of the USSR law 'On Universal Military Obligation,' and the circumstances that led to the decision about abolishing the military naval cycle, we see that mutual understanding is gradually being established. But why inflame passions artificially?" Why, say, involve in notoriously incompetent intercessions to the central organs the people's deputies and the party and komsomol workers of the city, who, one senses, even themselves do not fully understand the essence of the problem? And what is the purpose of this tactic—if the military naval cycle cannot remain permanently in the school, let it be retained temporarily, not only for those graduating this year, but also for the students in the junior classes. But, what is the sense of continuing to delay with the elimination (which, to speak frankly, was asked for long ago already), in order to graduate several hundred "reservists," who are not suitable according to modern standards? Here for you is the true attitude toward the processes of restructuring, specific, and in deed.

Ogarkov, Army Generals Discuss Initial Period of WWII

*00010014 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 11, Jun 89 pp 4-18*

[Interview with Marshal N.V. Ogarkov and Generals of the Army N.G. Lyashchenko, I.Ye. Shavrov, and I.N. Shkadov by Colonel P. Afanasev: "The Truth of History Is Irrefutable"]

[Text] Recently quite a few fabrications and idle talk regarding the initial period of the Soviet people's Great Patriotic War from 1941-1945 have appeared in various publications in the West, and also in articles by certain Soviet authors. On behalf of the magazine's editorial staff, our Guest Correspondent Colonel P. Afanasev requested that Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov and Generals of the Army N.G. Lyashchenko, I.Ye. Shavrov, and I.N. Shkadov, active participants in the war, answer a series of questions.

[Afanasev] It is well known that the initial period of the war did not turn out in our favor. There are various opinions on the causes of this. Did the leadership of our country foresee the possibility of such large-scale aggression and were we prepared beforehand to repel it?

Nikolay Vasilevich Ogarkov, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Hero of the Soviet Union, inspector general of the MO [Ministry of Defense] USSR Inspectors General Group. In the Soviet Army since 1938. CPSU Member since 1945. Participant in the Great Patriotic War. He was Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff and First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense.

[Ogarkov] Absolutely. They both foresaw and were prepared for it. It is perfectly obvious because repelling this aggression and this powerful and at the same time in many ways surprise and ramming attack by a five million man German Fascist Army armed to the teeth would have simply been impossible for us if the nation had not prepared for this in advance during the pre-war years.

First of all, industrialization was carried out in the USSR and the main defense sectors of industry were created (incidentally, certain historians and writers for some reason forget about this today while one-sidedly examining and frequently defaming our past in every possible way) under the very difficult conditions of that time and in unprecedented short time periods. Industry was created and built up for equipping our ground and naval forces with new types of weapons and combat equipment. In essence, aviation, tank, and mechanized forces were established from the start. The officer corps of all combat arms were intensely trained and new divisions, corps, and armies were formed. Troop training, command and control system, and the nation's armed forces and economic mobilization deployment system (in case of war) were improved. Simultaneously, mass defense

work and military-patriotic education of young people and the whole population was broadly and purposefully conducted. But the fact that there were quite a few errors, misinterpretations, and miscalculations on the eve of war is also perfectly obvious. First of all, owing to the total devastation in the nation after the Civil War and foreign military intervention and the time lost due to drawn out discussions on the paths for national economic renewal and development, we did not succeed in doing everything that was planned for strengthening the Motherland's defense capability prior to the attack by Fascist Germany.

The baseless mass repressions of military cadres in the 1930's inflicted enormous damage on our Armed Forces combat capability as a result of which the main backbone of the RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army] command and political cadres was destroyed, including the most experienced military leaders and commanders. By June 1941, only seven percent of the Army and Navy's command staff had higher military educations.

Serious errors were allowed in improving the combat arms and in their training: They poorly considered the development of military art and relied excessively on the experience of the Civil War. Thus, for example, we underestimated the broad introduction of automatic weapons into the world's main armies, were developing cavalry which had already lost its significance by the end of the 1930's, and we minimized the role of tank and mechanized forces. We abandoned the progressive military theory of "Operation and Engagement in Depth" developed in our Army at the beginning of the 1930's on the orders of Budennyy and Voroshilov, repressed its authors, and, in 1938, disbanded tank and mechanized corps which had been created taking this theory into account. On the eve of the war and after it had begun, we already had to create not only these corps but also tank armies. But time had been lost.

In short, we approached the impending war mainly from the standard of the last war. Incidentally, this is the most widespread error in the history of wars which, unfortunately, we can observe among ourselves even now to a great degree. It is important to not allow this.

Ivan Nikolayevich Shkadov, General of the Army and Hero of the Soviet Union, military inspector, and advisor to the MO USSR Group of General Inspectors. In the Soviet Army since 1935. CPSU member since 1938. Participant in battles at Lake Khasan and the Great Patriotic War. Was deputy USSR Minister of Defense for Personnel.

[Shkadov] We need to thoroughly research the question posed on a documentary basis. Everything that has been written until the present in this regard does not yet provide a convincing answer or a complete picture. As for my personnel opinion, it is possibly far from indisputable.

Events in the international arena, as we all know, developed in such a manner that, during the second half of the 1930's, the capitalist world had stirred up subversive anti-Soviet acts. The strike detachments of imperialist reaction—Fascist Germany and Fascist Italy in the West, and Militarist Japan in the East which were closely joined to it, were intensively preparing for war. Practically all of the leading imperialist powers supported their aggressive aspirations against the Soviet Union. The sinister "Berlin—Rome—Tokyo" axis was swinging into action.

The militarists also conducted a distinctive reconnaissance in force. In regards to the Soviet Union, it began in the Far East. These were armed provocations of the Japanese militarists in the area of Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin-Gol River (on the territory of the Mongolian Peoples Republic which was friendly toward us). You did not have to be a grand strategist to understand the scheme—to simultaneously or successively tie the USSR to a war on two fronts. The Land of the Soviets was forced to prepare to repel aggression. In 1937, our Army was transitioned from a territorial to a personnel formation system, the number of personnel divisions was increased ten-fold, and the Armed Forces strength levels were increased three-fold.

I had the occasion to participate in engagements on Lake Khasan in 1938 as a tank platoon commander. Our Army was strong both in spirit and in weapons. We drove the Japanese out of Soviet territory in conditions which were difficult for us. We had losses but I think that the enemy did not suffer fewer losses. Moreover, our weaknesses also became more visible. Many of them were already taken into account during engagements on the Khalkhin-Gol River. Campaigns were brilliantly conducted against Japanese forces under the leadership of Corps Commander G.K. Zhukov.

Lessons were learned from this campaign as also from the experience of other combat operations. The weakness of our mass T-26 [light] tanks and BT's [Armored Vehicles] became obvious. The armor turned out to be poor and could be penetrated by 37 millimeter anti-tank guns and 45 millimeter cannons. The poor quality of gunsights and command and control assets were revealed. Shortcomings also were discovered in other types of equipment and armament. But new types of both tanks, aircraft, and other equipment were already being created which did not lag behind in quality but exceeded that of the enemy (T-34 tanks, KV [Tanks], MiG aircraft, etc.).

However, toward the beginning of the war against the USSR, Fascist Germany had a more powerful military industrial potential at its disposal and connected the economies of all the occupied countries of Europe to it. For example, from March 1939, the Czechoslovakian State with its developed industry, which also included military industry, disappeared from the world political map. Having disarmed the Army of Czechoslovakia,

Germany seized 1,582 aircraft, approximately 3,000 guns, hundreds of tanks, and other weapons and equipment. All of this entered the Wehrmacht inventory. The same thing also took place in the other states captured by Germany.

Raising the question "Were we ready for war," in my opinion, is too simplified. If the Land of the Soviets had not been completely prepared for war, then not we but the German Fascist State would have been the victors with the very serious consequences resulting from this for the fate of our Nation. Another matter is—Were we ready to give an adequate rebuff to the enemy, not allow the German Fascist Army incursion into Soviet territory, and simultaneously hold the needed forces for preventing aggression in the East?

It has already been stated many times: By June 1941, we were still not ready. The nation's political leadership was attempting to delay the war by any means and was obviously re-evaluating its real capabilities. And the military leadership, following Stalin's instructions to not give the enemy the slightest cause to provoke a war, did not screw up its courage and decisively raise the question. Moreover, not everything was done by many commanding generals and commanders, first of all in the Belorussian Special Military District, which did not even require permission and directives "from above," if only to hold the forces assembled in permanent deployment locations in a daily routine activities mode.

As for command and political staff cadres, we need to direct our attention to two circumstances. First of all, the rapidly spread "epidemic" of groundless repression regarding leading military cadres undoubtedly lowered the quality of troop leadership and impacted the initial period of the war to a well-known degree. Secondly, relatively rapid growth in the Army's numerical strength did not supply graduates of military institutions in an appropriate manner. The need arose to call up a significant number of command staff from the reserve who required a certain amount of time to renew and fill in their military knowledge and skills.

Speaking of operational-strategic miscalculations, we need to bear in mind that strategy is subordinate to policy. And obviously our military-political leadership did not perceive the moment when political and diplomatic acts had already lost their meaning in relations with Hitler's Germany and we should have given the command "To war!" All other consequences stem from this. It is true, while we soberly discuss this, we can suggest that if our special western military districts had also been brought to combat readiness beforehand and had taken up defense in a timely manner, we still would have had to retreat. Really the German Fascist Army was an invasion army which was intensively prepared for a war of aggression. It was mobile, excellently equipped technically, totally mobilized by the beginning of the aggression, and had quite a bit of combat experience. All of this allowed the Fascist command authority to secure

their formations' main strike axes with the multiple superiority of forces on the ground and in the air under any conditions. And nonetheless, if we had not allowed serious miscalculations, the forced withdrawal of Soviet forces would have been much more organized, and resistance to the enemy incomparably more powerful and effective and, obviously, the matter would not have become a threat to our capital.

To evaluate Stalin's role—the actual leader of the party and the state during the Great Patriotic War—this means to evaluate the very important stage in the life of our nation in the prewar period and to evaluate the beginning, course, and outcome of this war. He was the head of state. His cult of personality flourished until that time. It is entirely legitimate that he bear total responsibility for foreign, domestic, and war policy, and their validity and results.

Our people cannot forgive Stalin for his groundless and illegal victims from the 1930's to the beginning of the 1950's. He was undoubtedly involved in the miscalculations and failures of the initial period of the war. However, as we all know, we need to also take the fire and not only the ashes from history.

General Ivan Yegorovich Shavrov began his service in 1935. CPSU member since 1940. Participant in the Great Patriotic War. In the postwar period, he occupied a number of responsible posts in the Armed Forces. Since 1973, chief of the General Staff Military Academy. From 1978 to 1984, on the administrative staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization member nations. Currently, military inspector and advisor to the MO USSR Group of Inspectors General.

[Shavrov] Actually, We need to deeply and reliably study the documents and get a good picture of the situation at that time to answer the questions raised. Our nation was in a situation of hostile capitalist encirclement. The party and the people were faced with two main tasks of historical significance: Restore the extremely backward national economy which remained from Tsarist Russia and which was destroyed by the imperialist war and afterward the Civil War, develop the construction of socialism and simultaneously provide a reliable defense of the new order and peaceful constructive labor of workers and peasants.

V.I. Lenin warned that "We must accompany our steps toward peace with efforts toward our total military preparedness." In the complex international situation and in the complicated conditions of the struggle for a general line within the party itself, VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)], raising the nation's economy, having taken a course on construction of socialism, envisioned providing defensive might, the

basis of which was socialist industrialization. Constant attention was devoted to defense issues and they were discussed at Party congresses and at its Central Committee Plenums.

The directives of the 15th Congress for formation of the first five-year plan pointed out in particular: "Taking into account the possibility of military attack by the capitalist states against the proletarian state, we need to devote maximum attention during development of the five-year plan to the very rapid development of those sectors of the economy in general and of industry in particular to which the main role is assigned for ensuring the nation's defense and economic stability during wartime."

And the 17th VKP(b) Congress, in a resolution about the second USSR national economic five-year development plan, was oriented toward the establishment of industry in the eastern areas of the nation and planned the construction and location of industrial facilities closer to the sources of raw materials which allowed, in case of imperialist military attack, to transition industry to wartime production in the shortest possible time period and ensure rapid mobilized expansion and stability in its operation.

During two and a half five-year plans, 9,000 new industrial enterprises were built, of which a significant portion were in the eastern portion of the nation. Soviet metallurgy placed a firm base under the defense industry. Giants of metallurgy began operating, tractor, tank, automobile, aviation, chemical and other branches of industry were established, and the nation's fuel and energy base was rapidly developed. Construction of the White Sea-Baltic Sea Canal provided the capability of transporting a portion of military ships from the Baltic Sea to Murmansk and creating the Northern Fleet which played an important role during the war years in the struggle with the German-Fascist aggressors on the sea lanes and in defense of the Soviet Polar Area.

The economic foundation of the nation's defense was created during a historically limited time through the great efforts of the people under the Party's leadership and with the Soviet peoples' great discipline and patriotism. But there was not enough time for serial production of the needed quantities of military equipment and weaponry. At the same time due to a series of difficulties in production (the lack of electrical energy, iron, steel, and machine building tools), industry was late in setting up the large-scale output of new types of aircraft, tanks, anti-aircraft artillery, ammunition, and radar and communications assets.

For example, new types of aircraft like the MiG-3, YaK-1, LAGG-3, and IL-2 accounted for only 19 percent of the total number of aircraft at aviation units in Western military districts along the entire border (approximately 4,000 kilometers). Furthermore, flying personnel had still not managed to master them. T-34

and KV-1 tanks (there were approximately 1,200 of them in the European portion of the USSR) were delivered first of all for crew training of tank and mechanized corps being formed which, naturally, were deployed far from the border. Only two tank divisions (the 8th and the 14th) each had 140-150 of these combat vehicles.

There were also extremely few motor vehicles. Thus, according to the tables of organization and equipment [TOE], there were 558 motor vehicles (there were really less since a portion of them were attached from the economy) in border military district rifle divisions but then there were 3,039 horses. Artillery and rear services were mainly based on horse-drawn [vehicles].

Thus, deployed forces were not equipped with sufficient quantities of combat equipment and armament. And we can firmly state that our Armed Forces were not prepared to successfully repel and defeat the German Fascist Army's aggression during the initial period of the war we were forced into. There is no doubt that the Hitlerite leadership knew very well what the state of the USSR's economy and the Army and Navy's degree of preparedness for combat operations was.

I would also like to say this about that. The development of our nation's economy and of all spheres of social life according to the time periods and range were truly immense. However, Stalin and his closest advisers, having resorted to the mass annihilation of leading party and state cadres, experts of industry, science, agriculture, and culture with the aid of an enormous repressive apparatus, inflicted enormous damage on socialist construction and also affected our defensive might. Moreover, practically all ranking personnel of the Armed Forces from marshals to regimental commanders were repressed and annihilated. This significantly reduced the level of troop and headquarters training and their combat readiness. And the commanders who remained among the forces were uncertain and silent. This is the only thing that can explain the fact that even experienced commanders of regiments, divisions, and corps who were deployed comparatively near the border and who had reconnaissance data at their disposal about the intensive preparations of the Fascists for attack, did not take any steps whatsoever for increasing combat readiness or even reinforcing the security of their headquarters and units while following commands from above.

I am firmly convinced that if all of the Army and Navy command and political personnel who were subjected to Stalinist repression, beginning with Marshals Yegorov, Blyukher, Tukhachevskiy, and ending with unit and sub-unit commanders, would have remained intact, Soviet Armed Forces combat readiness would have been immeasurably higher and who knows if in this case Hitler would have risked beginning aggression in June, 1941.

It is also impossible to be silent about the Narkomat Oborony's [People's Commissariat of Defense] weak and unsteady leadership of the Armed Forces during those years. It is hard to list all of its miscalculations and errors. These are the continuous changes in organic troop organization, poor training of staffs and young commanders promoted to replace the repressed commanders, and the low combat and mobilization readiness, and many others.

Under an increased threat of attack from Fascist Germany, Narkom Oborony [People's Commissar of Defense] (from 1940) S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff (from the beginning of 1941) G.K. Zhukov could not convince Stalin and other Politburo members of the vital necessity of bringing the Western border military districts up to full combat readiness or to obtain a repeal of the ban on conducting any kind of measures whatsoever among the forces which an enemy could construe as grounds for unleashing a war.

The enemy treacherously invaded Soviet territory and disrupted mobilizing and bringing first echelon forces to complete combat readiness in border areas. Hastily coming out on defense positions, the enemy, using tanks and motorized units, cut off and bypassed Soviet forces, hastened into the depth, came out deep in the rear areas, and surrounded our units.

Thus the initial period of the war took shape in a way which was extremely unpleasant for us.

General of the Army Nikolay Grigorevich Lyashchenko, military inspector and advisor to the MO USSR Group of Inspectors General. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1929, CPSU member since 1931. In the 1930's, he participated in the struggle with the basmatch [counter-revolutionary robber bands] bands in Central Asia and, in 1937-38, he carried out his international duty in Spain. A participant in the Great Patriotic War. He commanded forces in a number of military districts.

[Lyashchenko] Speaking about preparations for the Great Patriotic War and about Stalin's role in this, I would like to list these facts.

In 1941, I graduated from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze. We, the graduates, were invited to a reception at the Kremlin. All of us were searched while entering, stopping as if for a document check. All of the leadership, besides Stalin, came to our ceremonial unit. We stood and applauded. Whispers flew past us through the hall: "Stalin is not here, Stalin is not here."

M.I. Kalinin, having received a report about the conclusion of the Academy's students studies, congratulated us and wished us success in life and in the service. As soon as he sat at the desk, I.V. Stalin appeared. I had earlier seen him only from a distance and was this close for the first time. Everyone jumped to their feet and began wildly applauding and yelling "Dear," "Brother,"

"Great One," etc. We had hardly taken our seats. I then thought, what is the purpose of all of this? Later I decided: So that everyone knew how to meet other leaders and how to meet him, Stalin.

Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko announced: "Our dear Comrade Stalin will say a few words." We once again stood up, clapped with all of our strength, and yelled greetings to our "leader." He reluctantly waved his hand and there was an expression on his face as if all of this bored him.

Finally, the hall settled down. Stalin began his speech. The essence of his speech was reduced to the fact that war with Germany was unavoidable. We are already not providing it with any strategic raw materials (this was not true: Even on the night of 22 June 1941, 22 trainloads of wheat and metal crossed our border and headed for Germany). Speaking about the possible war, he turned to the Presidium and said: "If Comrade Molotov and his apparatus can manage to avoid war for two to three months, our hope, and you will go to the forces and raise their combat readiness." We especially remembered this order directing us to our duty location. I received an assignment as deputy regimental commander in Zaporozhe. The regiments entered into an encampment. Several units of our division were in one encampment near Nikopol. The regimental commander was on leave and was getting ready to retire. The division commander directed me to prepare myself to assume the duties of regimental commander.

No one spoke aloud about the threat of war here. A peaceful life flowed on, the units were not at full strength, and many personnel were used in other work. Commanders and Commissars, having found out that I was at a reception at the Kremlin and saw Stalin, asked me to describe his speech since it was not published in the press. When I repeated his warning about the threat of war to them, they all shrugged their shoulders: How can that be since we have a treaty with Germany?

My information caused special doubt at the meeting at corps which occurred after a TASS report that false rumors were being spread by the West about Germany's preparations for war against the USSR. And that was allegedly simply "transferring forces for rest." Even the chief of the special section questioned me individually: Had I not gotten it all wrong. The corps commander said the same thing... And we continued to live peacefully. We intended opening a summer encampment on 22 June, 1941. The leaders of three obkoms and oblastpolkoms and five or six raykoms and gorkoms had gathered on holiday. We raised toasts to the health of our leaders until we were told that they were bombing Kiev and the war had begun. I received a new assignment to the 225th Rifle Division as commander of the 972nd Rifle Regiment. The first organizing had begun. People arrived, but there were no weapons or uniforms for more than a month. Many of those called up into the Army

had not fired even once since the Civil War. I led the regiment to meet the enemy without the authorized organic cannons and machine-guns. They caught up to us only at Dnepropetrovsk.

In 1961, articles about the initial period of the war appeared in the Soviet press. They criticized those guilty for our failures: Timoshenko, Zhukov, and also Mekhlis, who was in charge of the reserves and concentrated the main reserves, not without Stalin's approval, in the Western portion of the nation. As a result, 37 trainloads of uniforms and other equipment and fuel were burned only at Lvov since they did not manage to transport them out of there. Are these really not Stalin's miscalculations?

And why were the fortified areas (UR's) on the old borders demolished? They had begun construction of them on the new borders but had not succeeded [in completing them]. This was also Stalin's decision as Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov told me. An obviously foolish action was permitted. The UR's could have played a very important role at the beginning of the war.

[Afanasev] The opinion is being expressed that as a result of the error permitted by our Supreme Command in determining the axis of the main enemy attack for the period of the war right up to the Battle of Moscow and this was a strip of utter defeat and disorderly retreat of Soviet forces. Are such assertions based on fact?

[Ogarkov] Not entirely. Actually, according to the pre-war evaluation of the situation, our preference was to give up not to the west but to the southwest strategic axis. There we had somewhat higher operational troop densities. But this was achieved not due to unwise weakening of the western formation. There was also a troop formation here which was sufficient for conducting defense under favorable conditions of the war's development. The trouble was that for well known reasons these conditions turned out to be incredibly hard and very difficult for us. I myself, a young officer at the time, at dawn on 22 June 1941, happened to be directly at the Soviet-German border in a fortified area under construction and experienced these conditions in full measure.

But even in that incredibly difficult situation, combat operations did not take on the character of an utterly disorganized retreat. Our forces, with their stubborn resistance, began to foil the plans of the German-Fascist "blitzkrieg" from the very first days. The Hitlerites counted on a triumphal procession across Soviet soil, but they miscalculated, and they were already forced to become involved in fierce, bloody battles in many sectors from the first hours of the war.

The border guards, the legendary defenders of the Brest Fortress, fought to the bitter end. Tank forces courageously fought near Lutsk, Brody, and Rovno. Soviet forces fearlessly fought in the areas of Peremyshel and

Liypaya, and on the approaches to Borisov, Mogilev, and Smolensk. The staunch, heroic defense of Leningrad and Smolensk, Odessa and Sevastopol became graphic pages of the annals of war. During just two months of battle on Soviet soil, Fascist German personnel losses exceeded its losses for the two previous years in all military campaigns it conducted in Europe. In the future, the steadfastness of the armed defenders of the Motherland and the force of their blows on the enemy grew with each passing day. Our forces first counterattacks on the Fascist invaders were in the area of Yelnya, near Rostov, afterwards a counteroffensive in the area of Tikhvin, and the heroic defense of Leningrad cooled the enemy's offensive heat.

But the immense Battle of Moscow which began in the Fall of 1941 became the decisive event which finally disrupted the Hitlerite plan for the so-called "blitzkrieg." During the course of this battle, Soviet forces, manifesting immeasurable courage and heroism, managed to stop the enemy offensive, bled white its best crack forces, inflicted a defeat on the enemy, and afterward themselves transitioned to a counteroffensive and drove them to the west. G.K. Zhukov was the Western Front commander of forces and from 1 February 1942, Commander-in-Chief of Western Axis forces. As a result of the Battle of Moscow, the exaggerated myth about the unconquerable German-Fascist Army which had existed until this time, was shattered. The Soviet people breathed easier and their faith in the inevitable enemy defeat became stronger. The Resistance Movement in the enslaved countries of Europe was intensified. This was our major victory. Its significance for the subsequent course of the war is hard to overestimate. It was precisely here, at the walls of Moscow, that the dawn of our Great Victory was set and here, in my view, the beginning of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War was fixed.

The events of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War convincingly showed the urgent need to already have in peacetime a reliably developed (during wartime) organization of forces and a completely established, constantly ready system for mobilizing and commanding them. To count on working this out at the beginning of the war in contemporary conditions is impossible and unrealistic. In this regard, I suggest that it would be very useful to also examine our existing realities today. There are reasons for this and quite a few.

[Shkadov] The foreign policy situation which took shape during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War was ambiguous and quite complicated. Our lack of preparedness to repel the powerful thrusts of the German Fascist forces from the air and on the ground became a undeniable fact, especially on the western and northwestern axes. Hence the defeats in border battles, encirclement, and withdrawal, and a rapid rate of advance of enemy tank groups into the nation's depth.

As for the issue of whether an error was allowed by our military political leadership in defining the axis of the enemy's main thrust in the forthcoming war and concentrating our main troop formation, my opinion is reduced to the following. We point out as a fait accompli that the enemy actually delivered a main strike on the western axis and our most powerful formation was on the southwestern axis. However, the matter also turned out to be the downfall of the Hitlerite command's scheme and its core—the axis of the main thrust and also the adventurist strategy of the Blitzkrieg as a whole.

We must also bear in mind that the German Fascist troop command, having a mobile army, could have relatively quickly changed the axis of the main thrust which it also did but already during the course of the war which was unleashed. Transitioning to defense as a result of the Smolensk engagement on the western axis, the Hitlerites were forced to regroup the more powerful 2nd Tank Group on our southwestern axis but, during the summer of 1942, it became the main and only [axis]. Obviously, logic does not always accompany every decision. To assert that the Hitlerite command chose the more advisable axis for its main thrust is just as baseless as to assert the indisputability of concentrating our troop formations. We must also direct attention to the fact that, taking the allied forces of Hitler's Germany into account, their troop formation to the southwest was sufficiently powerful. Our political leadership's chief miscalculation was in overestimating their capabilities to delay the inexorably approaching war to a later period and not the error of determining the axis of the aggressor's main thrust.

Miscalculations are obvious both from our and from the other side. They cost us dearly in the initial period of the war and during the summer of 1942, but they led Hitler's Germany to failure.

[Shavrov] Hitler, understanding that war would be difficult for Germany, based his calculations on the force of a decisive first strike which in his opinion, should have ensured the blitzkrieg's success. I repeat that, knowing the condition of our Army and nation in detail, Hitler rushed and selected the most advantageous time of attack. An enormous invasion force was concentrated which totaled up to 5.5 million men in 194 divisions and 160 brigades, more than 4,500 tanks, 48,000 guns and mortars, 5,000 modern aircraft for that time, and more than 300 naval ships.

The "Center" more powerful Group of Armies included 50 divisions of which 15 were tank and motorized; the "South" Group of Armies—44 divisions of which there were nine tank and motorized; and, the "North" Group of Armies—29 divisions including six tank and motorized. The army of "Norway" attacked on the Murmansk axis and from Finland and, farther south, the Finnish Army with German units advanced toward Leningrad.

Therefore, I think it is hardly justifiable to talk about the fact that the unfortunate development of events in the first months of the war was the result of our national military leadership's errors in determining the axis of the enemy's main thrust. Both main invasion troop formations, both "Center" and "South," were, as we see, very powerful and they provided multiple superiority in forces and assets over our forces who were really not mobilized and, in the majority of cases, not prepared for a steadfast defense.

We must particularly emphasize: Many comrades, due to insufficient skill in the military profession and superficial knowledge of the composition and activities of the sides in the initial period of the war, think that our forces rendered weak resistance to the enemy. This is not entirely correct. By the end of July, all three German Fascist Groups of Armies had suffered great losses and had practically not carried out the blitzkrieg missions. For example, despite the reinforcements which had advanced, the "Center" Group of Armies tank and motorized division strength had been reduced to 50 percent, and infantry to 80 percent. As a result of the Battle of Smolensk which unfolded on 10-12 July and which lasted for two months, on 30 July Hitler had already ordered the "Center" Group of Armies to transition to the defensive and sent Guderion's 2nd Army and 2nd Tank Group to the Kiev axis to aid the "South" Group of Armies with penetration into the rear areas of our South-Western Front forces. As a result, the "South" Group of Armies at that time was no less powerful than the "Center."

One thing is indisputable: If our border military district forces had been brought to full combat readiness earlier, even if only one month earlier, and had occupied defensive points (strips), the German Fascist formations would not have achieved such successes and they would have turned out to be bled white to a significant degree and stopped at some points farther from the center of the nation.

[Lyashchenko] Of course, errors were allowed in determining the axis of the main enemy thrust. And this is primarily Stalin's fault. He insisted on considering the main axis of a possible enemy attack to be southwestern and the Fascists inflicted the main attack on Moscow. According to S.K. Timoshenko's stories (who, unfortunately, did not write anything about the war), he and G.K. Zhukov attempted to prove the need to take measures for immediately deploying forces and transitioning them to defense on the western axis to Stalin and the Politburo on 16 June 1941 which was rejected. Stalin stated that Germany alone would allegedly not attack the Soviet Union. This turned out to be a gross miscalculation. And only when it became clear that the war was beginning did they send a telegram, only in the first hours of 22 June 1941, to the forces about raising the alarm and defensive tasks, but the Fascists had already begun bombing our cities and airfields at 4 a.m. This gross miscalculation cost us very dearly.

[Afanasev] Various points of view exist about the number of dead in the Great Patriotic War. The opinion is expressed that official data on losses of 20 million people by the Soviet Union in this war have allegedly been drastically underestimated. Is this opinion justified and should we not (as some suggest) conduct work to make the official data more precise?

[Ogarkov] I think that it is not justified and we should not do it. To conduct a discussion on this issue and, moreover, to once again collect data on military losses during the course of events which took place half a century ago means to consciously come to the conclusion of those Western gentlemen and hack writer—anti-Soviets who have already been strenuously attempting to falsify, in any way possible, the history of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole for many years. They have one goal while doing this—to discredit the Soviet Union's decisive role in this war and to minimize the Great Victory of the peoples of our nation and its Armed Forces in it which demonstrated examples of courage and mass heroism to the whole world, and which saved mankind from the brown plague. We need to say that this unseemly goal of the falsifiers will never be achieved.

The official data gathered after the war is reliable for the most part. According to these data, of the total number of 20 million Soviet people killed, permanent losses of Soviet Army and Navy servicemen during the period of the Great Patriotic War (taking into account those recently called up into the Armed Forces during the war due to the liberation of Soviet territories seized by Hitlerites, and also those prisoners who returned at the end of and after the war) totaled nine million men.

[Shkadov] Various false rumors about the issue of the dead in the Great Patriotic War have become possible because this problem was not thoroughly researched.

And it is quite complicated. During the course of a retreat, for example, to conduct a strict accounting of personnel is extremely difficult in practice. We can sufficiently accurately calculate how many fighters remained in a division after retreating from one point to another. To calculate how many died, were wounded, or became prisoners was frequently simply impossible. We are still finding many people alive who were counted as dead or missing for many years.

In the Ministry of Defense archives, there are still approximately 1.5 million cards for decorations or medals on which there are no comments about their presentation to those being decorated. Searches are not being terminated but obviously a significant portion of such cards belong to the missing.

Which nation had more people die and which less? It is correct that in the aggressor's army, especially in one such as that of Fascist Germany, the losses by death could be less. The Hitlerite war machine inflicted a

powerful surprise attack from the air and on the ground against our troops and facilities which were unprepared for battle and inadequately protected. Treatment of prisoners of war was also basically different. If we observed humanitarian treatment of German prisoners in principle, many cases are widely known of mass annihilation of Soviet servicemen who ended up in Fascist captivity.

I think that discussion of this issue is completely senseless. Painstaking and comprehensive investigations are needed in order to have data about our losses which are closer to the truth. We also need to do this because quite a few "shouters who are louder than everyone else" have recently been speculating on the inaccuracies and incomplete data which helps our enemies to falsify the history of the last war.

In accordance with a CPSU Central Committee resolution, an editorial collegium is already beginning work and its PAMYAT [Memory] Book working group whose task also includes taking into account and ascertaining all who died or are missing.

[Lyashchenko] I subscribe to the opinion that more than 20 million of our people died. Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev also spoke about this in a speech once: "Victory was very expensive for us. We lost more than 20 million people." Yes, we had to retreat to the Volga during heavy engagements. How many dead and wounded we lost on the territory seized by the enemy is hard to ascertain. In 1988, the remains of 1,320 dead soldiers were found and buried near Myasnyy Bor in Novgorod Oblast. And how many of them are there, still unaccounted for, who died for our Motherland? Such sad discoveries as those near Myasnyy Bor obviously also give birth to arguments about the number of our losses during the war years.

[Afanasev] In the works of a number of Western historians, and also in individual statements in our nation, the idea is conveyed that during the war we attained victory not through quality but through quantity and that is why we suffered unjustifiable losses. What can be said in this regard?

[Ogarkov] I consider discussions that we defeated the enemy not with quality but with quantity to be unscrupulous. And, more precisely, as provocative. They are of the same sort as the previous issue and are interrelated with them.

We all know that the Soviet Armed Forces conducted more than 50 operations of groups of fronts, approximately 250 front operations, and more than 1,000 army operations during the course of the Great Patriotic War. Certainly during the course of some of them our losses could have been higher than enemy losses (moreover, if we assign finding such data as a special goal). But these

are only details which at the same time we need to examine taking into account all of the numerous facts about the situation in each specific operation and its results.

As for the establishment of numerical superiority in forces and assets by us over the enemy in operations on a definite (main) axis in a definite (decisive) time—is that really so bad? On the contrary, this is a very important principle of mature military art since the times of Epaminond and the victory at Cannes. And if our commanders and their staffs knew how to do that, then honor and praise to them! Only a rank amateur would reproach them for that.

To see the flimsiness of such statements regarding operations conducted during the course of the war, it is sufficiently brief to examine the most important of them. Take, for example, the Stalingrad Operation, which, in my opinion, marked a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War and in the whole Second World War. This is really an example of military art in the conduct of a group front operation and comprehensively prepared under the organizing role of G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevskiy! And the celebrated timely calculated operation of the Central (K.K. Rokossovskiy), South-Western (I.F. Batutin), and the Steppe (I.S. Konev) fronts on the Kursk Bulge. We can also say the same thing about the brilliantly organized and irreproachably conducted at the highest degree of results Yassy-Kishinev Operation of the 2nd (R.Ya. Malinovskiy) and 3rd (F.I. Tolbukhin) Ukrainian Fronts! There are also the Korsun-Chevchenkovskiy Operations of two fronts in the Ukraine and the unprecedented in scale at that time and extremely instructive four front Belorussian Operation! Already not talking about the operations which were being completed during the war: Lvov-Sandomir, Vistula-Oder, Budapest, Vienna, Berlin, Prague, Manchurian, and others. They are still being studied with interest in military academies of all of the world's main countries. That means they withstood [the test of time]. And naturally, we are also studying this very rich experience.

There can be no doubt that the falsifiers of history will never succeed in diminishing the Soviet peoples' victory in the Great Patriotic War. It is entirely indisputable that the Soviet Union played the main role in the defeat of Fascist Germany and afterward of militarist Japan as well. It is precisely the country of socialism that broke the back of the enemy and saved mankind from the threat of Fascist enslavement. The Soviet people, the unparalleled courage and mass heroism of its soldiers on the front, and the selfless labor of millions of people in the rear areas led by the Communist Party, were the main heroes and creators of this Great Victory.

The superiority of Soviet military art over the enemy's military art was also one of the most important factors which ensured our Victory. This is the absolute truth. The result of the last war is convincing confirmation of this.

[Shkadov] During the Battle of Moscow, we reduced the enemy's superiority to nothing and we went on the counteroffensive with a correlation of forces of approximately one to one. Who else, besides obviously spiteful people, can contend that this victory was achieved not by numbers but mainly by the already mature war-fighting skills of Soviet soldiers and commanders and by the developed operational-strategic thinking of the high and operational commands?

I could cite a dozen examples from my own combat experience when we defeated the enemy with significantly smaller forces. I think that it does not make sense to engage in a discussion with those who express a contrary opinion because they are either ignorant of military affairs or obvious ill-wishers. Really the whole world knows about the dozens of Soviet troop operations during the Great Patriotic War which both in those times and now are the height of military art.

[Shavrov] The attacker always has the initiative, he concentrates major forces and assets in a relatively narrow sector (in an area) for an attack for the purpose of creating decisive superiority. Operations in the Kursk Bulge can serve as a graphic example. Our defense was then exceptionally powerful and prepared in all respects. The thoughts and decisions of the Supreme General Headquarters are well-known: Wait for the Germans to go over to the offensive, repel the enemy attack, pulverize his forces and assets and thus weaken the enemy formation which should ensure a successful Soviet troop counterattack afterward. The enemy succeeding in wedging 6-8 kilometers into our defenses only on the northern sector and up to 35-38 kilometers to the south. The general correlation of forces was almost equal. There was a completely different picture on 22 June 1941 when huge masses of Fascist Germany's maneuvering forces pounced on the not mobilized Soviet formations and units which were not occupying real defensive positions.

[Lyashchenko] Of course, it was hard to stop an enemy which was numerically superior to us. But we need to particularly state that the qualitative composition of our forces, their political maturity, life-giving Soviet patriotism, devotion to the cause of socialism, and the Leninist fraternal friendship of the peoples of the USSR multiplied the forces of the Motherland's armed defenders in the struggle with the enemy. It was very difficult but we stood our ground. Our people and the guiding party of Lenin knew how to give a front everything it needed for victory including first-class aircraft, tanks, guns, mortars, and so forth. In 1944-45, we had 180-250 guns per kilometer of breach. Here the quality and quantity of guns and troop training played a decisive role in successful combat operations against hostile forces.

During the concluding phase of the war, when the enemy's faith in victory had already been shattered, our soldiers frequently successfully defeated numerically superior enemy forces with smaller numbers.

[Afanasev] But to what degree did the aid of our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, and in particular the United States of America, facilitate the attainment of our Victory?

[Shkadov] The Soviet people and its Armed Forces indisputably made a decisive contribution to the victory over Fascist Germany. In life, decent people are grateful for any aid—both small and large. Our people have always expressed and continue to express their sincere gratitude to the American people for aid during the Great Patriotic War. Although, in my personal opinion, this aid could have also been more effective. And not only through deliveries of military equipment, weaponry, strategic raw materials, and food, but by an earlier time period for opening a second front. I, for example, do not know of any substantial arguments which justified delaying its opening. And then it is well known that there were various approaches toward the treatment of our nation within the leadership of the U.S. Government. There were both advocates of the policy of waiting which was calculated so that when the warring sides had exhausted each other, only then would they become involved in the fight for the position of lord of the manor who would also settle the dispute. This approach, obviously, had a definite impact on the U.S. position.

[Lyashchenko] No one, besides our obvious enemies, currently attempts to denigrate the Soviet Union's decisive role in the defeat of Fascist Germany. During the fiercest battles, the Soviet people to a man steadfastly withstood for 900 days in the blockaded city of Leningrad and did not allow the enemy to capture Moscow. And afterward, having gathered the forces, they went on the counteroffensive near Moscow, Stalingrad, at the Kursk Bulge, freed the city of Leningrad from the blockade, swept the enemy out of all of our land, and began liberating the countries of Western Europe which had been enslaved by the Fascists. And only then, when our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition understood that we had defeated Fascist Germany with our own forces, did they begin active operations in June 1944, crossed the English Channel, and conducted a rather timid offensive in the south-east.

Soviet Armed Forces defeated 607 of Fascist Germany's and its satellites crack divisions. The Allies defeated a total of 175 enemy divisions.

These numbers very convincingly speak of the decisive role which the Soviet Union played in the defeat of Fascist Germany. As for aid to us from the United States of America, we will always remember it with gratitude although this aid was also not too significant (4-6 percent of our tanks, aircraft, motor vehicles, etc.) and did not nearly decide the fate of our victories.

[Shavrov] It is very important to picture what threatened the peoples of the whole planet who were cursed by German Fascism's world imperialism. The Hitlerites

were striving for world supremacy, planned to exterminate millions of people, and turn the rest into its slaves. And these were not only plans. By the middle of 1941, almost all of Europe was overthrown by Fascist Germany. The Soviet Union, birthplace of Lenin and the Great October Revolution, was the peoples only real hope. The Red Army was the only real force capable of actually confronting the Fascist war machine.

When the Great Patriotic War began, many in the West thought: Who will remain standing, will we take the Soviet Union or the Fascists? "The Germans will need a minimum of one and a maximum of three months to defeat the Soviet Union," reported US Secretary of War Stimson to President Roosevelt. And at this time the hand of a Soviet soldier was writing this on the blood-stained bricks of the Brest Fortress: "There were five of us: Sedov, Krutov, Bogolyubov, Mikhaylov, and Selivanov. We had our first battle on 22 June 1941 at 3:15 a.m. We are dying but we are not retreating!"

All honest people of the world admired the courage of the Soviet people, were grateful to them, and believed in their victory. In those days, when crack Hitlerite divisions were pulverized on the enormous front from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, in the bloody Battles of Moscow, Leningrad, Sevastopol, and Odessa, the "Washington Post," refuting its Secretary of War's prediction, wrote: "You tremble at the thought of what could happen if the Red Army breaks under the pressure of the advancing German forces and if the Russian people were less courageous and fearless... While conducting this valiant struggle, the Russians are simultaneously defending the cause of civilization from all enemies of mankind. They have made an unprecedented contribution to the common cause." I think it would not hurt for those who today want to consign to oblivion or minimize the liberating advance of the army of the first country of socialism in history to attentively ponder those newspaper articles of the war years.

[Afanasev] The truth of history is irrefutable. And no matter how much the falsifiers persist in their evil-intentioned distortions of history, they will not succeed in erasing the greatness of the Victory of the Soviet people during the Second World War from mankind's consciousness.

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[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Baydakov, professor: "Based on Intelligence Information From the Archives of USSR State Security Agencies"]

[Text] There is probably no larger a "blank spot" in history (both Soviet and world history) than the history of intelligence. The word itself is shrouded in a haze of

mystery.... Due to its specific nature, intelligence is doomed to guard the true facts for an extremely long time (and even when every possible term has elapsed, it parts with its information extremely unwillingly). I repeat, however, therein lies its specific nature. The researchers therefore have to exhibit a certain persistence and sift piles of "barren material" in order to understand, if not in detail at least on a general level, the direction of the intelligence policy of this or that period and to grasp its role in a state's history and in relations among states. Without this, we can agree, there can be no integral concept of history itself, because intelligence in the 20th century has acquired extremely solid socio-historical weight....

In the course of his scientific work the author spent a certain period of time studying the intelligence activities of state security agencies of the USSR prior to the war and during the Great Patriot War of 1941-1945. He familiarized himself with the basic intelligence information obtained during that period and promptly sent to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and sometimes S.K. Timoshenko. Important political decisions were made on the basis of this information, of course. The author contemplates the reaction of higher officials to these reports, the progression of military operations on the Soviet-German front and certain other matters.

The article presented here is interesting in that the scholar, who selected the subject of his research, the history of intelligence (not just in general but precisely that of a specific service of state security agencies), attempts to feel out the key elements and the state-policy-intelligence linkage. Perhaps the conclusion which he draws breaks down (or even explodes!) the customary stereotypes, but this is undoubtedly essential in order to obtain the historical facts.

This is the first time an attempt has been made to scientifically analyze this subject, so extraordinary, in the open press. It is no doubt a sort of conspectus for a broader publication. What is more important is the fact that the restructuring processes have made it possible for us to turn over yet another page in Soviet history, to read what was until quite recently—figuratively and literally—stamped "Top Secret."

And so, did state security intelligence agencies accomplish their mission on the eve of the war with fascism? How effectively did their people operate? The author is not afraid to raise these questions. And to answer them.—Special PRAVDA correspondent A. Chernenko

Retrospect

We all know V.I. Lenin's statement that any revolution is only worth something if it is capable of defending itself....

The VChK [All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage] did not have a section dealing directly with intelligence at first. The subversive activities of the secret services of the imperialist states against the young Soviet Republic, however, forced us to set up a special intelligence service in the VChK at the beginning of the '20s.

The cutting edge of our intelligence was directed against the subversive activities of foreign, anti-Soviet emigre centers during the first 10-15 years. The success in this area was fairly perceptible and is well known.

During the period of Stalin's cult of the personality, however, and particularly in 1937-38, many prominent Soviet intelligence agents, headed by intelligence chief A.Kh. Artuzov, were unlawfully repressed and our contacts with a number of our foreign helpers were severed, as a result of which intelligence operations were reduced to naught in certain areas.

At the end of 1938 the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] CC discussed the state of the intelligence work and took steps to improve it; among other things, sending 200 young Communists with a higher education from among the party, soviet and Komsomol workers into intelligence. After a brief training period these comrades, together with professionally mature Chekists, were able to accomplish a great deal during the period 1939-1941 to place the intelligence work onto a more or less satisfactory footing.

Prior to the war there were many active intelligence agents who succeeded in appropriately establishing themselves in the main imperialist states, particularly those which had begun preparing for a military attack on the Soviet Union, and in their future satellites. In fascist Germany, for example, there were valuable sources of information in the central Gestapo organization, on Goering's staff, in the Abwehr encoding service, in scientific and industrial circles and in Germany's embassy in Moscow; in the military intelligence in Japan; in Mussolini's office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Italy.

On the Eve

The fact that fascist Germany was hatching up aggressive plans against the USSR was known both in our nation and abroad. Soviet state security agencies began to receive specific information on the preparations of the Hitlerites and their allies for war, beginning in 1940. This information was sent to the nation's leadership.

I cite here what I consider to be the most important of this information, received in April-June 1941.

On 10 April 1941 intelligence obtained by agents on the substance of Hitler's talk with the Yugoslav prince, in which Hitler announced that he had decided to launch military operations against the USSR at the end of June 1941 was received and reported to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov.

On 22 April 1941 a report was received and sent "upstairs" on reliable statements by Baron Rammengen, representative in Romania of Hitler's headquarters, which indicated that extensive military preparations were underway in Romania for a war against the USSR, and many German troops had been concentrated on the Romanian-Soviet border.

On 5 May 1941 information obtained by agents was received indicating that "the Hitlerites are openly making military preparations in Warsaw and on the territory of Poland, and German officers and generals are completely openly talking about an impending war between Germany and the Soviet Union as a decision already made. The war is to begin after the spring field work is completed."

On 5 June 1941 a 31 May 1941 telegram to all inspectors of the Romanian police was reported. It stated the following: "According to orders from Gen Ion Antonescu, head of government, take steps to see that all residents of provincial cities with a German population dig special trenches in their yards to serve as self-defense sites in case of aerial bombing, in which case it would be very dangerous to remain in the buildings.... The digging of the trenches must be completed before 15 June 1941."

On 6 June 1941 a report received from Sofia stated that "German troops continue to be removed from Bulgaria and Greece to Romania, toward the Soviet border. Three divisions have passed through Plovdiv in recent days: the 16th Motorized Division and the 24th Division with heavy artillery; the number of one division was not ascertained. The main staff of the German command in the Balkans is being moved from Salonika to Sofia, and Marshal List is going there."

Intelligence was reported to I.V. Stalin that same day that around 4 million German and Romanian soldiers were concentrated on the Soviet-German border. Information obtained by agents was reported to Stalin on 9 June 1941, containing the following: "rumors have spread in Berlin in recent days that relations between Germany and the Soviet Union have been worked out. The Soviet Union will lease the Ukraine to Germany. Stalin will travel to Berlin to meet with Hitler...."

"These rumors," our source, who worked on Goering's staff, commented, "spread by the German Ministry of Propaganda and the higher command element of the German army, are designed to camouflage preparations for the attack and to ensure maximum surprise. An order has been issued at air headquarters to maintain strictest secrecy due to the fact that information on German plans

with respect to the Soviet Union have leaked out.... According to information existing at the German air headquarters, all preparatory military activities, including the compilation of maps of the locations of Soviet airfields and the concentration of German aircraft at airfields near the border, must be completed by mid-June 1941....

According to air force Maj Hertz, all chiefs of airfields in the Government-General (Poland—A.B.) and in East Prussia were issued the assignment to prepare to receive aircraft. A large airfield was hastily built at Istenburg....

The future administration was set up for occupied (so stated in the text of the report—A.B.) territories of the USSR, headed by Rosenberg.... A special agency with the title "Special-Purpose Management Organization" was being formed with approximately 2,000 German managers, industrial figures and specialists in various branches of industry to manage occupied territories of the Soviet Union. As of 5 June 1941 all of them were registered for military service and received the rank of military-management advisors equivalent to the rank of army major."

...Three reports were sent to I.V. Stalin and B.M. Molotov on 9, 11 and 13 June, which reported in detail, almost stenographically, on a session of the Finnish government which discussed entering the war against the USSR on the side of Germany and set forth various viewpoints of members of the government and the Finnish army's command element on the adoption of this extraordinary decision.

It was also reported that a German division had arrived in Finland from Norway and that a German transport had arrived at Abo on 9 June, delivering approximately 1,500 soldiers and 40-50 motor vehicles for the motorized infantry. All of this was sent toward Tammerfors. Three German divisions in all had arrived in Finland, and around two German divisions were waiting to be loaded at Stettin. At the Germans' demand partial mobilization was begun in Finland, and all mobilized personnel were sent to the eastern border.

On 12 June 1941 reports were delivered from agents in Berlin stating the following: "Leading circles in the German air ministry and air headquarters assert that the matter of Germany's attack on the Soviet Union has been decided once and for all. It is not known whether any demands will be made of the Soviet Union, and we should therefore consider the possibility of a surprise attack. Goering's main headquarters is being transferred from Berlin, presumably to Romania. Goering is to arrive there on 18 June."

It was further reported that, according to documents passing through the source's hands, it was apparent that Murmansk, the Murmansk Railway, Vilno, Belostok and Kishinev were to be the initial targets of the main German air attack, followed by aircraft plants in Moscow, ports on the Baltic Sea and other cities.

That same day the USSR state security leadership reported to I.V. Stalin on constant violations of the Soviet border by the fascists. Germany violated the border with aircraft 185 times between October 1940 and 10 June 1941, including 91 times in May and the first 10 days of June alone. The aircraft flew up to 100 or more kilometers into our territory in a number of cases. A total of 2,080 violators were apprehended on the border with Germany between 1 January and 10 June 1941, 183 of which were exposed as German agents dropped into our territory to gather intelligence.

I would like to make a small digression at this point. During an interrogation of Field Marshal Keitel after fascist Germany was defeated, when asked by a Soviet investigator what, in Keitel's opinion, were the main merits and main shortcomings of German intelligence prior to and during the war, he answered: "The most positive thing was the fact that German intelligence provided a complete and accurate picture of the locations of all Soviet forces in the border districts prior to the beginning of military operations. The main shortcoming was that German intelligence failed to notice the concentration of a large number of Soviet forces at Stalingrad for a powerful strike in November of 1942."

And so, despite an active struggle by Soviet counterintelligence with German agents, according to Keitel, they still succeeded in gathering accurate information on our troops in the border districts.

The Center received the most important information from two of our intelligence groups in Berlin on the evening of 16 July 1941. It was sent to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov as an urgent special report. It contained the following: "All of Germany's military activities to prepare for an armed offensive against the USSR have been completed, and the attack can be expected at any time.... Hungary will take an active part in the military operations on Germany's side. A part of the German aircraft, mainly fighters, are located at Hungarian airfields."

Soviet intelligence agents also succeeded in learning the content of an order for the air force, which assigned the missions for bombing our cities, ports and airfields at the beginning of the war.

One of the Chekists' helpers attended a meeting of representatives of military-industrial circles conducted in Dresden by Rosenberg. Approximately 2,500 people designated to head various departments in occupied Soviet territory took part in it. According to an incoming report, Rosenberg had announced "the Soviet Union must be wiped off the face of the earth." The report gave the names of city mayors designated for Moscow, Peterburg (and not Leningrad), Kiev, Minsk and Tiflis (and not Tbilisi).

From the editors: How many books and films have been produced about the feats of Soviet intelligence agents.... If we thoroughly analyze the matter, however, the actual names of the heroes are still a mystery in most cases. One can count on the fingers of one hand the names of those who became fairly famous. Lev Manovich (Hero of the Soviet Union; died in a concentration camp without revealing his identity), Rikhard Zorge (Hero of the Soviet Union; executed in a Japanese prison)....

Let us explain, however, that all of these were military intelligence workers and not workers with state security agencies. This does not make a great deal of difference to many people: Isn't it all the same? It is all basically a part of Soviet intelligence, after all. That is the point: that the bitterly remembered work of a certain part of the state security workers during the cult of the personality cast—and undeservedly!—a shadow over the intelligence agents who worked in the subsections of this department. Professionals devoted to their work, but what a tragic fate awaited many of them!

How Stalin Reacted

Lt Gen P.M. Fitin, former chief of intelligence for state security, now deceased, told me that the following day after the aforementioned special report was received, at 12:00 on 17 June 1941, Stalin summoned People's Commissariat for State Security Merkulov and Fitin himself. According to him, this is how the meeting went.

"Stalin was alone in his office. When we entered, he immediately turned to me and said: 'Intelligence chief, no need to go over the special report; I have read it carefully. Tell me the sources of the report, where they work, their reliability and how they are able to obtain such secret information.' I told him in detail about the sources of the information. Stalin paced the office and asked various clarifying questions, which I answered. He paced the room a long time, smoking his pipe and pondering something, while Merkulov and I stood near the door. He then turned to me and said: 'Intelligence chief, there are no Germans who can be trusted except Wilhelm Pieck. Is that clear?' I answered: 'Yes, Comrade Stalin.' He then told me: 'Go and verify everything. Recheck the information and report to me.'"

I asked P.M. Fitin: "What did you make of Stalin's statement that no Germans can be trusted except Wilhelm Pieck? Have there been other reports from W. Pieck or what?" Fitin answered: "No, he meant that your sources are not Communists, after all, but members of a fascist party, Wehrmacht officers, and it could therefore be disinformation." Upon arriving at the people's commissariat, we prepared a detailed encoded telegram for Berlin to clear up a number of questions. There was no answer, however. The war had begun.

A study of reports from state security agents to I.V. Stalin and other leaders of the Soviet Union in 1941 shows that the intelligence service fulfilled its historic

duty to the homeland; it did not overlook fascist Germany's direct preparations for war against the USSR and promptly informed the Soviet Government of this. The reports showed that the fascists were engaged in all-around preparations for a war against the USSR and would unleash it within the immediate future. We did not discover a single document in the archives of the USSR KGB for the first half of 1941 which indicated any degree of doubt about the credibility of this information.

I shall permit myself to express the personal opinion that when critical situations were coming to a head, as was the case with the preparations for aggression against the USSR, it was obviously impossible to limit oneself to reports in the form of specific information on the matter coming in from various nations. It was necessary to prepare a summary with an in-depth analysis of all the factual material and with corresponding conclusions which could be the subject of special consideration by the nation's governing bodies.

P.M. Fitin told me that they prepared such a document but that the USSR People's Commissar for State Security would not sign it, stating that "there, 'at the top,' they know to analyze better than we."

It should be frankly stated that, in my opinion, the leadership of the USSR people's commissariats for state security and defense did not do everything possible to convince Stalin and other national leaders of the inevitability of an imminent confrontation with the Germans. The main culpability for the error in determining the time the war would begin and for the fact that the nation was not turned into an armed camp and not put into a state of complete combat readiness in good time lies with the political leadership of the USSR of that period.

From the editors: Such a categorical assessment will possibly evoke certain objections in a number of readers. The facts clearly indicate, however, that underestimation of the intelligence information did occur. Unique reports from our intelligence agents were ignored, and statements by defectors were not subjected to proper political analysis....

It is difficult to judge today what guided I.V. Stalin in receiving with such skepticism the great volume of extraordinarily alarming information. It would probably be incorrect to ascribe to him absolute political (particularly military-political) nearsightedness.... The motives were more stratified and multifaceted, of course, than they would appear to today's reader. The fact remains, however, that the information obtained by state security agents, like that obtained by military intelligence workers, was of paramount importance, but political considerations devaluated it.

During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 the main mission assigned to Soviet intelligence agencies was that of revealing the strategic military plans of fascist Germany and its allies and promptly reporting them to the

State Defense Committee and the Red Army's command element. I shall discuss what was in my view the most important information obtained by USSR state security agencies and reported to the USSR GKO [State Defense Committee] and the Red Army's command element.

In September of 1941 intelligence reported the concentration of large German forces in the area of Yartsevo, Sasonovo and Dukhovshchina, when the Germans were preparing for the important offensive against Moscow begun on 2 October 1941.

Information was gathered in temporarily occupied Belorussian territory in 1941 and reported to the Red Army command element on 35 enemy airfields and landing sites, on 21 bases and an artillery depot in the areas of Baranovichi, Minsk, Borisov, Orsha, Pinsk, Bobruysk and other locations, and on 12 headquarters of German units.

Following the routing of German fascist forces at Moscow, the question of revealing fascist Germany's strategic military plans for the summer of 1942 became highly important.

Germany's supreme high command assigned its forces the mission for 1942 of capturing the southern part of our nation, cutting off the center from Caucasus oil and, failing that, developing the front toward the north, toward Moscow. In order to conceal the axis of the main thrust in the summer campaign of 1942 the Germans worked out a special disinformation directive, "Kremlin," and issued on the basis of it the "Order on the Offensive Against Moscow," which was signed on 29 May 1942 by Field Marshal Kluge, commander of Army Group Center. There was feigned aerial photography of the Moscow area, and the plans of Moscow and other cities on the route to Moscow were reproduced and distributed all the way down to the regiments.

Despite all of the enemy's disinformation activities, the Chekists succeeded in revealing the Germans' true intentions and correctly determining that the southern part of our nation would be the main sector of the attack in the summer of 1942. This information was repeatedly reported to the USSR State Defense Committee (on 17 January, 17 and 23 March, 4, 8, 10 and 16 April, and 7 June). The reports indicated not just the axis of the main thrust, but also the size of the forces activated for the offensive.

From the editors: Col Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, legendary Soviet intelligence agent, had an extraordinarily broad range of talents: he drew beautifully (among other things, he produced a beautiful design for a book about the Chekists), studied mathematics seriously.... Even in prison he constantly kept his brain busy to prevent it from atrophying, because intelligence is not merely a profession; it is a professional way of life, in which there are no vacations or breaks.... Even given all the "artistic assets" of his multifaceted personality, he placed the ability to

analyze dispassionately a fact, an aggregate of facts, a combination of such aggregates... among the dominant features of the intelligence agent's profession. Whether officials at this or that intelligence "level" possessed this capacity was another matter.

The war experience showed—and this is confirmed in the memoirs of renowned regimental, front, army and corps commanders—that the extreme situation, with the life or death of the homeland, its fate, at stake, rapidly raised professionalism above circumstances. The specific weight of intelligence became equal, figuratively speaking, to the specific weight of the iron from which the steel for tanks was smelted. A dilettantish approach to the information gained by intelligence agencies still made itself felt during the war, however....

Just as the Chekists had predicted, the Germans began a large offensive in the south in June of 1942. Ignoring the intelligence information, however, the Red Army command element arrived at the erroneous conclusion that the main German offensive in the summer of 1942 would be against Moscow. The erroneousness of this strategic decision is now acknowledged even in our literature on military history. MSU A.N. Vasilevskiy states in his book "Delen vsey zhizni" [A Lifelong Cause] that the error lay in the fact that "substantiated information provided by our intelligence on preparations for the enemy's main thrust in the south was not taken into account."

Following our victory Stalin was faced with the matter of revealing the Hitlerite command element's strategic plan for the summer of 1943.

In May-June of 1943 a number of reports on preparations for a large German offensive in the area of Kursk were sent to the USSR GKO through USSR state security agencies. On 7 May 1943, for example, the USSR GKO was provided the text of an encoded telegram from the southern group of German forces, dated 25 April 1943 and signed by Field Marshal Weichs, assessing the Soviet forces which would be opposing the German Citadel plan in the area of Kursk. It was clearly apparent from this document that the Germans were preparing for a large offensive operation with this code name on the Kursk-Orlov salient.

On 23 May 1943 it was reported that a reconnaissance and sabotage group of the USSR NKGB [People's Commissariat for State Security] headed by P.G. Lopatin had captured Karl Krug, a German officer from the intelligence section of air force headquarters, Central Front, who was delivered to Moscow. During the interrogation Krug stated that, beginning on 5 April 1943, the Germans would move troops up to the Orlov area, where a large operation would be conducted. Around 1,000 combat aircraft were concentrated on the Central Front. The Central Front's air force headquarters was located at

Orsha. Krug provided detailed information on 32 German airfields on the Central Front (17 in operation and 15 under construction) and on the number of aircraft at each.

On 13 June 1943 the following information was reported: "There is reliable information that the Germans have designated an offensive on the Orlov front on 3 July of this year with up to 40 divisions."

Behind Our Back

Following the routing of the German fascist forces at Orlov and Kursk, when the strategic initiative had been seized from the German command element, many bourgeois figures in the Axis nations began feverishly seeking a way out of the war and establishing contacts with the USA and England in order to conclude a separate peace. In 1943-44 the intelligence service of state security agencies obtained much valuable information on this matter and regularly reported it to the VKP(b) and the USSR GKO. The most important were reports on the triple-stage plan of von Papen, German ambassador to Turkey, who had consulted I. Antonescu in Bucharest and asked him to take the initiative in contacts with the British and Americans, proposing the following:

- first stage: removal of Hitler and his replacement with another member of the fascist party;
- second stage: overthrow of the fascist party by the army;
- third stage: replacement of army office "with a democratic government."

Information was also provided on talks between the German general envoy to Switzerland and the British and between Germany's ambassador to the Vatican, speaking for the military opposition, and New York's Archbishop Spellman and Roosevelt's personal ambassador to the Vatican Taylor.

Other fascist figures entered into talks with the Western nations in the final stage of Hitlerite Germany's existence (1944-1945).

Talks began in October of 1944 between International Red Cross Chairman Burkhard and former member of the Swedish Federal Council (Muzi), on the one side, and Himmler on an exchange of prominent Jews and political figures of the West located in Germany's concentration camps, for a guarantee for 200 prominent Nazis, who could reside in Switzerland and other neutral nations without persecution by the allies. The talks ended with the conclusion of an official agreement on 12 January 1945, but Hitler rejected it.

After that talks were stepped up between Himmler and Ribbentrop and Swedish Red Cross representative Berndtsson, through whom they tried to establish contact with Eisenhower in order to surrender to the West, to the British and Americans, while continuing the war against Soviet forces.

Following Hitler's death a "new" government led by Doenitz sent Himmler's retainer Shellenberg, chief of the 6th (Intelligence) Directorate of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security, as Germany's ambassador to Sweden, assigning him as his main mission, Shellenberg himself subsequently admitted, that of achieving Germany's capitulation only to the Western nations.

In 1944-45 our intelligence obtained information that the fascists were preparing for a struggle in case part of Germany's territory were seized, specifically Himmler's instructions for a "German underground movement."

In the East

During the combat operations with Germany it was very important to ascertain whether Japan would enter the war against the USSR on Germany's side, particularly during the extremely difficult period of 1941-1942. In our homeland's mortal clash with fascism it was highly important to have the correct answer to this question.

During the war more than 20 reports were sent to the USSR GKO on this matter through USSR state security agencies; 15 reports in 1941 and 1942 alone. They described in detail the strategic aspirations of the two main groupings of the Japanese military: the land army and the navy. The former insisted on a war against the USSR; the latter on a war in Southeast Asia, and only after the war there was concluded, the beginning of a war against the USSR.

The German fascist government was making an intensive effort to get Japan to enter the war against the USSR. This question was discussed twice at a session of the Japanese government during that period.

From the editors: The work of Soviet intelligence in the Far East is rightly linked with Zorge, who derived information there, thousands of kilometers from the Nazi Reich, not just on the plans of the Japanese militarists, but also on the most secret plans of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht. (I would mention in passing that his grave, located at a Japanese cemetery, holds the unusual inscription that Rikhard Zorge was not so much an intelligence agent as a fighter for peace among peoples. This is symbolic, because Zorge himself sincerely thought of himself precisely as an internationalist. Humanism and Humanness represented an unshakeable absolute for him.)

It would be naive to assume that the Center could rest easy with only one source of information, even the most prestigious. A fact acquires the status of a fact in intelligence only when it has been confirmed not just once and not just

twice, after all. The author cites below just a few of the reports sent to the Center through state security intelligence agencies. They are unique, however, and their value is indisputable.

On 27 November 1941 Japan's minister of foreign affairs sent an encoded telegram to his ambassador in Berlin, stating the following: "Meet with Hitler and Ribbentrop and explain to them confidentially what our intentions are toward the USA.... Explain to Hitler that the main Japanese effort will be concentrated in the south and we plan to refrain from deliberately undertaking operations in the north."

The timely receipt of information on the Japanese militarists' plans enabled the Red Army's command element to send part of our forces from the Far East to the Moscow front.

On 25 February and 4 March 1942 the nation's leadership was sent information to the effect that Germany had stepped up its pressure to get Japan to enter the war against the USSR in March of 1942, since there was allegedly to be a large offensive by German forces on the Eastern Front at that time, and the grouping of the Japanese military headed by Gen Araki was in favor of meeting the German demands.

On 15 February 1942 there was a meeting of Japanese leading circles headed by Kanoe, which discussed the German demands. Participants in the conference concluded that it was premature to take action against the USSR, that the main operations in the Pacific had to be concluded first. Corresponding instructions were issued to the Japanese army's main staff in accordance with the decision. These and subsequent timely reports on Japan from our intelligence provided a picture of the basic aim of Japanese ruling circles. In 1943-1944 information began to arrive that they were seeking a way to induce us to enter into separate talks with Germany.

The formation of an anti-Hitlerite coalition, the main nations of which were the USSR, the USA and England, was of great historical importance with respect to routing fascist Germany and its allies in World War II.

Agreements on cooperation between our intelligence agencies and those of England and the USA were concluded during those years. The Soviet side actually received no major information from them, however.

At the same time the Soviet Union faced the fairly acute problem of preventing reactionary circles of our allies from coming to an agreement with Hitler and concluding the war with a separate treaty with Germany. Soviet intelligence obtained considerable reliable information on contacts between representatives of Germany and its satellites and certain representatives of the USA and

England, which was promptly reported to the nation's leadership. Some of it has been discussed here. Essentially no such information came from the allies' intelligence agencies, however.

From the editors: And so, we have turned only the first small page—an extremely synoptic one at that—in the history of the intelligence work of USSR state security agencies pertaining to events of the Great Patriotic War. We hope that it will help historians to make additional concrete discoveries in the future—both the amazing biographies of immortal heroism and those fundamental facts without which even the most penetrating look at history still suffers from a certain inaccuracy.

And these discoveries are inevitable, because the history of the great war, inexhaustible in both tragic element and grandness—still contains many highly unexpected facts and secrets.

WWII Alliance Recalled

18010704 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
6 Jun 89 p 3

[Article by V. Pustov under the rubric "History: Dates and Reflections": "The Second Front and Its Lessons"]

[Text] In the history of humanity there have not been any military conflicts as colossal as the Second World War, which carried off more than 50 million human lives. The lessons of this war are so instructive that we still remember the successive events which influenced in various degrees its course and outcome. One such event was the opening of the second front.

Exactly 45 years ago, on 6 June 1944, a major British-American expeditionary force (with the participation of Canadian, French, Czechoslovak and Polish troops) landed on the coast of Normandy (in northwestern France). Several favorable circumstances facilitated the execution of this assault landing operation. At that time the bulk of the forces of Nazi Germany were operating on the Soviet-German front where our troops were leading successful offensive operations. Moreover, the Nazi command expected the British-American force to land in another region—on the coast of the Pas de Calais.

By the end of July the allies succeeded in creating a bridgehead large enough to assemble on it the forces necessary for the execution of subsequent offensive operations. Because the Nazi command had committed several times more divisions to the Soviet-German front than to its western front, an overwhelming superiority of forces determined the ensuing successful advance of the allied troops. Without going into the histories of the separate engagements and battles, we will recall that the allied troops, as a result of a general offensive, emerged on the Elbe River in the western area of Austria and Czechoslovakia, where they linked up with the Soviet forces in spring 1945.

It must be noted that the second front was opened not in 1942, as the allies promised, but almost two years later. That is, when a fundamental turning point in the war had occurred as a result of the Red Army's well-known, brilliant victories. When it became clear that the Soviet Union was able to defeat Nazi Germany once and for all, alone and without the help of the allies.

During the war the Nazi aggressors lost more than 10 million men in battle against the Soviet troops, almost three-fourths of their total losses. This fact alone is convincing evidence that the USSR's contribution to the victory of the anti-Nazi coalition over fascism was decisive, which, of course, in no way detracts from the military valor of the soldiers of the allied armies—of the United

States, the United Kingdom, and France. The Soviet people of the older generation also remember with gratitude the material aid supplied to our country by the allies at that time.

The history of the anti-Nazi coalition should not be forgotten. It convincingly reminds us that states with opposing social and political systems are able to combine their efforts in the struggle against a common enemy and can work together for the resolution of critical problems affecting the interests and fate of humanity. This experience is especially important in our time, when the states participating in the Warsaw Pact and the NATO member states face the tasks of establishing relations on a nonconfrontational basis, combining efforts in the maintenance of a reliable security for their peoples, and eliminating the threat of nuclear and other forms of war.

Western Threat, Danger of War Assessed
18010644 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Apr 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Maksim Ponomarev in the column: "International Affairs Observer Responds to Reader's Letter": "Too Early to Stack Arms"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] There is genuine concern for the security of the Motherland expressed in a letter received from war veteran M. Levin, who resides in Troitsk, Moscow Oblast. He writes:

"It is gratifying, of course, that our Armed Forces are being reduced. However, I am quite concerned over the actions on the part of the other side. As far as I know, the U.S. has not ceased preparing for war against the Soviet Union. As a result, the threat of war remains. At the same time, our policy is such that it enhances the position of American imperialism and unties its hands. Could I be wrong in my thinking?"

The present international situation is extremely contradictory, the same as any other aspect of public affairs, with the external and military policies of countries that are active in the world's arena determined by a multitude of diverse factors. However, if one is to name the main—the dominant—trend of modern times, Mark Isayevich, he would arrive at the inevitable conclusion that the threat of war has recently abated in great part; efforts to put it off have been successful.

On what can this conclusion be based? Is this a case of illusion, an attempt to substitute wishes for reality? Is it possible that the imperialistic sources of aggression and wars no longer exist? They do exist. Nevertheless, the axis of international affairs has shown a noticeable inclination away from confrontation and toward collaboration. The world situation is becoming more stable and predictable. There is difficulty and complexity, but the principle of security through disarmament has come into play.

These processes have become especially noticeable in the last year and a half. Let us recall that the Soviet-American INF Treaty has been signed. I believe that agreement on a convention outlawing and eliminating chemical weapons is nearing completion. Talks are under way to effect agreement between the USSR and the USA relative to a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments, while retaining the ABM Treaty. We see the outlines of a general approach to reduce conventional armed forces in Europe. The agreements have been signed in Geneva and Soviet troops withdrawn from Afghanistan. Noticeable advances have been made in settling a number of old regional disputes. Finally—and most important—these processes are working to produce fundamental changes in the conscience of people, even though past stereotypes are very much in evidence.

I am bringing up all these well-known facts to once more make the point that efforts to put off the threat of war have indeed been successful. In this connection, the security of the USSR for the first time in many years has been strengthened not by military buildup, but by encouraging greater trust in our country; not by incurring greater defense-related expenses, but by applying the principle of maintaining the country's defensive capability at the level of judicious sufficiency and implementation of the Soviet defensive military doctrine.

One of the most important factors contributing to reducing the threat of war is the USSR's belief that words should not be at variance with deeds. A graphic example is the very recently initiated implementation of the decision to effect unilateral reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces. The first subunits and units of Soviet troops have already been withdrawn from the HPR, GDR, and the CSSR. The entire world now sees that the new political thinking is not merely a philosophy we are advancing in international affairs; it is a definite program of actions intended to improve general security. This cannot fail to produce fundamental changes based on principles of trust in relations between countries.

That is so. However, it would be incorrect and dangerous for us to close our eyes to the fact that the threat of war—although diminished—still does exist. For this reason, Mark Isayevich, you do have grounds for concern. I myself cannot understand statements appearing in certain organs of the Soviet press to the effect that it may be time to stack arms, essentially eliminating the USSR Armed Forces as a regular army.

For two military and political unions—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization—continue to exist and confront each other. They both possess powerful armed forces, enormous nuclear potential, and deployed forces that maintain a high state of combat readiness, standing in direct confrontation. This fact alone could serve as an indication that a threat of military conflict exists.

We are also concerned that the United States continues to develop virtually all technical military programs. Work is continuing on the so-called "strategic defense initiative"; the experimental phase of the powerful Alpha chemical laser, intended for use as a space weapon, has just been completed. Also moving along is the Stealth technology, which renders weapons difficult to detect. It is being applied primarily to the creation of new strategic bombers and air-launched cruise missiles, which are first strike weapons. The U.S. refuses not only the imposition of limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles, but also the negotiation of restrictions on naval activity.

In spite of its own admission that nuclear war would be catastrophic and cannot happen, the United States continues to work on adapting nuclear weapons to employment on the battlefield, in a theater of war, and on a

global scale. The U.S. refuses to declare nuclear weapons illegal or even to make the commitment not to be the first to use them; it in many ways exerts pressure on its NATO partners to modernize tactical nuclear weapons and build up their nuclear potential on the European continent.

Indicative of the nature of American military preparations are large-scale maneuvers of their armed forces together with those of the allies known as Autumn Forge in Europe and Team Spirit in the Far East. There is more. In only three months of this year about 800 foreign reconnaissance aircraft "worked" the Soviet borders, necessitating the Air Defense Forces command to scramble fighter aircraft more than 1,000 times.

The facts show that the USA and NATO have not abandoned a policy of force in their attempts to achieve military superiority. This naturally hinders further diminution of tension and stands in the way of eliminating the war threat.

Why is this so? Because there still are people in the West that are unwilling to recognize the principles of the new political thinking. Influential circles in a number of Western countries continue to look at the world from the standpoint of confrontation and military and political opposition. Misconceiving perestroika and the new thinking, they tend to think of them as a threat to their "values."

All this does not permit the Soviet Union, which is undertaking such major and far-reaching steps toward eliminating the threat of war and ridding mankind of the nightmare of nuclear holocaust, to forget that there are as yet no guarantees that the positive processes occurring in the world are irreversible. This leaves its mark on our defense construction. We must assure reliable security for our country and our allies.

This, Mark Isayevich, is a lengthy reply to your letter, which deals with the main—the most fundamental—problem on the minds of everyone: mankind's survival in the nuclear age, and peace and security for all.

Counseling for Vets with 'Post-Trauma Syndrome' Urged

18010589 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Apr 89 p 3

[Letter to the editors by A. Nemeshayev and G. Shtyrlin, members, Afghanistan Veterans for Peace Commission, at the Soviet Peace Committee: "Tomorrow Will Be too Late"]

[Text] For a long time we could not decide whether or not to raise this question; we have enough problems as it is. Nonetheless, we realized that we could no longer remain silent. This is not something that involves merely hundreds of young men; it is a matter of concern to thousands of youths who are not yet 20 years old. We have no idea of who will respond to this letter and in what manner the response may come. We are simply sending out an SOS signal. We must do this. Today. Tomorrow will be too late.

The problem pertains to the so-called post-trauma syndrome, which is experienced by many veterans of the war in Afghanistan. If one is to paraphrase this medical term, this is a "person's delayed reaction to a stressful situation."

The problem was first mentioned five years after the end of the U.S. war in Vietnam. Many Vietnam veterans were suffering nervous breakdowns for unknown reasons. They were seeking refuge in alcohol and drugs, and there was a sharp increase in the suicide rate. In addition, the veterans were haunted by "memories of the war." They had visions of being surrounded by the enemy, and on the streets of their own cities they would arm themselves with weapons to "make war."

American statistics furnish much food for thought. In the war in Vietnam the U.S. lost 56,000 men, while after the war 129,000 men died as a result of stress and suicide. That is in excess of twice the number killed in action! Another figure arrived at by American veterans indicates that 95 percent of men who saw combat are in need of psychological treatment.

We anticipate a question: Is it proper to compare the "Afghans" and Vietnam veterans? There the war was one of military conquest, while our boys were fulfilling

their international obligation. There can be no doubt that there are no grounds to do so, and we have no intention of comparing the war in Afghanistan with that of Vietnam.

We are interested in another question: How is a man affected by a war he is fighting in a foreign land, while back home the people continue to live a normal life? It makes no difference who this is—an American, Russian, Frenchman—the consequences are quite similar.

A military patriotic association in Moscow received a phone call from a young man: "What am I to do? My girl friend, whom I have known since before induction into the Army, refuses to see me. She told me that I am a murderer—that my hands are bloodied." It is good that he knew our phone number and that the call was answered by a former "Afghan." We do not know if the discussion helped him, but we are sure that he would have been much worse off if he had not called. The point is that there are quite a few of them—veterans of Afghanistan—who have suffered nervous breakdowns, since they could bear it no longer. They have taken to drink and using drugs; there also have been cases of suicide. We must not close our eyes to this, continuing to paint pictures of them all as heroes.

We must start today to shout loudly and clearly to make it known that we need a system of organized psychological treatment for people who have returned from the war to peacetime living. And this is not only a war problem. Similar problems can arise in peacetime—as a result of violent acts of nature and accidents. These are occasions when stress tends to build up and after a time threatens to bring on breakdowns and tragedies.

American veterans visiting us this past fall brought with them special computer programs designed to relieve stress-induced conditions. They sought like-minded psychologists, but they found none. In this area of our medical science there is a blank spot, which must be filled immediately, not several years after data are collected and processed. Why can't we initiate this work by having a look at the bitter experience of the Vietnam veterans?

Finally, we are certain that this problem must be resolved on a state—not a personal—basis. This must be approached as an official matter, since most people cannot afford to hire the services of cooperatives and private practitioners. This is not the kind of "services" for which the boys should pay. They have long since paid with their lives, health, and nerves. The time has come to pay them back.

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